The Nature of Temptation and its Role in the Development of Moral Virtue by Snider, Kevin
THE NATURE OF TEMPTATION AND ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 











A Thesis submitted to Middlesex University in partial fulfillment of the 























Kevin Bentley Snider, “The Nature of Temptation and Its Role in the Development of 
Moral Virtue: An Exploration in Analytic Moral Theology,” Doctor of Philosophy, 
Middlesex University/London School of Theology, 2020. 
 
In the last 70 years there has been an explosion of philosophical and theological work on 
the nature of virtue and the process of virtue formation. Yet philosophers and theologians 
have paid little attention to the phenomenon of temptation and its role in developing 
virtue. Indeed, little analytic work has been done on the nature of temptation. This study 
aims to fill this gap in moral philosophy and theology by offering an analytic moral 
conception of temptation and explicating its connection to the development of virtue.   
  This project deploys a new iteration of an older methodology of integrating 
philosophy and theology that may now appropriately be called “analytic moral 
theology.” In discerning the nature of temptation and its role in virtue formation, 
theological sources provide foundational guidance. Analytic moral philosophy provides 
illumination, coherence, and conceptual robustness to the theological foundation.  
 The argument developed follows in the footsteps of John Hick’s soul-making 
theodicy by contending that the development of virtue requires a world that permits of 
experiences of temptation. This conclusion is substantiated by a close moral analysis of 
the nature of temptation that builds on key works done in philosophical moral 
psychology, philosophy of action, and philosophical theology. The emerging 
conceptualization of temptation is then compared and contrasted with the closely related 
moral phenomenon of akrasia and weakness of will, and finally interfaced with a neo-
Aristotelian conception of virtue development. In the end, Thomas Aquinas’s 
understanding of infused virtue is employed as a theological test of the thesis and 
conditions the scope of the thesis. In light of this constructive analysis of the nature of 
temptation and its argument for temptation’s role in acquiring moral virtue, this project 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Methodology and 
Objective 
  
1 Introduction: The Project and Methodology of This Study 
“What kind of person will people say you were at your funeral? How will they describe 
the real you, the deep character of who you are?”1 asks David Brooks. His point is not a 
macabre exercise but rather an invitation to reflect on our “eulogy traits” versus our 
“resume traits.” In the language of ethics, Brooks is asking about our moral character, 
whether we are virtuous or vicious. The assumption he makes is that the readers do 
indeed want to have good “eulogy traits” and not merely good “resume traits”—that, in 
fact, we humans want to have excellent moral characters. But how do we get there, what 
do we need in order to become virtuous? What factors need to be in place even to have 
the opportunity to make progress toward well-formed moral virtues? The total answer to 
such questions would be lengthy and complex, filling many volumes and covering many 
factors—such as the moral status of one’s community, an adequate cognitive 
understanding of moral duty, and healthy emotional responses that support moral 
motivation. However, this project specifically focuses on one aspect of the present 
concern over virtue in order to contribute to the larger discussion. The particular aspect 
under study here is temptation and its relation to virtue formation. As we shall see, 
theories differ in various ways over the relation of temptation to virtue formation—that it 
is important to, or necessary to, or even somewhat irrelevant to virtue formation. 
 Historically, the extant theories on the nature of temptation and its exact 
connection (or lack of connection) to virtue formation display strengths and weaknesses, 
as we shall see in Chapter 2. The present project works through those well-known 
theories, explaining what is helpful and what seems mistaken, clarifying key concepts as 
needed, and continuing to construct the argument that a specific experience needs to be 
available to us in order to develop moral virtues. More explicitly, this thesis supports the 
contention that in order for humans to develop the moral virtues, they need an 
environment that is conducive to experiencing temptation, whether or not they actually 
do experience it in any given case. Stated slightly differently, I aim to defend the 
following conditional statement: if human persons are to develop the moral virtues, then 
 
 1 David Brooks, The Road to Character (New York: Random House, 2015), xi-xii.  
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the possibility of temptation is necessary.2 In order to substantiate this claim, I will build 
an account of temptation that is analytically robust—that is well informed by both moral 
philosophy and moral theology. As it turns out, that account of temptation may be argued 
to fit within a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical theory of character formation, an important 
point which I elaborate and defend in Chapter 5, section 6. 
 Temptation is an ubiquitous human experience. Every person knows what it is 
like to want to do something that they also think is problematic for some reason. From 
mundane and seemingly innocuous examples of being tempted to eat one more piece of 
cake to more morally weighty examples of being tempted to cheat on one’s spouse, we 
all experience temptation in varying degrees and for a variety of things. Yet, surely there 
is some difference that is worth careful attention between the temptation to eat cake and 
the temptation to adultery. Indeed, as this thesis progresses, I explicate the philosophical, 
moral, and theological aspects of the nature of temptation in order to provide the 
framework to enhance the attention we will need to give. This careful approach will 
involve situating the technical moral concept of temptation in reference to two important 
loci in moral philosophy and moral theology—namely, akrasia and moral responsibility. 
Doing this will help clarify the notion of temptation and work toward substantiating the 
ultimate claim that the possibility of this experience is necessary for the formation of 
moral virtues, particularly from a neo-Aristotelian conception of virtue formation, which 
has long been a major viewpoint in Christian ethics. This project, then, is a constructive 
work in Christian ethics conducted by utilizing the methodology of analytic moral 
theology. A key aim of this thesis is to offer a creative and substantive analysis of the 
nature of temptation—in interaction with extant alternatives—and to do so through the 
method of analytic moral theology. With this core notion in hand, the argument can then 
be advanced to substantiate the emerging conclusion that an environment permissive of 
this kind of temptation is necessary in order to develop moral virtues.  
 
 2 Throughout this project I will use “person” to mean both “human person” and “agent.” This has 
two reasons. First, I want to distinguish human persons from other non-human persons like angels, 
(possible) aliens, or God. I make no claims as to how or whether non-human persons experience 
temptation. Second, “agency” describes beings with the capacity to act intentionally (Markus Schlosser, 
"Agency," SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2019 edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives 
/win2019/entries/agency/>). As with “person,” agency may describe non-human persons; therefore, in 
order to limit the discussion to humans, every instance of “person” will mean “human person” unless 
otherwise explicitly stated.  
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 In many ways, the logic of John Hick’s Irenaean, “soul-making” theodicy is the 
background framework for the argument of this thesis.3 Indeed, as Hick says, albeit with 
a different aim in mind but fairly appropriable here:  
 
The value-judgment that is implicitly being invoked here is that one who 
has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering 
temptations, and thus rightly making responsible choices in concrete 
situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one 
created ab initio [from the beginning] in a state either of innocence or of 
virtue.4 
 
Hick’s claim here is stronger than my position that develops through this work. Although 
Hick may be correct that having attained moral character by mastering temptations 
makes one virtuous in a rich sense, the implication that one must necessarily experience 
temptation in order to attain this rich moral character can be argued to be too strong. 
Such a strong position goes a step further than the findings I argue for as this study 
progresses, but the inspiration and very general framework comes from Hick. In 
particular, his soul-making theodicy posits that two conditions are necessary for humans 
to reach sainthood or virtue:5 (i) free will (sainthood cannot come by “divine fiat”6) and 
(ii) an environment conducive to authentic moral formation. On Hick’s account, in order 
to become morally (and spiritually) mature persons, human beings need a certain kind of 
world. We do not need a world that is like a pet’s cage or a hedonist’s paradise—
designed to meet every need of survival and comfort.7 Rather, in a world that can allow 
virtue, what is necessary is hardship, suffering, injustice, and even temptation since these 
experiences create moral challenge and can bring forth moral effort.8 As the present 
project develops, increasing substantiation for something in the neighborhood of Hick’s 
claim emerges. Again, it will be a weaker (that is, more qualified) claim than Hick’s 
because I judge the logic and evidence of the case, all things considered, to support the 
 
 3 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2010 [originally, 1977]). 
 4 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 255. 
 5 I take “sainthood” as an abbreviated locution of Hick, who prefers “children of God,” from 
Daniel Speak, The Problem of Evil (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015), 99-102.  
 6 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 255. 
 7 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 257. 
 8 Michael Peterson, Evil and the Christian God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1982), 119; 
Michael L. Peterson, God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 
94. 
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claim, not that temptation is strictly necessary but only that temptation must be possible 
in order for humans to develop the moral virtues. 
 This thesis also bears similarity to Michael Brady’s argument in his recent book 
Suffering and Virtue.9 Brady contends that in order to develop virtues, suffering is 
necessary: “suffering of various kinds is necessary for the cultivation and expression of 
many virtues, both individual and social…”10 He is careful to add that it is not just any 
kind of suffering that develops virtue and that suffering is not sufficient for cultivating 
virtue but that humans need experiences of suffering in order to be virtuous. His account 
also makes generous space for desire in the conception of suffering, and thereby displays 
similarity between his views and those herein (although Brady and I take different views 
on the nature of virtue). While I do not think temptation is suffering, although some 
experiences of temptation may also be experiences of suffering, the structure of the logic 
of Brady’s argument is parallel in this way to the structure of my argument here.  
 Mention here of Hick and Brady is to accent the fact that the argument I construct 
is structurally similar to quite well-known arguments already out there for other 
conclusions. The structure of my argument is parallel to these others, although the 
content of my argument is invested with different claims. Thus, this thesis aims to make 
a constructive contribution to an ongoing conversation about human morality by taking 
seriously certain classes of everyday experiences that are often morally relevant to the 
point under discussion—and it does this using a familiar argument approach and pattern. 
 In the following sections of this introductory chapter I will explicate the operative 
method of the project in order to clearly set up the argument to unfold in subsequent 
chapters as the pertinent evidence and reasoning is evaluated. The nomenclature I used 
for this methodology is “analytic moral theology.” I also then offer a brief outline of the 
chapters in order to describe the shape of the argument and offer a rationale for the 
various ethical loci examined as I look deeply into the nature of temptation and its role in 
virtue formation.  
 
2 What is Analytic Theology? 
Analytic moral theology is a new and developing field that has entered the historied 
landscape of Christian ethics. It finds its impetus and roots in analytic theology, which is 
itself a rather new and developing approach to Christian theology. Both of these 
 
 9 Michael S. Brady, Suffering and Virtue (New York: OUP, 2018). 
 10 Brady, Suffering and Virtue, 3. 
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approaches are characterized by their shared fundamental and distinctive methodology. 
This project is an argument that participates in this developing field by adopting its 
pioneering work of applying philosophical disciplines, tools, and insights to issues in 
moral theology. Grounded as it is in analytic theology, understanding the method of 
analytic moral theology requires knowing the shared methodological commitments with 
analytic theology. This section, then, brings forward the founding pillars of the 
argumentative methodology of the project by exploring the procedural commitments of 
analytic theology. In order to distinguish “analytic moral theology” as a specific 
approach to doing Christian ethics, it needs to be located within a larger theological 
movement: analytic theology.  
 What precisely is analytic theology? Although the question is straight-forward the 
answer, in fact, has not been so obvious or simple. Defining what “philosophical 
theology” or “analytic theology” is has proven to be an uphill task for those theologians 
and philosophers working in the center of this discipline.11 Michael Rea offers this 
definition of analytic theology: it “is a matter of approaching theological topics with the 
ambitions of an analytic philosopher and in a style that conforms to the prescriptions 
distinctive of analytic philosophy.”12 Roughly, following Michael Rea, Oliver Crisp, and 
William Abraham, I define analytic theology (in the grounding trajectory that I set in this 
project) as an approach to systematic theology that is characterized by the tools and input 
of analytic philosophy of religion—such as the aim for conceptual clarity, argumentative 
rigor, and overall coherence.13 Analytic theology, then, is a methodological approach to 
doing systematic theology.14 More needs to be said about analytic theology as a distinct 
 
 11 This is one of Andrew Chignell’s points in his essay “The Two (or Three) Cultures of Analytic 
Theology: A Roundtable,” JAAR 81, no. 3 (September 2013): 569-72. 
 12 Rea, “Analytic Theology: Précis,” JAAR 81, no. 3 (September 2013): 575. Rea is not concerned 
to make the distinctions that I have here; indeed, he would rather such distinctions between analytic 
theology and philosophy of religion be blurred rather than made more distinct. He is committed to the idea 
that analytic philosophy of religion is a legitimate form of theology (“Analytic Theology,” 576).  
 13 Max Baker-Hytch distinguished ‘analytic philosophy of religion,’ as a subspecies of analytic 
philosophy, from other approaches to philosophy by its historical development (which tracks with the 
broader category of analytic philosophy), its subject matter, and its methodology; see “Analytic Theology 
and Analytic Philosophy of Religion: What’s the Difference?” JAT 4 (May 2016): 347-61, DOI: 
https://journals.tdl.org/jat/index.php/jat/article/download/jat.2016-4.120023010007a/302.  
 14 My definition is closely informed by Abraham’s conception: analytic theology is “systematic 
theology attuned to the deployment of the skills, resources, and virtues of analytic philosophy. It is the 
articulation of the central themes of Christian teaching illuminated by the best insights of analytic 
philosophy” (“Systematic Theology as Analytic Theology,” in Analytic Theology: New Essays in the 
Philosophy of Theology, eds. Michael Rea and Oliver C. Crisp [New York: OUP, 2009], 54). And, Oliver 
Crisp’s idea that “analytic theology is about redeploying tools already in service of philosophy to a 
theological end” (“On Analytic Theology,” in Analytic Theology New Essays in the Philosophy of 
Theology, eds. Michael Rea and Oliver Crisp (New York: OUP, 2009), 38). Michael Rea thinks  
Abraham’s (and Crisp’s but for different reasons) definition is too limiting in that some analytic 
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and powerful methodology—and here the purported difference between general 
philosophy of religion and analytic theology comes to the fore. Further exploration will 
also help to locate analytic moral theology in the same vein of analytic theology but also 
distinct from traditional moral philosophy. The following insights that illuminate analytic 
theology will also serve to illuminate analytic moral theology, given their shared 
methodological commitments. 
 
2.1 Analytic Theology and Analytic Philosophy of Religion:  
A Difference of Sourcing 
Analytic theology is different from standard philosophy of religion in that philosophers 
of religion, in general, tackle questions pertaining to religion using reason as the only 
authority; they do not necessarily depend on a given religion’s sacred texts as normative 
or authoritative or assumed to contain some truth that must be readily accepted by the 
philosophical enterprise.15 Additionally, standard philosophy of religion is not 
necessarily Christian since there is Hindu philosophy of religion, Jewish philosophy of 
religion, and so forth—although the large bulk of contemporary philosophy of religion 
publications consists primarily of reflection on the Christian religion per se or its theistic 
components.16 Philosophy of religion is a very broad discipline in that it explores the 
metaphysical framework and epistemology of any given religion in focus.  
 
theologians are not always concerned to connect the topic of discussion to other theological loci, thus, done 
this way, analytic theology need not be systematic theology (“Analytic Theology: Précis,” 576). 
 Oliver Crisp argues that analytic theology is a “means of thinking theologically,” and “a particular 
theological methodology” (“Analytic Theology,” 33). In another essay, Crisp argues that analytic theology 
is rightly considered systematic theology; see “Analytic Theology as Systematic Theology,” Open 
Theology 3 (2017): 156-66. 
 Steven Nemes locates analytic theology as “a species within the genus of philosophical theology;” 
indicating the close relationship but conceptual distinction (“On the Priority of Tradition: An Exercise in 
Analytic Theology,” Open Theology 3 [2017]: 274, DOI 10.1515/opth-2017-0022). There seems to be as 
many opinions about what analytic theology or philosophical theology is as there are those who seek to do 
theology in the vein of analytic philosophy. Some have questioned whether analytic theology needs its own 
category (cf. Eleonore Stump, “The Problem of Evil, Analytic Philosophy, and Narrative,” and Merold 
Westphal, “Hermeneutics and Holiness,” and Sarah Coakley, “Dark Contemplation and Epistemic 
Transformation: The Analytic Theologian Re-Meets Teresa of Ávia,” all in Analytic Theology, ends Rea 
and Crisp).  
 15 Baker-Hytch, “Analytic Theology and Analytic Philosophy of Religion,” 351; see also, Andrew 
Chignell, “‘As Kant Has Shown’: Analytic Theology and the Critical Philosophy,” in Analytic Theology: 
New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, eds. Oliver Crisp and Michael C. Rea (New York: OUP, 2009): 
119. 
 16 This has been the lament of some contemporary philosophers working in philosophy of religion. 
That is to say, some philosophers have recently pressed their colleagues to do more reflection on religions 
other than Christianity; see Charles Taliaferro, “Philosophy of Religion,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta  
(Spring 2019 edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/philosophy-religion/. For a 
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2.1.1 Ecclesial Sourcing: Scripture and Tradition 
Although there is some overlap in topics of interest between philosophy of religion (even 
analytic style philosophy of religion) and analytic philosophical theology, the key 
differentiation regards sourcing. Analytic theology, if it is to be Christian, is committed 
to Christian Scripture as an authoritative and necessary source for doing theology.17 J. 
Aaron Simmons’s view is characteristic of the distinction to be made:  
 
My basic view is that philosophy and theology should be differentiated 
along the lines of divergent epistemic appeals to evidence that is taken as 
immediately legitimate within philosophy and theology, respectively. 
Specifically, theology can and should appeal to evidence that is not 
immediately available to philosophy because it is located within 
determinate communities defined by revelational authorities.18  
 
In this way, analytic theology seeks to be, to a certain extent, more constrained than 
general philosophy of religion.19 Andrew Chignell describes this well:  
 
Philosophy of religion involves arguments about religiously pertinent 
philosophical issues, of course, but these arguments are customarily 
constructed in such a way that, ideally, anyone will be able to feel their 
probative force on the basis of “reason alone.” Analytic theology, by 
contrast, appeals to sources of topics and evidence that go well beyond 
our collective heritage as rational beings with the standard complement of 
cognitive faculties.20 
 
Agreeing with Chignell, Max Baker-Hytch notes three activities that analytic theology 
engages in that, with regard to Scripture, distinguishes it from philosophy of religion: “(i) 
looking to scripture or ecclesial tradition as a source of topics for investigation; (ii) citing 
claims made by scripture or ecclesial tradition in order to try to demonstrate what is 
 
philosophy of religion text, written by a Christian, that takes a broader religious approach see Keith E. 
Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2016).  
 17 Scripture alone is not, however, a sufficient source for analytic theology; which distinguishes it 
from other disciplines in theology, like, perhaps, biblical theology (although even that approach uses 
sources beyond Scripture); see Oliver Crisp, “Reflections on Scripture’s Use in Analytic Theology,” 
contribution to panel discussion of how philosophy informs theology, EPS, November 2017, 
https://henrycenter.tiu.edu/2019/03/reflections-on-scriptures-use-in-analytic-theology/. 
 18 J. Aaron Simmons, “Living in the Existential Margins: Reflections on the Relationship Between 
Philosophy and Theology,” Open Theology 5, no. 1 (2019): 147, https://doi.org/10.1515/opth-2019-0014. 
 19 Rea, “Analytic Theology,” 575. 
 20 Chignell, “‘As Kant Has Shown’,” 119. 
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entailed by Christian theism; (iii) using a claim asserted by scripture or ecclesial tradition 
as a premise in an argument.”21 Of course, even with analytic theology’s distinct 
revelational authority, there are ways of approaching a scriptural epistemic appeal that 
might move it more into the realm of philosophy of religion.22 The point here is not to 
draw hard and fast lines of separation. Indeed, Simmons makes a reasonable point:  
 
I do not care very much about who is “in” or “out” in relation to 
philosophy or theology understood as fixed ontological objects, but rather 
care about what I think ought to guide disciplinary self- description in 
ways that maximize the health of the discourses given where they find 
themselves internal to their contingent social histories and development.23  
 
It is toward the goal of self-description that I point out the clear difference between 
philosophy of religion (even analytic philosophy of religion) and analytic theology—and, 
further, to locate the context of the argument offered in the following chapters. Yet, there 
are two other elements of this sourcing distinction that are pertinent to notice before 
moving forward. That is to say, Scripture is not the only fountainhead of critical 
reflection that marks analytic theology as different in scope from philosophy of religion. 
 To pursue this point, Scripture is not the only fountainhead for critical reflection 
in analytic theology because, first of all, not all theologians accept the idea that Scripture 
as a primary source is a key point of differentiation of analytic theology from 
philosophy. For example, Roman Catholics would disagree with this very Protestant and 
Reformed view, by adding that the teaching Tradition of the church must be considered 
authoritative.24 Although the nature and function of tradition has varied among Catholic 
theologians, it still serves as a much greater voice of authority than is often the case in 
most Protestant theology.25 Indeed, as Steven Nemes sees it, “Of Tradition, Scripture, 
and (analytic) philosophy, the Tradition of the Church has ultimate priority as analytic-
theological source insofar as it reliably mediates the genuine, divinely revealed content 
of Scripture and justifies the utilization of analytic philosophy for theological 
 
 21 Baker-Hytch, “Analytic Theology,” 351.  
 22 This is Baker-Hytch’s analysis. Depending on how the analytic theologian approaches actions 
(i)-(iii), will determine how distinct the theologian’s endeavor is from philosophy of religion. Baker-Hytch 
offers seven possible trajectories (“Analytic Theology,” 354-9). 
 23 Simmons, “Living in the Existential Margins,” 148 (emphasis added).   
 24 Nemes, “On the Priority of Tradition,” 275. 
 25 Walter J. Burghardt, “The Catholic Conception of Tradition in the Light of Modern Theological 
Thought,” CTSA 6 (2012): 42-75. 
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purposes.”26 Ecclesial authority need not have such an informing or norming position in 
philosophy of religion, thus pointing us to further distinction, as described in the next 
point.27  
 
2.1.2 Philosophical Sourcing: Anglophone Analytic Philosophy 
Revelational authorities, whether sacred Scripture or ecclesial tradition, are not the only 
distinctive sources for analytic theology. There is a separation in which bodies of 
scholarly literature are operative between analytic theology and general philosophy of 
religion and these different literatures track with the divergence between analytic 
philosophy and continental philosophy.28 Nemes hints towards this divide when he 
describes analytic theology as contemporary and Anglophone.29 While the analytic 
approach focuses on Modern (15th—late-19th centuries) to Contemporary (late-19th 
century—present) periods, with English publications stemming from the United 
Kingdom and the United States, continental philosophy locates its work in Modern to 
Contemporary stemming from the “continent” of Europe—generally Western Europe, 
especially France and Germany. As Neil Levy points out, “each stream develops 
separately” because “philosophers who belong to each camp read and respond to their 
fellows almost exclusively.”30 Analytic theology, given its pedigree in analytic 
 
 26 Nemes, “On the Priority of Tradition,” 276. 
 27 To be sure, Tradition need not have such a primary role in theology. This, of course, broaches a 
debate in theological method that has seen many participants. For a helpful entry into the conversation 
between Catholic and Reformed thinkers see Michael Horton, “Sola Scriptura: A Dialogue Between 
Michael Horton and Bryan Cross,” Modern Reformation, November/December 2010 (Cross has written a 
further response not published in Modern Reformation; Bryan Cross, “Sola Scriptura: A Dialogue Between 
Michael Horton and Bryan Cross,” Called to Communion: Reformation Meets Rome, 15 November 2010, 
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/11/sola-scriptura-a-dialogue-between-michael-horton-and-
bryan-cross/. The debate is not merely between Catholic and Protestant theologians; there are tough 
biblical questions internal to the sola Scriptura position. See Ben Witherington, “Sola Scriptura and the 
Reformation: But Which Scripture, and What Translation?” JETS 60, no. 4 (Dec 2017): 817-28.   
 28 On the difference between “analytic philosophy” and “continental philosophy,” see: Neil Levy, 
“Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences,” Metaphilosophy 34, no. 3 (April 
2003): 284-304; Dagfinn Føllesdal, “Analytic Philosophy: What It Is and Why Should One Engage in It,” 
in The Rise of Analytic Philosophy, ed. Hans-Johann Glock (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 1-16; Simon 
Critchley, “What is Continental Philosophy,” IJPhSt. 5, no3 (1997): 347-64; David Cooper, “Analytical 
and Continental Philosophy,” PAS 94 (1994): 1-18.  
 29 Nemes, “On the Priority of Tradition,” 274. 
 30 Levy, “Analytic and Continental Philosophy,” 284. Levy is clear that this “divide” is not 
characteristic of all philosophers and that there are philosophers who work in both streams and those who 
are not easily characterized.  
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philosophy, does its work in conversation with that stream of scholarship that is 
primarily in English in both the United Kingdom and the United States.31  
 In summary, a key distinctive of analytic theology is sourcing. On the one hand, 
as a child of Christian theology it takes Christian scriptures and ecclesial tradition as 
informing and authoritative. On the other hand, analytic theology as a child of analytic 
philosophy, appeals to and invests in the philosophical literature that is produced by 
philosophers in the analytic trajectory found, mostly, in both the United Kingdom and 
the United States. With this distinction of sourcing in mind, we can further elucidate the 
operative definition of analytic theology and its hallmarks by exploring the 
methodological ambitions of an analytic philosopher via his or her rhetorical style—
highlighting what Rea calls its distinctive prescriptions—of analytic philosophy.32 Again, 
this explication of analytic theology is also an explication of analytic moral theology and 
this serves to highlight the ordering methodology of this project. 
 
2.2 Analytic Theology as Theological Method 
2.2.1 Methodological Ambitions 
Rea offers two ambitions of analytic philosophy.33 First, an epistemological ambition: 
analytic philosophy seeks to answer the question of how far and wide does our 
epistemology carry us in gaining knowledge about reality; that is, what are the limits and 
scope of human knowing? Second, a practical ambition: analytic philosophy seeks to 
provide explanations for non-scientific phenomena. Applied to Christian theology, the 
two ambitions come to this: to discern the scope and limits of human knowing regarding 
God as informed by Scripture, ecclesial tradition, the body of didactic reflection, and 
God’s self-revelation in Jesus. Clearly much follows from this but it should suffice to say 
that part of the ambition of analytic theology is to identify the human capacity to know 
God and reality in light of God.  
 
 31 There has been some lamenting of this “divide” and offerings of dual sourced work (Levy 
laments the “entrenched” differences and suggests some pathways of overcoming this divide; “Analytic 
and Continental Philosophy”); on this bridge-making approach see J. Aaron Simmons, “On Shared Hopes 
For (Mashup) Philosophy of Religion: A Reply to Trakakis, The Heythrop Journal LV (2014): 691-710; 
and “Prophetic Philosophy of Religion,” Common Ground Journal 12, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 13-23. For 
evidence of Anglophone philosophy’s insular condition see Eric Schwitsgebel, Linus Ta-Lun Huang, 
Andrew Higgins, and Ivan Gonzalez-Cabrera, “The Insularity of Anglophone Philosophy: Quantitative 
Analyses,” PhPa. 47, no. 1 (2018): 21-48; https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2018.1429741.  
 32 Michael C. Rea, “Introduction,” in Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of 
Religion, eds. Oliver Crisp & Michael Rea (New York: OUP, 2009), 5, 7. 
 33 Rea, “Analytic Theology,” 574. 
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2.2.2 Methodological-Rhetorical Style 
Analytic theology would seek to adopt the second ambition by formulating, explaining, 
and clarifying theological, and potentially doctrinal, data. It is in view of this second 
ambition that Rea provides the description of methodological-rhetorical style (or, again, 
“distinctive prescriptions”). 
 There are five prescriptions that Rea offers for analytic rhetorical style: 
(1) Write as if philosophical positions and conclusions can be adequately 
formulated in sentences that can be formalized and logically 
manipulated. 
(2) Prioritize precision, clarity, and logical coherence. 
(3) Avoid substantive (non-decorative) use of metaphor and other tropes 
whose semantic content outstrips their propositional content. 
(4) Work as much as possible with well-understood primitive concepts, 
and concepts that can be analyzed in terms of those. 
(5) Treat conceptual analysis (insofar as it is possible) as a source of 
evidence.34 
 
Analytic theology seeks to import these stylistic-methodological features into doing 
theology and it is by incorporating these that this approach to theology acquires the 
distinctive as “analytic.” It is analytic because, like analytic philosophy, this way of 
doing theology “involves the use of certain tools like logic to make sense of theological 
issues,” and the rhetorical style of analytic theology will “prize intellectual virtues like 
clarity, parsimony of expression, and argumentative rigor” as does analytic philosophy.35 
Crisp accents one aspect of the style of analytic theology that Rea does not—although, 
Rea is not opposed to it; that this methodology seeks to break larger problems down into 
smaller pieces. This follows the analytic philosophical method of analysis “by seeking to 
understand the composition of its subject matter (or concepts of that subject matter) out 
of simple (or simpler) components…the method of seeking to understand a subject 
matter by coming to understand its composition. ”36 To Rea’s five prescriptions, we can 
add a sixth:  
 
 34 Rea, “Analytic Theology,” 574. 
 35 Crisp, “Analytic Theology,” 37-8. 
 36 Guy Longworth, “Analytic Philosophy,” in Key Ideas in Linguistics and the Philosophy of 
Language, ed. Siobhan Chapman and Christopher Routledge (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2009), 
4-5.  
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(6) Dissect concepts into their smaller component parts and analyze each for 
their logical fit into the whole 
 
For example, when working on the problem of three-in-oneness in the Trinity it may 
prove helpful to examine what a “divine person” is, what “essential” versus “accidental” 
attributes are, and what “being” is. All of the smaller parts can then be fit together to 
address the larger problem of consistency. In this process, theology will work much like 
analytic philosophy in the making of clear and precise distinctions.37  
 The rhetorical style features are not simple accoutrements of language but 
actually aim at supporting the second ambition, namely, to provide theological 
explanations that are true or plausibly true. And while analytic theology wants to do this 
with linguistic precision, conceptual clarity, and argumentative rigor, it also seeks to do it 
with consistency and coherence. In this sense, part of the second ambition, conditioned 
by these rhetorical features, is to be sure that theological statements are consistent and 
coherent.38  
 
2.2.3 Methodological Consistency and Coherency 
There are two kinds of coherency sought. The first is a kind of plausibility of veracity, a 
self-coherency (is the proposition minimally self-consistent), and the second is a kind of 
global coherence (does the proposition “hang” with, cohere with other propositions in 
related domains of discourse). Richard Swinburne clarifies what “coherency” means in 
the first sense: “A coherent statement is…one that it makes sense to suppose is true; one 
such that we can conceive of or suppose it and any other statement entailed by it being 
true; one such that we can understand what it would be like for it and any statement 
entailed by it to be true.”39 Harry Gensler’s “coherence principle” gives form to the 
 
 37 On philosophy as the making of clear and precise distinctions see Robert Sokolowski, “The 
Method of Philosophy: Making Distinctions,” RMeta. 51, no. 3 (Mar 1998): 515-32. 
 38 This is not to say that other forms of theology, biblical theology, for example, are not 
committed to being coherent and consistent. Rather, analytic theology with its overt commitment to the use 
of logic and precision gives special place to coherency and consistency.  
 39 Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, rev. ed. (New York: OUP, 1993), 12-13. On 
Swinburne’s view statement and proposition are equivalent. Sometimes philosophers prefer proposition 
over statement as the designators for that which carries the notion that is either true or false. Statements 
come in many forms of which the basic truth claim is the same; for example, “es regnet” and “it is raining” 
are the same proposition in different sentences, or statements. I follow Swinburne’s example and use 
statement and proposition as interchangeable—they both designate the truth claim at the heart of various 
expressions of that claim.   
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second kind of coherence, global-coherence: “Other things being equal, we ought to 
prefer a theory that harmonizes with existing well-established beliefs.”40 
 Coherency, in either plausibility or harmony, does not entail truth, however. That 
is to say that simply because a proposition, or set of propositions, are coherent does not 
automatically mean that it is also true. Swinburne gives an example: “the moon is made 
of green cheese.” Of course, this statement is false but it is not incoherent to suppose that 
it could be true—it is minimally self-consistent. By contrast, a statement that is 
incoherent is one that we cannot even imagine being true because it is either meaningless 
or logically inconsistent. For example, “the color nine is late” is meaningless.41 Numbers 
are neither the kind of things that can be on time nor have color; as abstract objects, they 
are candidates for a wholly different discussion about their unique characteristics. In 
analytic theology we strive to make our theological statements to be coherent, that is 
meaningful, self-consistent, and, therefore, plausible. More than being plausible, analytic 
theology works to both investigate and explicate theology so that it is globally consistent, 
so that it meets Gensler’s coherence principle. In this way, theological propositions 
should “hang together” in a way that is overall consistent. Those propositions that are 
held to be true about God are then also coherent with what is held to be true about human 
destiny, for example. 
 Ultimately, then, what analytic theology purports to be is a way of doing theology 
that takes seriously the tools of analytic philosophy—especially logic, precision, clarity, 
diligent argumentation, consistency and coherency—which when pursued effectively 
allow for better, more adequate assessments of truth, plausibility, and explanatory 
power.42 We might say that the genius of the analytic approach is using these tools to 
break large and complex problems into smaller parts and testing these claims for their 
 
 40 Harry Gensler, Introduction to Logic, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 109. 
 41 Swinburne distinguished between a meaningless statement and an incoherent one because there 
are statements that are incoherent but seem to carry meaning (Coherence of Theism, 14). For example, 
“There is a square root of one.” Unlike my example (which is incoherent and meaningless on Swinburne’s 
conception) this one does make sense and have meaning, but it is also incoherent because it is not even 
possibly true. 
 42 There is potentially a third category of discourse that analytic theology avoids, namely, 
“unclarifiable unclarity” or as Harry Frankfurt put it, “bullshit.” See Harry Frankfurt, “On Bullshit,” The 
Raritan Review 6, no. 2 (1986): 81-100; which has been published in book form, (Princeton, NJ: PUP, 
2005). Randal Rauser brings Frankfurt’s ideas in that essay into dialogue with analytic theology in the 
essay, “Theology as a Bull Session,” in Analytic Theology New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology (op. 
cit.).  
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self-consistency and global-coherence.43 It is against this background and foundation that 
analytic moral theology emerges and engages the project of doing Christian ethics.  
 
3 What is Analytic Moral Theology? 
The avenue of approach I take in the arguments of this project is “analytic moral 
theology.” This way of classifying Christian ethics is rather new to the scene of moral 
theology.44 The phrasing may be new but doing Christian ethics in this vein is not 
altogether new and has a rich expression in Christian moral theology.45 The connection to 
and foundation of analytic theology for this approach to moral theology cannot be 
underestimated and forms one of the reasons for the methodological exposition of the 
general character of analytic theology above. A few further observations clarify the more 
specified method of approach that I employ in the overall project. To be sure, the 
methodological commitments, methodological ambitions (epistemic and practical), and 
methodological stylistic prescriptions of analytic theology remain valid and are 
accommodated to the explicit turn to ethics. Thus, in the first, epistemic, ambition, 
analytic moral theology seeks to answer how far does our naturally and theologically 
informed epistemology carry us in gaining knowledge about morality; and in the second, 
practical ambition, analytic moral theology seeks to provide arguments for, explanations 
for and of Christian moral commitments.  
 
3.1 Sources of Analytic Moral Theology 
Sourcing is much the same as with analytic theology more generally but with more 
specific attention given to moral philosophy and its related disciplines of philosophy of 
 
 43 For Crisp, reason is instrumental in analytic theology (“Analytic Theology,” 41), whereas for 
Rea reason is not merely instrumental, or, at least, that analytic theology per se need not be committed to 
that idea even if some practitioners are (“Analytic Theology,” 576). 
 44 Indeed, as of this revision (Summer 2020) there is only a single book published explicitly 
operating within ‘analytic moral theology’: Michael W. Austin, Humility and Human Flourishing: A Study 
in Analytic Moral Theology (New York: OUP, 2018). Cf., Michael W. Austin, “Analytic Moral Theology 
as Christ-Shaped Philosophy,” EPS, 2012, https://www.epsociety.org/userfiles/art-
Austin%20(AnalyticMoralTheologyAsChrist-Shaped).pdf. 
 45 For example, Kent Dunnington, Humility, Pride, and Christian Virtue Theory, Oxford Studies 
in Analytic Theology (New York: OUP, 2019); Jonathan Kvanvig, Faith and Humility (New York: OUP, 
2018); Grant Macaskill, The New Testament and Intellectual Humility (New York: OUP, 2018); Daniel A. 
Westberg, Renewing Moral Theology: Christian Ethics as Action, Character and Grace (Downers Grove, 
IL: IVP, 2015); William C. Mattison, The Sermon on the Mount and Moral Theology: A Virtue Perspective 
(New York: CUP, 2017); Romanus Cessario, O.P., Introduction to Moral Theology (Washington, DC: 
CUAP, 2001); and the series New Studies in Christian Ethics, ed. Robin Gill (Cambridge: CUP, 1993-
2020). 
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action and moral psychology than general philosophy of religion. The distinctions 
between analytic moral theology and analytic moral philosophy parallel the differences 
between analytic theology and analytic philosophy of religion. The first key distinction 
noticed there, regarding sourcing, remains: analytic moral theology gives authoritative 
and normative space to revelational authority and ecclesial tradition in a way that general 
moral philosophy does not. However, in alignment with analytic moral philosophy, as an 
analytic enterprise, analytic moral theology gives preferential option to those sources in 
the analytic, Anglophone stream of philosophy instead of those in other streams, such as 
continental. None of this suggests a value judgment but merely an attempt to locate 
clearly, and to limit appropriately, the discursive context of the present project.  
 
3.2 Methodological-Rhetorical Style 
Just as analytic theology pulls practical insights from philosophy of religion, so analytic 
moral theology garners methodological practices from moral philosophy. As Michael 
Austin remarks, “Analytic moral theology, then, involves approaching theological topics 
where moral concerns are central with the ambitions of an analytic philosopher, prizing 
particular intellectual virtues, and using the analytic style of discourse.”46 Baker-Hytch’s 
observations on this score are especially pertinent since he more clearly captures key 
elements from moral philosophy’s methods and practice—the analytic style of discourse. 
These, then, are the sorts of methods used in analytic moral philosophy, which will be 
important for this project:  
 
thought experiments and intuition pumps; reasoning by analogy; 
attempting to achieve reflective equilibrium between intuitions and 
theoretical principles; offering analyses in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions; refining analyses and principles by way of 
counterexample (also known as ‘Chisholming’); appealing to theoretical 
devices such as possible worlds and sets…formal languages such as 
predicate logic and modal logic in order both to state arguments with 
precision and to examine the consequences of philosophical theories; 
appealing to explanatory virtues such as simplicity, elegance, and 
explanatory power as a guide to theory-choice; and where appropriate, 
appealing to philosophically relevant portions of well-established 
scientific theories.47 
 
 46 Austin, Humility, 7. 
 47 Baker-Hytch, “Analytic Theology,” 348-9. The allusion above is to Roderick Chisholm, who 
was known for careful but tedious analysis, in which he continued to refine his topic by making small 
alterations (Richard Feldman and Fred Feldman, "Roderick Chisholm,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Fall 
2019 edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/chisholm/. 
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 Arguably, the use of thought experiments and intuitions pump is more prominent 
in moral philosophy, than in philosophy of religion. This will be key to the methodology 
used in this project.48 Thus, in future chapters, some “just so” stories will be employed to 
help explicate and give concrete handles for the theoretical concepts. “Just so” stories are 
particularized case studies designed both to alert one’s moral intuition for analytic 
reflection and to move the argument forward. As in analytic theology, these stories and 
examples do not replace careful, clear, and consistent argumentation but serve to 
elucidate the argument. As Rea says concerning metaphor, these rhetorical devices do 
not supplant the argument and the “semantic content [should not] outstrip the 
propositional content.”49 
 A core reason that case studies take such prominence in moral philosophy is the 
endeavor for reflective equilibrium. The method of reflective equilibrium was first 
described by John Rawls.50  This mode of argument  
 
consists in working back and forth among our considered judgments [and 
intuitions] about particular instances or cases, the principles or rules that 
we believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we 
believe bear on accepting these considered judgments, principles, or rules, 
revising any of these elements wherever necessary in order to achieve an 
acceptable coherence among them.51 
 
My developing argument follows this methodology closely. 
 
 
 48 This is not to suggest that thought experiments are absent in philosophy of religion—far from it 
(e.g., the importance of possible worlds thought experiments to analytic philosophy of religion is hard to 
overstate [see, e.g., Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil [Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. 
Co., 1977]; or the valuable role thought experiments have in the literature on the problem of evil would be 
difficult to miss [see, e.g., Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of 
Suffering [New York: OUP, 2010]). Rather, it is to highlight the seemingly more central role such 
exercises take in moral philosophy (see Georg Brun, “Thought Experiments in Ethics,” in The Routledge 
Companion to Thought Experiments, eds. Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige, and James Robert Brown 
[New York: Routledge, 2018], 195-210). 
 49 Rea, “Analytic Theology,” 574. 
50 Rawls does not claim he is the first to use it. Rather he says he is following in the footsteps of 
Aristotle among others (see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice [Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1971], 20, 48-51). 
51 Norman Daniels, “Reflective Equilibrium,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2020 edition), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/reflective-equilibrium/. 
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3.3 Methodological Consistency and the Conditions for Moral Rationality 
Moreover, the centrality that consistency and coherency have in analytic theology is also 
key to analytic moral theology. In this way, the current project aims to meet Gensler’s 
standards of logicality and consistency in his conditions for moral rationality.52 There are 
four conditions for being rational in one’s moral thinking according to Gensler: (i) 
consistent, (ii) informed, (iii), imaginative, and (iv), as he says, “a few more things.”53 
Indeed, I would suggest that these conditions are necessary conditions for any analytic 
moral theology. That is to say, these four conditions of moral rationality are required to 
be met in order for some ethical examination to qualify as analytic moral theology. A 
closer but brief look at each of these conditions will further illuminate the methodology 
of analytic moral theology. Special applied attention will be given to (i) and (ii) as they 
are more pertinent to the nature of the work done in this thesis. That is, we need not get a 
more substantial explanation of (i) and (ii), as if more words dedicated to explaining the 
concepts is what is needed; rather, the attending will come in the form of conforming the 
argumentation to the demands of these two condition in particular. Thus, the reader 
should expect that the argument is, as a matter of fact, both consistent and informed. 
 Consistency in Gensler’s view ranges over both one’s rationality and one’s living. 
This broad scope incorporates four areas to avoid inconsistency: logicality, ends-means 
consistency, conscientiousness, and impartiality.54 Of these four, the most pertinent to 
this work is logicality.55 Two basic rules typify the analytic demand for logical 
correctness:  (i) “If A and B are logically inconsistent with each other, then don’t 
combine these two: I believe A and I believe B. (ii) If A logically entails B, then don’t 
combine these two: I believe A and I don’t believe B.”56 These rules apply regardless of 
whether we are talking about internal or self-consistency and self-coherence in a concept, 
 
 52 Harry Gensler, Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 
especially chapters 7-9.  
 53 Gensler, Ethics, 97. Gensler offers a formalized logical version of consistency in Harry J. 
Gensler, Symbolic Logic: Classical & Advanced Systems (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1990), 
243-7. 
 54 Gensler, Ethics, 66.  
 55 We violate ends-means consistency when we “(a) have an end, (b) believe that to fulfill this end 
[we] need to carry out certain means, and (c) don’t carry out the means” (Ethics, 69). This particular kind 
of inconsistency will have a special connection to the account of temptation offered—as succumbing to 
temptation is a kind of inconsistency. Conscientiousness is a consistency between, actions, resolutions, 
desires and moral beliefs (Ethics, 69); and like ends-means consistency, the account of temptation that I 
will argue for has particular connection to this kind of consistency. Impartiality is a consistency in moral 
judgment; it is to make like moral evaluations about like actions without undue regard for the individual 
doing the acting (Ethics, 73). Gensler explains, “I violate impartiality if I make conflicting evaluations 
about action that I regard as exactly similar or relevantly similar” (Ibid.) 
 56 Gensler, Ethics, 68. 
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proposition, or argument—or about external consistency and coherence. Thus, for 
analytic moral theology to apply these criteria for logicality would mean probing a 
concept’s internal logical relationship and its logical relationship with other important 
external ethical concepts with which it must comport. In the present study, for example, 
if it turns out under analysis that temptation is essentially about desires and desires arise 
outside a person’s control, and control is a necessary feature of moral responsibility, then 
a view that posits both (a) that temptation is based in desire and desire is outside the 
control of the person and (b) that it is morally culpable would be inconsistent. Thus, the 
view in question would fail Gensler’s requirement and not meet this project’s standards.  
 
3.4 The Methodology of the Current Project 
In summary, then, the modus operandi of this thesis, as a work of analytic moral 
theology, is as follows.  
(a) Methodological sourcing: as a work of moral theology, the argument will be 
informed and guided by theological resources including the Bible and church 
tradition. In terms of Baker-Hytch’s three activities of analytic theology’s use of 
the Bible (2.1.1 above),57 the unfolding argument will: (i) “look to scripture as a 
source of topics for investigation”—temptation is an experience noted 
prominently in the Christian scriptures; for just two very important examples: 
Adam and Eve (Genesis 3.1-7) and Jesus in both his wilderness experience 
(Mark 1.12-13; Matthew 4.1-11; Luke 4.1-13) and his Gethsemane experience 
(Matthew 26.36-46); (ii) “citing claims made by scripture or ecclesial tradition in 
order to try to demonstrate what is entailed by Christian theism”—in this sense, 
the following argument will both philosophically unpack and substantiate the 
coherency of the philosophical assumptions and underpinnings of the Bible’s 
brief testimony on the nature of temptation found in the Letter of James (Chapter 
2, section 2.7.3); and (iii) “using a claim asserted by scripture or ecclesial 
tradition as a premise in an argument”—after briefly exegeting the claims of 
James regarding the nature of temptation, these claims then become one of the 
guiding parameters for the philosophical argumentation such that the argument 
works to both cohere with the biblical claims,  to make philosophical sense of 
 
57 Baker-Hytch, “Analytic Theology,” 351. I am narrowing the scope of Baker-Hytch’s activities 
to the Bible whereas he includes the Christian tradition. I have no objections to these activities also 
applying to church tradition but want to note more specifically how the text of scripture will function in my 
argument.  
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those claims, and to follow the logical implications of those claims (thus, 
demonstrating what is entailed by Christian theism). The greater focus of the 
ensuing argument is not biblical theology but a kind of natural moral theology 
that seeks to be consistent with biblical data. Regarding the use of church 
tradition, two endeavors guide the coming argument: first, to appeal to various 
Christian philosophers and theologians as guides and interlocutors in developing 
the argument; and, second, to be attentive to and note various important 
theological intersections between the philosophical case developed and the 
various loci of systematic theology.58 Furthermore, the Christian tradition will 
serve to test my argument in conversation with Thomas Aquinas (Chapter 5, 
section 6) and the theological loci of Christology (Chapter 5, section 7).  In 
addition, as situated within the stream of analytic moral philosophy, I will take 
seriously content from moral philosophers and particularly those who have done 
relevant work in philosophy of action, philosophical moral psychology, moral 
responsibility, and virtue ethics. In this vein, a methodological assumption 
guides the entire discourse: namely, that important moral concepts must be 
carefully and philosophically analyzed in order to build a consistent and coherent 
theology. Thus, the developing argument builds primarily on analyzing work 
done in moral philosophy in order to construct an account of temptation and 
moral virtue formation that is both consistent and coherent with biblical-
theological data and fertile ground for further theological construction.  
(b) Methodological ambition: this approach aims to meet the first of Rea’s 
ambitions for analytic theology but conditioned for moral theology (and further 
conditioned to the narrow scope of this project); namely, to gain knowledge 
about virtue formation and the nature and of role of temptation in that process. 
Furthermore, what is key to analytic moral theology is the assumption that 
humans have access to moral reality outside of special revelation and that 
humans are capable of veridical deliberation about that moral reality.59 
Moreover, practical questions regarding temptation and virtue formation are not 
 
58 This notation will take place only sparingly in the text body and further in the footnotes (e.g., in 
Chapter 4 regarding temptation, culpability, and a theology of sin [section 3.4] and Chapter 5 regarding 
character formation and the afterlife [section 6]). This is due to the necessary constraints of time/space and 
argumentative focus.  
 59 Thus, analytic moral theology is related to natural theology. Cf., Andrew Chignell and Derek 
Pereboom, “Natural Theology and Natural Religion,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2020 edition), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/natural-theology/. 
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the center of focus in this project. Instead, the work here is more tightly focused 
on a moral theology that is robustly informed by philosophical moral 
psychology, philosophy of action, and virtue ethics. This is not a denial of the 
importance of practical aims but to adequately limit the scope of the project.  
(c) Methodological-rhetorical style: the method pursued involves these key 
stylistic elements: clear and consistent argumentation; clarifying important 
concepts and positions; introducing fine distinctions between important 
concepts; and identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for the concepts 
under study. Furthermore, the method here prioritizes propositional content 
before metaphorical devices or thought experiments/just so stories—and yet uses 
these semantic devices to provide greater clarity and concreteness to the 
unfolding argument. Still further, when appropriate, formal analytic 
philosophical constructions will be used (numbered premises, logical operators, 
etc.). Under the inspiration of Chisholm and others, this will mean adopting as 
our convention numbering key propositions that are subject to analysis and 
argument, such as (1), (2), (3), and so on, and using symbols and variables from 
predicate logic such as ~ (“not”), ∧ (“and”), ∨ (“or”), → (“if…then”), and so on. 
In text enumerations will follow Roman numeral formatting: (i), (ii), (iii), and so 
on. These numerals will never signify propositions in an argument.  
(d) Methodological consistency: evidence offered, conclusions reached, and 
sources consulted will be tested for consistency and coherency. This will be done 
first by working to articulate the argument in a way that is philosophically 
plausible—self-consistent and meaningful. Second, it will be accomplished by 
interfacing evidence and conclusions of the argument with important and 
relevantly related moral and theological data to test for global coherency. 
Together these two aims ensure the project meets Gensler’s first two conditions 
of moral rationality: (i) logical consistency and (ii) informed. This process works 




 There are at least two possible lines of criticism to the foregoing methodological 
commitments.60 The first comes from Sarah Coakley, a systematic theologian and 
philosopher of religion, who is friendly to analytic theology but has worries about 
methodological requirements.61 The second comes from J. Aaron Simmons, postmodern 
philosopher of religion who is adept with and friendly toward analytic philosophy. In a 
recently published article, Simmons argues for a stronger methodological divide between 
the disciplines of theology and philosophy, especially as they are practiced by 
confessional Christians.62 Below I will briefly offer their views as critical objections to 
my own project and then suggest a trajectory of response to each. As will become clear, 
Coakley’s corrective requires that I add a nuance to the methodological commitments 
noted in section 3.4 above. However, Simmons’s potential objection cannot so easily be 
incorporated and therefore needs a more considered rejoinder.  
 Coakley’s worry for analytic theology, which applies equally to analytic moral 
theology, is that those who practice it and those who attempt to delimitate its features 
might create an exclusive “club” with hard boundaries of who is in and who is out. As 
she suggests, “I would gently propose that we do not waste too much time in the 
future…trying to nail down precisely what is, and what is not, ‘analytic theology’…it 
would seem more profitable…to speak of us analytic theologians as a ‘family 
resemblance’ group who share some, but not all, of a range of overlapping and related 
goals and aspirations.”63 Her contention is that it is “pointless to look for one essentialist 
 
60 Thomas McCall offers and responds to six objections to analytic theology that are insightful but 
not narrowed enough to apply to the more focused approach I take here as analytic moral theology (An 
Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology [Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015], 24-35). Perhaps the 
only exception is the criticism that “Analytic theology is an exercise in natural theology” (26). J. Aaron 
Simmons’s potential line of critique captures better this worry because it is more focused and detailed, 
therefore I respond to his rather than McCall’s. 
61 Sarah Coakley, “On Why Analytic Theology Is Not a Club,” JAAR 81, no. 3 (September 2013): 
601-08; and Sarah Coakley, “Dark Contemplation and Epistemic Transformation: The Analytic 
Theologian Re-Meets Teresa of Ávila,” in Analytic Theology: New Essays in Philosophical Theology, eds. 
Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea (New York, OUP, 2009),  280-312.  
62 J. Aaron Simmons, “Prospects for Pentecostal Philosophy: Assessing the Challenges and 
Envisioning the Opportunities,” Pneuma 42 (2020): 175-200. Simmons is speaking specifically to 
“pentecostal philosophy” but he is also making metaphilosophical claims about methodology that 
explicitly address analytic philosophy and theology. This suggests why his argument is pertinent as a 
possible objection to the methodology herein. 
63 Coakley, “On Why Analytic Theology is Not a Club,” 602-3. 
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definition of our project.”64 The reason we ought to avoid any kind of methodological 
gatekeeping is two-fold. First, as a matter of fact, within the work of various analytic 
philosopher-theologians there is a breadth of methodology, not all of which is equally 
coextensive. Second, the division of philosophy into two camps of “analytic” and 
“continental” is historically recent—"a purely twentieth-century phenomenon.”  
The goal according to Coakley, however, is not a forced re-marriage of the 
estranged partners, but to “learn how to understand each other again and to appreciate the 
divergent philosophical emphases that have been spawned in the meantime.”65 This is 
surely laudable, and I take it as a needed refinement and nuance to my methodological 
commitments. Thus, the methodology of the current project, as outlined in section 3.4 
above, is not intended as a litmus test of what any analytic moral theology must be in 
order to be rightly so called. While I do think that any analytic moral theology will have 
a “family resemblance” to some of the commitment noted in this chapter, I must agree 
that the family is quite large and there is room for a variety of appearance and, therefore, 
other iterations of analytic moral theology may leave out or add in various rhetorical 
elements and appeal to sourcing that goes beyond analytic staples; for example, 
Continental, French, or German sources.  
J. Aaron Simmons’s type of objection will not allow for such an easy 
accommodation. Simmons’s argument has some affinity with Coakley’s above in that 
there should be room for methodological diversity within in any particular philosophical 
or theological endeavor. Yet, his contention goes further than Coakley to suggest that 
“Christian philosophy can and…should be more methodologically diverse and may 
become even more compelling when viewed as decidedly philosophical and not simply a 
different mode of philosophical theology.”66 A core problem in certain modes of 
philosophical theology, according to Simmons, is the incorporation of theological 
authorities into the philosophical discourse such that the lines between philosophy and 
theology become very nearly erased.67 From this faulty foundation, this mode of 
philosophical theology then treats every audience as a confessional audience thus 
confusing the needed distinction between the academy and the church. The result here is 
 
64 Coakley, “On Why Analytic Theology is Not a Club,” 603. 
65 Coakley, “On Why Analytic Theology is Not a Club,” 604. 
66 Simmons, ““Prospects for Pentecostal Philosophy,” 178. 
67 Simmons, ““Prospects for Pentecostal Philosophy,” 177; 195-6. 
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that most often theology overtakes philosophy and this can lead to a kind of Christian 
triumphalism and professional estrangement to otherwise friendly interlocutors (for 
example, those philosophers who are not confessionally committed and therefore do not 
share acceptance of theological sources).68 The worry for this project, then, is that 
analytic theology reduces philosophy to theology and does “philosophy” for only one 
audience: “philosophy and theology are more effectively considered together when we 
do not reduce philosophy to theology, but instead allow both to resound as individually 
contributing to the integration of the life of the mind and the life of faith…Far too much 
Christian philosophy is simply confessional theology that appropriates philosophy for its 
own aims.”69 To be fair, Simmons’s is not overtly critiquing analytic theology, his sights 
are elsewhere, but his metaphilosophical and methodological concerns fairly apply to the 
approach I have outlined above, especially in section 3.4.  
There is a legitimate danger in reducing philosophy to theology in any 
philosophical theology project. Further, it is reasonable that such a reduction could 
unnecessarily and inhospitably alienate dialogue partners who are not confessionally 
committed to the theological sourcing. Yet, analytic theology that is committed to 
authoritative grounding in theological sourcing does not necessarily entail reducing 
philosophy to theology and neither does it necessarily entail estrangement even when 
theological sourcing is offered as evidence in non-confessional, academic settings. To be 
sure, one of the endeavors of philosophy is to offer arguments in the hopes that those 
who hear them will be convinced by them and that requires building arguments upon 
premises that are themselves more likely to be accepted than not. To this end, reducing 
philosophy to theology where theological sourcing is not accepted will fail to meet one 
of the endeavors of philosophy. However, philosophers also offer arguments as wholly 
conditional; for example: “assume P; if P, then Q…”70 If P in this putative argument is 
built on theological sourcing, non-Christian philosophers can still analyze whether Q 
follows from P and whether P or Q are self-consistent or globally coherent. And this is 
possible regardless of the truth value of P or whether P is a compelling premise. If that is 
 
68 Simmons, ““Prospects for Pentecostal Philosophy,” 196. 
69 Simmons, ““Prospects for Pentecostal Philosophy,” 196. 
70 Timothy Pawl makes this kind of argument in his book on Christology. He does not defend the 
theological confessions of the councils on the nature of Christ but assumes them and argues for their 
internal coherency (see In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay [New York, OUP, 
2016]). Secular philosopher can assess Pawl’s argument on its merits without necessarily feeling ostracized 
by the theological assumptions. 
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correct, then this suggests that Simmons’s objection need not necessarily apply to either 
the methodology of this project or to the audience of this thesis. That said, in what 
follows, I will utilize theological sourcing—both biblical and theological—in order to 
give both a starting place for the argument and to provide its most general guiding 
parameters. In order to not reduce philosophy to theology, the argument should be able to 
“stand on its own two feet” for those non-Christian philosophers who do not accept 
theological sources as authoritative; and for those Christian philosophers and 
theologians, the argument should resonate and hold consistent with their acceptance of 
theological sources as authoritative (to be sure, without my presuming their immediate 
agreement with my interpretation of those sources). 
The objections can be simplified in this way: first, the methodological 
commitments too quickly and narrowly constraint what it means to do analytic moral 
theology; and second, analytic moral theology, in its use of biblical-theological sources 
as a starting place and argumentative parameter, unduly reduces philosophy to theology 
thus undermining the discipline of philosophy and estranging valuable dialogue partners 
who do not accept the authority of biblical-theological sources. In response, I have 
argued against the first objection by allowing that analytic theology is a methodology of 
“family resemblance”—there is room for a variety methodological expressions and 
commitments and this project is simply one member of the family. Thus, the 
methodology of section 3.4 above is not a litmus test of membership in a parochial club. 
The second objection does not undermine the methodological commitments because 
there is no actual reduction of philosophy to theology since the biblical-theological 
sourcing is vitally informative without being dogmatically or obstinately necessary: non-
Christian philosophers can putatively accept the theological sources and evaluate the 
argument on its philosophical merits. With these worries addressed, I can now turn to 
outlining the coming argument. 
 
4 Outline of the Argument 
To indicate how the initial problem and methodology of this thesis naturally transitions 
to the unfolding investigation, Chapter 2 offers a review of literature on temptation. 
Although in the literature this particular very important moral topic has been addressed 
directly only occasionally, a large number of influential philosophers and theologians 
have made relevant contributions to the problem area, providing an intellectually rich 
body of work that this project engages. Chapter 2 also gives serious consideration to 
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biblical data, utilizing a measure of exegetical theology, because of its influence on 
moral theology. 
 In Chapter 3, I argue for a constructive account of temptation that emerges from 
critical interaction with the extant literature and positions. The central concept of 
temptation that I work with is given the following technical definition: 
 
(T)=def. Temptation is an internal psychic conflict whereby a temptee, TE, desires 
some state of affairs, which state of affairs or the desire for the state of affairs the 
TE judges to be bad, and simultaneously the TE has some other psychic state 
that conflicts with the obtaining of or desire for the bad state of affairs and which 
state is seen as morally superior. 
 
This conception of temptation, (T), trades on important information drawn from my 
review and assessment of the literature and seeks to be consonant with data from 
Scripture. The account I develop, then, is a constructive and corrective synthesis of the 
common (somewhat consensual) threads of thought in this area. 
 The more elaborate account of temptation to follow identifies five necessary 
conditions for (T) with each being examined and defended against potential objections. 
Throughout its treatment, Chapter 3 seeks to be deeply informed by analytic moral 
philosophy and especially philosophical moral psychology and philosophy of action.  
 Chapter 4 takes up the important task of comparing (T) to akrasia or weakness of 
will, which is a closely related experience in moral psychology. That chapter elucidates 
and defends the claim that temptation is not the same as akrasia or weakness of will but 
that the two concepts are tightly connected.  
 The connection between akrasia and moral responsibility was famously 
discussed by Aristotle and has received considerable attention in moral philosophy. 
Thus, Chapter 4 also contextualizes the account of (T) offered by this project in a larger 
historical conversation. This contextualization sets the stage for the Neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethical framework I develop for my account of temptation and moves the project 
toward its main conclusion: that the possibility of temptation is necessary for authentic 
virtue formation to occur. 
 Chapter 5 culminates the project and defends the claim that, in order to inculcate 
moral virtues, temptation must be possible. Put differently, developing virtue requires an 
atmosphere where temptation is a live possibility. In this chapter, I am careful to explain 
why the virtue ethical framework makes most sense of the emerging account of 
temptation as opposed to some other normative ethical framework. Important 
 26 
background orientations are drawn from both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, particularly 
Aristotle’s emphases on rational desire’s role in virtue, his basic conception of virtue and 
how virtues are habituated, and Thomas’s contribution of infused virtue. Interestingly, 
the end result currently would be labeled Neo-Aristotelian, rather than purely 
Aristotelian, because it emanates from the analytic trajectory of moral philosophy and 
theology.  
 Finally, Chapter 6, pulls together the conclusion of my overall argument, 
summarizing the intermediate arguments for important points along the way. The 
mounting argument, then, will be seen to strongly support the thesis that moral virtue 
habituation requires an environment that allows the experience of temptation to arise—
that it is necessary to virtue that temptation be possible. In highlighting this conclusion at 
the end, further avenues of exploration in both moral philosophy and moral theology 
become obvious but lie beyond the scope of this study.
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Chapter 2: Mapping the Concept of Temptation: An 
Appraisal of the Extant Literature 
 
1 Introduction 
Casey is in her third hour of marking end of term papers; grades are due 
tomorrow, and she is nearly finished. She sincerely wants to finish 
marking the last few papers but also would really like to take a break, 
have a glass of wine, and sit with her favorite fiction book. She is torn: the 
papers really need finishing, but the mental break and relaxation are very 
enticing. “I’m tempted to just quit and relax!” she exclaims. 
 
An experience like Casey’s is standard fare for most people. Indeed, it would seem that 
nearly all people have had a sufficiently similar experience. For a phenomenon that is 
ubiquitous, it is odd that there should be a paucity of robust and developed analytical 
philosophical-theological reflection on it, yet this is the status of temptation.1 Something 
that is known to be common in human life deserves careful reflection, but the fact that so 
little has been engaged on temptation readily raises important questions. For example, 
why is temptation universal? Is it a negative or positive factor in human life? When is 
temptation morally significant, as opposed to morally irrelevant? What is its exact role 
from the perspective of moral theory? Do different moral frameworks, which are 
advanced in the extant literature, entail different accounts of temptation? Given the 
relative lack of literature on temptation in relation to morality, what general account of 
morality makes best sense of the experience of temptation? Working through questions 
 
1 Temptation has seen very little treatment in the literatures of analytic moral philosophy and 
moral theology. This is not the case, however, concerning akrasia (weakness of will), which receives 
considerable reflection in philosophical circles. In chapter 3 I investigate the relationship between these 
two concepts. 
The topic of temptation is discussed in psychology and economics. I do not appeal to these 
literatures for two reasons. First, they do not offer any analysis of temptation itself. Even the most cited 
sources do not analytically examine the nature of temptation but seem to work with a standard dictionary 
definition. Second, the aim of these resources is empirical. This data is interesting and useful in 
advertising, marketing, and counseling but not informative for analytic moral accounting. See Y. Trope & 
A. Fishback, “Counteractive Self-Control in Overcoming Temptation,” JPSP 79, no. 4 (200): 493–506, 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.4.493; Roy F. Baumeister, “Yielding to Temptation: Self-Control 
Failure, Impulsive Purchasing, and Consumer Behavior,” JCR 28, no. 4 (March 2002): 670–676, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/338209; Frank Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, “Temptation and Self-Control,” 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 69, no. 6 (December 2003): 1403-1435, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00252; A. Fishbach, R. S. Friedman, and A. W. Kruglanski, “Leading 
Us Not Into Temptation: Momentary allurements elicit overriding goal activation,” JPSP 84, no. 2 (2003): 
296–309, https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.2.296; and Francesca Gino, Maurice E. Schweitzer, and 
Nicole L. Mead, et al., “Unable to Resist Temptation: How Self-Control Depletion Promotes Unethical 
Behavior,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 115, no. 2 (July 2011): 191-203. 
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such as these will be key to our investigation—and the emerging argument for what 
seems the most reasonable and best-supported account of morality in relation to 
temptation will constitute an important contribution to this scholarly area.  
 
1.1 Analytic Methodology and Appraisal of Extant Literature  
The aim of this chapter is to rigorously evaluate how important thinkers have conceived 
of the nature of temptation. Central to the methodology of this project as analytic moral 
theology, is the analytic practice of breaking down complex propositions into their 
constituent parts and subjecting those parts to close philosophical examination for clarity, 
precision, consistency, and coherency.2 While there is not a vast literature attempting to 
make precise the notion of temptation, what there is will inform the account constructed 
in this project. This process of analysis is necessarily careful, attentive, and thorough. It 
involves faithfully and precisely extracting the pertinent components for which previous 
thinkers have argued for and subjecting them to critical examination. On the one hand, 
then, this will require close attention to the details of the ideas proffered by previous 
thinkers. And, on the other hand, it will then involve evaluating those ideas for their 
conceptual clarity, consistency, and coherency. Thus, in what follows I will adopt the 
methodology of “Chisholming” described in Chapter 1, section 3.2—“repeated refining 
analysis and principles by way of counterexamples” including very close attention to the 
words and ideas proposed by the informing thinkers and the use of number propositions.3 
 The current chapter serves two purposes: first, to examine critically the different 
accounts of temptation available. This will prepare for Chapter 3 and the constructive 
development of a distinctively analytic account of temptation that is grounded in, yet 
builds beyond, common agreement with insights from the thinkers below. Second, 
having done this, Chapter 2 will, in conjunction with Chapter 3, prepare the way to make 
the argument of Chapter 4 that the experience of temptation is not the same as akrasia or 
weakness of will but that the two are related. Both the argument and analysis of Chapters 
3 and 4 serve as a creative contribution to the literature of moral philosophy in the area 
of akrasia/weakness of will, which has often assumed the two to be synonymous. This 
will explicitly locate the place of temptation in moral philosophy/theology. Finally, the 
 
2 Guy Longworth, “Analytic Philosophy,” in Key Ideas in Linguistics and the Philosophy of 
Language, ed. Siobhan Chapman and Christopher Routledge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2009), 4-5; Robert Sokolowski, “The Method of Philosophy: Making Distinctions,” RMeta. 51, no. 3 (Mar 
1998): 515-32. 
3 Max Baker-Hytch, “Analytic Theology and Analytic Philosophy of Religion: What’s the 
Difference?” JAT 4 (May 2016): 348. 
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current analysis, coupled with the arguments from Chapters 3 and 4, sets the stage for 
Chapter 5 which develops the culminating argument regarding temptation’s role in virtue 
formation (namely, if human persons are to develop the moral virtues, then the 
possibility of temptation is necessary).  
 
1.2 The Common Definition of Temptation 
What, then, is temptation? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a basic and 
common definition of temptation, is “to test,” or “to try.”4 We should also include the 
idea of enticing or alluring someone with something.5 However, deep analysis reveals the 
complex and sometimes elusive elements of temptation beyond the common definition. 
  
2 Informing Voices 
Toward the goal of doing deep analysis, I will engage seven thinkers who have explicitly 
developed positions on what temptation is: John Owen, J.P. Day, A.T. Nuyen, John 
McKinley Paul M. Hughes, Brian Leftow, and Adam Pelser.6 To be sure, other Christian 
theologians have discussed temptation but not with any attempt to explicate the nature of 
temptation per se; or they have connected temptation to akrasia/weakness of will. Thus, I 
have limited my attention here to those thinkers who have given focused attention to the 
nature of the experience of temptation and I will treat akrasia/weakness of will and its 
relation to temptation in Chapter 4. In what follows I shall examine the philosophical 
nuances of temptation noted by these thinkers, with an eye toward explicating the nature 
of temptation. This foundation will be further augmented and shaped by a consideration 
of the pertinent biblical data on temptation. 
 
 
4 “tempt,” OED, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/198973?rskey=PF9CIV&result=2&is 
advanced=false#eid, accessed 23 August 2015. 
5 “tempt,” Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/tempt, accessed 23 August 
2015. 
6 John Owen, Of Temptation (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, [original 
1658]), PDF version, online: https://ccel.org/ccel/o/owen/temptation/cache/temptation.pdf; J.P. Day, 
“Temptation,” APhQ.30, no. 2 (1993): 175-81; A.T. Nuyen, “The Nature of Temptation,” SJP 35 (1997): 
91-103; John McKinley, Tempted for Us: Theological Models and the Practical Relevance of Christ’s 
Impeccability and Temptation (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009); Paul M. Hughes, “The Logic of 
Temptation,” Philosophia 29 (2002): 89-110; Brian Leftow, “Tempting God,” FPh.. 31, no. 1 (2014): 3-
23; Adam Pelser, “Temptation, Virtue, and the Character of Christ.” FPh 36, no. 1 (January 2019): 81-101.  
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2.1 John Owen’s Of Temptation 
Perhaps one of the earliest attempts to explicate a careful account of temptation comes to 
us from John Owen. A seventeenth-century English Puritan, Owen was a careful 
theologian who taught and administrated at Christ Church, Oxford (1651-59) and wrote a 
number of theological treatises. One of those writings, Of Temptation, includes a brief 
investigation of temptation with a longer treatment on how to prevent and overcome 
temptation. While his account is both short and non-analytic, it is still instructive for 
building a robust description of temptation. It is clear that his aim is not overtly analytic 
moral theology. Although he does seek to clearly elucidate and argue for his points, his 
dominant aims are expository and pastoral. In fact, over half of the text is dedicated to 
exhortation for preventing, enduring, and overcoming temptation.   
 
2.1.1 Testing Versus Temptation 
Owen takes his cue from Christ’s admonition recorded in Matthew’s Gospel: “Watch and 
pray so that you will not fall into temptation” (26.41 NIV). Owen notices that there are 
two ways in which “temptation” can be used—one way that indicates the “general 
nature” of temptation and another that shows its “special nature.”7 He briefly proposes 
the general nature of temptation to be amoral (“things indifferent”) and states that this 
kind is best understood as “to try/test” or, as he says, “to search.”8 God does this kind of 
tempting and we have a duty to “tempt” ourselves in this way, according to Owen.9 This 
brief treatment is followed by his discussion on the special nature of temptation.  
 The special nature of temptation, which occupies most of his attention, has moral 
import—it “denotes any evil.”10 As James 1.13 indicates, Owen argues, this is the type of 
temptation that God does not do. It comes in degrees and two kinds: active and passive.11 
The active special nature of temptation leads to evil and may involve an outside tempter 
or not, or some combination of both.12 The passive special nature of temptation is that 
 
7 Owen, Of Temptation, 7 (all page references are to the PDF version found online: 
https://ccel.org/ccel/o/owen/temptation/cache/temptation.pdf; the PDF notates the pagination of the 1658 
original). 
8 Owen, Temptation, 7. 
9 Owen, Temptation, 8-9. 
10 Owen, Temptation, 9. 
11 Owen, Temptation, 7, 11. 
12 Owen, Temptation, 7, 10. 
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which has evil in it, which he says is the kind of temptation that is understood as 
affliction.  
 
2.1.2 Temptation as Seduction from Obedience to God 
After some introductory comments and clarifications, Owen offers the following 
definition of temptation: 
Temptation, then, in general, is any state, way, or condition that, upon any 
account whatever, hath a force or efficacy to seduce, to draw the mind and 
heart of a man from its obedience, which God requires of him, into any sin, 
in any degree of it whatever.  
In particular, that is a temptation to any man which causes or occasions him 
to sin, or in any thing to go off from his duty, either by bringing evil into 
his heart, or drawing out that evil that is in his heart, or in any way diverting 
him from communion with God, and that constant, equal, universal 
obedience, in matter and manner, that is required of him.13 
 
From this definition, and his later discussion, we can derive insights to build a concept of 
temptation. First, Owen’s account includes both rational and affectional elements, 
described here and elsewhere in his writings as necessarily involving both mental and 
“heart” aspects.14 Second, temptation is a conflict between a seduction (when it comes 
from without) or lust (when it comes from within) and some other moral-theological 
commitment. Third, given his Christian commitments, temptation is cast in explicit 
theological terms (obedience to God)15 and therefore does not have the same general 
scope as the other accounts considered below. Although none of the other authors 
considered in this review reference Owen, there is clear common ground between them, 
and his few basic insights will prove instructive to the account offered in the next 
chapter.  
 
2.1.3 Evaluation of John Owen 
First, Owen does not offer us any explicit argument for his account of temptation, but a 
charitable reading suggests his pathway—which pathway will be instructive for the 
forthcoming account. Of initial importance is Owen’s distinction between testing and 
temptation. Noting that these are both two different experiences in human life and 
 
13 Owen, Of Temptation, 10 (emphasis original). 
14 Owen, Of Temptation, 12, 15, 18, 22, 25, 31, 44, and 53. 
15 Owen, Of Temptation, 10, 11, 17, 30, 31, 34, and 36. 
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different conceptions in Christian scripture is the beginning of precise analysis. In 
agreement with Owen, this point will be noticed again below in Section 2.8 and will 
serve to ground the account argued for in Chapter 3.  
 Second, Owen’s method of examining human experience as a starting point for 
moral reflection is mirrored in and key to contemporary moral philosophy.16 Thus, while 
we might press for more exact articulation of how he gets to his conception of 
temptation, he is operating in a way that is considered a fair method in moral philosophy. 
Even without concerted argumentation, Owen has provided a conceptual framework that 
will factor into the synthetic analysis in Chapter 3. 
 A key problem with Owen’s account is that there is not enough precise 
description of the moral psychology or phenomenology of temptation. As it stands, 
temptation could be any psychological condition or experience so long as the condition 
or experience works towards disobedience. For example: if, under effective hypnosis, 
John Owen is led to curse those who have cursed him (thus, disobeying Jesus’s 
command to “bless those who curse you” [Luke 6.28 NIV; cf. Rom 12.14]), then Owen 
will have succumbed to temptation. This is true because temptation is, according to 
Owen, whatever draws a person’s heart or mind away from obedience to God. Clearly, 
this will give too wide a scope to the definition of temptation and therefore needs more 
refinement. Furthermore, Owen’s definition of temptation has built into it the idea that 
one will succumb, leaving little room for examination of the experience of temptation 
before or without succumbing to it. Of course, I analyze with caution, not 
anachronistically blaming Owen for lacking a type of analysis that simply is not present 
in his historical moment. Yet, helpful as his account is, much more is needed.  
 
2.2 J.P. Day: Temptation is an Immoral, Disguised, and Manipulative Offer 
J.P. Day offers the first serious analytic account of temptation that we find in the 
philosophical literature. As such, it bears careful and close inspection and therefore will 
necessarily be more thorough than the inspection and insights from John Owen. In 
keeping with analytic methodology, I will first extract Day’s relevant conceptions, 
ensuring to take them in their best and fairest iteration, and then evaluate them for 
 
16 On the role of thought experiments, intuition pumps, and experience in moral philosophy see, 
James Robert Brown and Yiftach Fehige, “Thought Experiments,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2019 
edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/thought-experiment/; and Daniel C. Dennett, 
Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 2013). 
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consistency and coherency. Only after knowing what Day is saying can he be seriously 
evaluated in order to determine if his views cohere with our best reflective moral 
frameworks. This method of extraction and examination exemplifies the “reflective 
equilibrium” approach noted in Chapter 1, section 3.2, and is a process that is slow, 
attentive, and careful.17 The points gained by this exegesis and evaluation will serve two 
ends: (i) it will help build the argument for the constructive account of temptation 
(offered in primitive form in Section 3 below and argued for and defended in Chapter 3) 
and (ii) it will set up questions, the answers to which will serve as evidence for the 
ultimate aim of defending the conclusion that the possibility of experiencing temptation 
is necessary in order to develop moral virtue.  
 Day begins by noting the etymological origins of “temptation” in Latin (tentare 
or temptare) which is why the English language suggests the idea of testing and trying. 
However, Day sees this as the older meaning; the more contemporary meaning he 
suggests is, roughly, “to offer-to.”18 According to his construction, temptation is a 
“success verb”: to be tempted to do X entails one did X.19  
 A paradigm example in the New Testament exemplifies the meaning more clearly 
for Day. When Jesus encounters Satan in the wilderness, Satan offers to Jesus universal 
dominion (cf. Matt 4.1-11). For Day, this example highlights the nature of temptation: “a 
tempter (TR) tempts a temptee (TE) by offering TE something which (TR believes) will 
please TE,” but (presumably) TE has reasons against desiring.20 The attentive reader will 
notice several things according to Day: first, strictly speaking Jesus is not tempted since 
the “temptation” was not successful, and second that Satan does more than merely offer 
something to Jesus—Satan also attempts to compel Jesus. Therefore, Day’s conception 
of temptation includes offering and compulsion. In order to be tempted, then, these 
conditions need to be met:  
 (1) TR offers something, X, to TE 
 (2) TR believes X will please TE 
 
17 Norman Daniels, “Reflective Equilibrium,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2020 edition), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/reflective-equilibrium/. 
18 Day, “Temptation,” 175. It is a “rough” definition because, as Day notes, there are some 
important distinctions between temptation and offering. What is interesting about Day’s “contemporary” 
definition of tempting as offering (distinction noted) is that his rendering is not found in any of the major 
dictionaries I consulted (e.g., Merriam-Webster, OED, Cambridge Dictionary (Online), or Macmillan 
Dictionary). It is unclear where Day gets this peculiar definition.   
19 Day, “Temptation,” 176. 
20 Day, “Temptation,” 175-6. 
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 (3) X is immoral 
 (4) TE both desires X and has something against X 
 (5) TE accepts the offer (succumbs to temptation)21 
 
2.2.1 Temptation as a Peculiar Offer 
In defense of his conceptual construction, Day spends the remainder of his essay 
clarifying what “temptation as offer” means. “All tempting involves offering, but not 
conversely,” says Day.22 Thus, temptations are not mere offers but offers of a peculiar 
kind (Day does not use “mere offer;” I add “mere” in order to highlight more clearly the 
difference). He offers a handful of differences between “temptation as offer” and mere 
offers that serve to elucidate his account. The offers fundamental to temptation are 
conditional. In the Jesus example, Satan offers to Jesus political dominion on the 
condition that Jesus turn from God. Mere offers, however, can be unconditional: for 
example, a teaching assistant offering to tutor a student unconditionally. Temptation is 
not only conditional but it is also disguised and manipulation. These two points highlight 
Day’s argument that temptation is always immoral. Since it is always immoral, 
temptation needs to be disguised and the TR has to manipulate the TE. Mere offers, 
however, are not always immoral and certainly are not disguised—how could an offer be 
an offer if it is disguised? Neither, though, are mere offers manipulations and this owes 
to the fact that mere offers are not always immoral, unlike temptations.23 As Day argues, 
in order to get someone to do something that they have an internal conflict with it and 
that it is immoral requires manipulation: attempting to elicit desire in the TE. Thus, on 
Day’s account, temptation involves exploiting weakness in the TE.24 Even more, the TR 
attempts to bring about an automatic, instinctual, non-deliberative reaction to the 
temptation, and, so, compels the TE: “A TR compels [or makes/causes] TE to do X when 
and only when the temptation is irresistible.”25 Mere offerers, however, simply induce 
toward action and elicit deliberative action from the “offeree.” In sum, J.P. Day defines 
temptation as a peculiar kind of “offer-to,” and distinguishes that from mere offering by 
 
21 As described in Chapter 1, section 3.3.4, part of the methodology of this project is using the 
philosophical convention of numbering conditions, premises, and propositions that are under analysis. In 
order to retain clarity, all propositions will be number sequentially and not start anew with a new set. Thus, 
for example, J.P. Day will be (1)-(5), A.T. Nuyen will be (6)-(8), McKinley will be (9)-(12), and so on. 
22 Day, “Temptation,” 176. 
23 Day, “Temptation,” 177. 
24 Day, “Temptation,” 177. 
25 Day, “Temptation,” 177; Day uses “compel,” “make,” and “cause” interchangeably.  
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arguing that temptation is always immoral and involves a condition, deception, 
manipulation, and compulsion (which is not always successful). 
 
2.2.2 Evaluation of J.P. Day’s Temptation as a Peculiar Offer 
Day asserts that “tempt” is a “success-verb” and this means that, when correctly used, 
“tempt” means that the TE has initiated action to obtain X or has obtained X.26 In this 
sense, “temptation” will have to mean “succumbed to temptation.” Yet, this is 
problematic since on this view intuitive cases of temptation will turn out not to be 
temptation at all, if they are resisted.27 For example, Day’s own paradigmatic example, 
Jesus’s wilderness temptation, is not temptation at all—one wonders how it could be 
paradigmatic at all.  Indeed, this would mean that there is no such category as 
“temptation resisted,” rather some other concept is needed to range semantically over 
those experiences. That this runs strongly against intuition is not enough to show that 
Day’s concept is necessarily incoherent but, in the least, it does show that he needs to do 
more arguing rather than merely assert that “tempt” is a “success-verb.”  
 Regarding Day’s definition of temptation as “offering,” it is unclear why this 
notion finds such a key position. This is puzzling for at least two reasons. First, Day 
offers no actual argument that temptation is an offer. He merely begins with the example 
of Jesus’s temptation as a paradigm example (he also passingly mentions the temptation 
of Adam and Eve by the serpent). But this is hardly an argument and, moreover, it is a 
troublesome place to begin because, as I argue below (section 2.6.1), Jesus’s wilderness 
temptation is not paradigmatic for standard and typical human temptation. Second, his 
use of “offer” is puzzling because Day provides no clear similarities between tempting 
and offering. The differentiation does not substantiate how temptation is an offer. Indeed, 
what seems to be essential characteristics of temptation (for example, disguised, 
necessary immorality, and causation) are logical complements of the essential 
characteristics of offering (for example, undisguised, necessarily moral/amoral, non-
coercive). The implicit structure of a single example of temptation seems to be the only 
substantiation that “tempting” and “offering” are similar (and it appears that Day wants 
 
26 Day, “Temptation,” 176. 
27 P.M. Hughes, “Temptation and the Manipulation of Desire,” JVI 33 (1999): 375-6.  
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to say the two are more than merely similar).28 This assumed structure poses a sincere 
problem for coherency. 
 According to Day, temptation has four components: a tempter, a temptee, an 
object of temptation, and some conditional “if…then…” offer. On his construal, 
temptation requires a tempter. One of the necessary conditions for temptation, then, is 
the presence of a tempter. This is not clearly spelled out by Day but given his articulation 
of temptation as offering, the condition that a tempter is necessary is entailed. However, 
this conception of temptation does not have enough scope—it leaves out intuitive cases 
of temptation.29 As A.T. Nuyen argues against Day, there are instances of temptation that 
are simpler than Day’s account allows yet are still legitimate cases of temptation.30 For 
example, a simpler instance would be coming across a dropped wallet and wanting to 
take it for one’s own.31 Here there is a TE (the pedestrian) and an object of temptation 
(the wallet) but neither a tempter nor a conditional. Thus, a tempter is not always needed, 
and, therefore, the presence of a tempter cannot be a necessary condition of temptation; 
and furthermore, the requirement of a conditional is also mistaken. Given this, it is even 
less clear how temptation and offering are similar. To be sure, it is not the case that Day 
is contending that temptation and offering are identical, but he does wish to conclude that 
they are similar in a such a way that one (offering) defines the other (tempting). 
Unfortunately, his essay does not give the reader good reason to accept his definition. In 
this vein perhaps he would be better off replacing “offer” with “entice.” Then it would at 
least be in line with most dictionaries but, more importantly, “entice” could fill the gaps 
left by “offer” and not fall to the criticisms I have outlined. Furthermore, the distinctions 
he does provide raise troubling questions for his novel definition.  
 So far, then, the account of temptation that I develop will have to reject both 
temptation as a success-verb and “temptation as offer” since both have sincere 
conceptual problems and, thus, are incoherent. I argue in the following two sections that 
two of Day’s arguments regarding temptation are also troubled: namely, the immorality 
of temptation and the relation of temptation to compulsion. 
 
28 Paul Hoffman also connects offering to temptation but in a weaker facing. Hoffman says of 
temptation that “at least some temptations are a subclass of offers” (“Aquinas on Threats and 
Temptations,” PacPh. 86, no. 2 (2005): 225.  
29 Hughes, “Temptation and the Manipulation of Desire,” 373.  
30 Nuyen, “Temptation,” 92. 
31 This is an example that Leftow uses in explicating his structure of temptation but does so 
without reference to Day; cf. Leftow, “Tempting God,” 5-7. 
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2.2.3 Temptation is Always Immoral? 
At least twice, Day asserts that all temptation is always immoral.32 My argument here is 
not to question the veracity of Day’s conclusion per se, but to suggest that his argument 
does not have the currency to purchase its conclusion.33  
 There is little indication in Day’s argument that there is a necessary connection 
between immorality and temptation such that temptation is a sufficient condition for 
immorality. To be sure, an assertion that this connection obtains is offered but nothing 
more than this. It is Day’s view that by its very definition temptation is immoral.34 
However, this is considerably odd since he defines temptation as “to offer-to,” and, as he 
notes, an offer is not necessarily immoral. Indeed, if an amoral or permissible offer is 
described as a temptation, this is not “a serious use of ‘tempt.’”35 Ultimately, we may 
agree with Day that temptation is always immoral, however his argument has not given 
us good reason to do so. Were Day to clarify immorality perhaps then the connection 
would be more obvious or acceptable.36 For example, by “immoral” does he simply mean 
bad or impermissible, or does he mean bad and blameworthy? This distinction matters, 
since it is possible that temptation is always immoral but not always blameworthy, a 
broader and more conservative claim. However, he could mean that temptation is both 
always immoral and always blameworthy and this is a narrower, stronger, and much 
more contentious claim.  
 
2.2.4 Temptation and Compulsion 
Conceptual clarity is lacking in Day’s argument for compulsion in temptation. On the 
one hand, Day argues that sometimes a tempter “compels (or makes)” a TE do X.37 But, 
on the other hand, the compulsion of temptation is tied to the arousal of irresistible  
 
32 Day, “Temptation,” 176, 177. 
33 In fact, I will argue that all temptations are morally dubious even if not all temptations are 
morally culpable. See section 2.6.3 below and Chapter 3. For a dissenting view see Hughes, “Temptation 
and the Manipulation of Desire,” 376-9, and Paul M. Hughes, “The Logic of Temptation,” Philosophia 29 
(2002): 89-110. 
34 Nuyen, “Nature of Temptation,” 97-103. 
35 Day, “Temptation,” 177. 
36 Hughes, “Temptation and the Manipulation of Desire,” 376-9. 
37 Day, “Temptation,” 177. 
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desires in the TE.38 Which of the two is the operative force, which compels? In the first 
description it is the tempter but in the second description it is the TE’s desires, which are 
only aroused by the TE themselves. When answering how temptations compel, Day 
offers an answer that is inconsistent with his earlier proposal. This undermines the 
coherency of Day’s argument.  
 J.P. Day’s account of temptation is conceptually troubled and lacks strong 
coherency. For this reason, the view of temptation that I argue for will avoid many of his 
particulars. Yet, one informative aspect of his essay is the nomenclature of “tempter,” 
(TR), “temptee,” (TE), and X as the object of temptation. The use of such variables and 
descriptors will help to articulate a philosophically clear and precise account. Therefore, 
I will utilize this language from Day in the arguments to come. In order to continue to 
explore the necessary components for temptation, I now turn to A.T. Nuyen’s shorter and 
more consistent account. 
 
2.3 A.T. Nuyen: Temptation is an Internal Conflict  
A.T. Nuyen holds that “temptation” is “testing or trying of a person’s character or will.”39 
The correct account of temptation, then, will capture the key element of “the conflict, or 
struggle, taking place within” the one facing temptation.40  How one responds to this 
struggle determines whether one merely faces temptation, and, so resists or passes the 
test, or whether one succumbs to temptation, and, so fails the test and is tempted. There 
is a distinction made between “temptation” and “tempted” in Nuyen that shows the 
somewhat limited nature of J.P. Day’s conception. For Day, temptation is a success-verb 
(its use indicates its having happened, or been successful), however, Nuyen argues that 
temptation is a “try-verb.”41 In this sense, the TR has not succeeded in tempting the TE 
or the TE did not yield to temptation. One immediate advantage of this is that it accords 
more seamlessly with standard usage. On Nuyen’s try-verb idea, Jesus actually 
experiences temptation by Satan but is simply not tempted by Satan. This accords better 
with the text and it does so with our normal use of the word. 
 
 
38 Day, “Temptation,” 178. 
39 Nuyen, “Temptation,” 94. 
40 Nuyen, “Temptation,” 94. 
41 Nuyen, “Temptation,” 92-3. 
 39 
2.3.1 The Structure of Temptation 
Nuyen, builds on Day by offering three categories of persons in temptation: the tempter, 
TR, the temptee, TE, and the tempted, TD—the one who has succumbed to temptation.42 
Nuyen argues that to be a TE at least two conditions must be met, and a third must be 
met for TD. A person is a TE with respect to X, or is tempted to do X, if and only if: 
(6) TE has a desire for X, and 
(7) TE is conscious of the fact that the desire for X conflicts with some 
resolve which TE has made, or with TE’s present mindset; 
(8) [to be tempted] TE resolves to satisfy the desire for X, thus 
consciously giving up the previous resolve to ~X, or modifying the 
mindset that conflicts with X.43  
 Temptation begins with a desire for some object, action, or state of affairs where 
that desire is in conflict with some other aspect of the one being tempted. Jesus’s desire 
for universal dominion is a necessary condition for Satan’s temptation to be an actual 
temptation. Had Jesus not in some capacity wanted universal dominion, then Satan’s 
offer would have fallen on deaf ears. Thus, authentic temptation requires that the TE 
desire X. 
 The conflict in (7) is the hinge on which temptation turns. It is “a special kind of 
conflict.”44 Temptation is the struggle between an existing desire and another desire, 
resolve, or mindset that militates against, does not accord with, or contradicts the first 
desire. “Mindset,” for Nuyen, could be a belief, phobia, preference, attitude or some 
other mental state. Temptation, however, is not just any conflict of desires/mindset. 
Rather, the conflict has to be of such a nature that in succumbing to temptation the 
temptation-desire overturns the conflicting desire, resolve, or mindset. For example, in 
Jesus’s wilderness temptation if Jesus had no resolve to obey God when Satan tempts 
him with universal dominion (in exchange for denying God), then Jesus would not 
actually be facing temptation. Since Jesus does have a resolve to obey and serve God, the 
temptation for universal dominion conflicts with Jesus’s resolve. Further, Nuyen argues, 
this temptation to overturn the occurrent desire/resolve is conscious. 
 
42 A.T. Nuyen, “Temptation,” 91-2; cf., Day, “Temptation,” 175-6. 
43 Nuyen, “Temptation,” 96. 
44 Nuyen, “Temptation,” 95. 
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 The final condition (8) moves the temptee to the tempted and is where temptation 
moves from a try-verb to a success-verb.45 This condition makes clear that it is possible 
to face temptation without succumbing to it and, thus, that there is a more complex 
structure to temptation than Day argues. To have met the requirements of (8), Jesus 
would have had to consciously resolve to fulfill his desire for universal domination. 
Notice, that Nuyen does not say that Jesus would have had to actually carry out, or act 
on, that resolve. To be tempted does not require to have actually acted on the 
overturning-desire, rather all that it requires is the intention to act on X. 
 
2.3.2 Evaluation of A.T. Nuyen 
Nuyen’s account of temptation is clear and helpful. He makes obvious the necessary 
conditions for temptation, yet there is one element that needs further clarification and 
elaboration: namely, what is meant by “resolve”?  
 In order to be tempted, the one facing temptation has a desire for something, X, 
but this desire conflicts with “some resolve” that the one facing temptation has made, or 
with the temptee’s mindset. What precisely is meant by resolve? Nuyen doesn’t tell us. 
The trouble seems to be that “resolve” carries stronger connotations than intention or 
desire.46 That is, “resolve” has the sense of “settled commitment” toward something; 
whereas an intention or desire is a willing toward something but with less settled 
commitment.47 To resolve toward something (object, action, state of affairs) is further 
down the volitional line in terms of strength of commitment than mere intention.48 For 
example, suppose I merely intend not to eat dessert in order to keep up my healthy diet. 
In the way I am using “merely intend” here, this would be a rather weak intention: I 
desire to follow through with my intention not eat dessert. I, we might say, like the idea 
of keeping my diet healthy. Basically, I want to obtain my goal of a healthy diet and 
think not eating dessert is the way to go and thus aim not to eat dessert. This way of 
 
45 Nuyen, “Temptation,” 97. 
46 The OED shows this stronger sense by defining “resolve” as “firm intention,” “determination,” 
and “firmness”/“steadfastness,” http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163732?rskey=Cx0U50&result= 
1&isAdvanc ed=false#eid, accessed 06 July 2016; Richard Holton argues for a stronger notion of 
resolution in “How is Strength of Will Possible?,” in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, ed. 
Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (New York: Clarendon Press, 2003), 39–67. 
47 To be sure, intentions and desires come in degrees and strong desires/intentions no doubt can 
become (or just are) resolutions. Yet, I take it as rather clear that “resolve” is initially a stronger action 
concept than is intention or desire. Cf. Richard Holton, Willing, Wanting, Waiting (New York: OUP, 
2009), 6-11.  
48 Holton, Willing, 6-7. 
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thinking of my intentions has a rather weak sense—I would not be too disappointed in 
not actualizing my intention of not eating dessert. On another account, though, where the 
intention is stronger, I might say, “I resolve not to eat dessert” (in order not to raise my 
blood sugar as a diabetic, say). Here I seem to be making a stronger commitment than 
merely “intending not to.” In the former instance, if someone were to offer baklava, 
perhaps I would partake with only a little internal conflict. In the latter instance, 
however, if someone were to offer baklava, I would partake with more resistance and 
would be more disappointed if I overturned my resolution and partook. All this to say, 
intention is given to degrees, some stronger some weaker, and “to resolve” is a stronger 
degree of intention (stronger than “mere intention” here, at least).  
 In terms of Nuyen’s argument, the issue is the lack of clarity as to what point the 
intention is to the right degree for resolution to be the apt description. In my example 
immediately above, would I not have been tempted in the first iteration? I have a desire 
for baklava, I am aware of my desire for the Turkish delight, that desire conflicts with 
my intention to eat healthy but my intention to eat healthy is weak, half-hearted perhaps. 
Because I have not resolved to eat healthy and abstain from baklava, am I not tempted? 
This is perhaps the position that Nuyen’s argument puts me in. Unless, of course, 
“resolve” means something less strong than it typically does, then I would be tempted. 
What this brings to the fore is the need for more exactness on what “resolve” is to mean 
in Nuyen’s use.  
 The strength of Nuyen’s account is that it offers a (mostly) clear conception of 
temptation that is both plausible and harmonious with other moral intuitions and 
commitments. This suggests that Nuyen’s argument has potential to help inform the 
account of temptation for which I will argue. There are necessary pieces to the puzzle 
that Nuyen does not address and some of these are found in the other authors I consider 
below. The key ingredients that I will garner from Nuyen are the following: temptation is 
an internal conflict that involves desires, resolutions, and “other mental states,” and 
temptation requires conscious awareness. Moreover, his simple structure of necessary 
conditions will form the backbone of my more developed account to come in Chapter 3.  
 
2.4 John McKinley: Temptation is Enticement to Sin 
In his published dissertation, Tempted for Us, John McKinley examines the nature of 
temptation with special reference to the practical value of Jesus’s experiencing it. 
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McKinley’s account, like those above, will help to fill out the evidence garnered for the 
argument I am making regarding temptation. 
 
2.4.1 Conditions of Temptation 
McKinley argues that temptation is “an enticement to sin…it is a pull or draw towards 
evil action;”49 and, temptation is “an internal conflict fomented by both internal and 
external factors.”50 The object of temptation is sinful and need not be merely an action; it 
may also include an intention. Moreover, there is a pathway to the sinful target of 
temptation. Temptation finds impetus in humanity’s freedom and finitude on McKinley’s 
account.51 This freedom coupled with finitude opens space for temptation in two ways. 
On the one hand, temptation is the immoral fulfillment of a legitimate desire; for 
example, the need for food fulfilled through gluttony. On the other hand, temptation may 
stem from corrupt desire; for example, the wantonous desire for wealth. From his brief 
definition we can discern four necessary conditions for temptation:  
 (9) TE has a desire for X 
 (10) TE’s desire, or X, is sinful 
 (11) TE has some internal conflict with either the desire for X, or X 
 (12) TE can obtain X 
 
 First, desire for, or need of, some object: “Temptation seems to require the 
presence of needs or wants;” there must be some kind of appeal in the target of 
temptation to the person experiencing temptation.52 Temptees imaginatively consider the 
prospects of succumbing to the temptation or realizing their desire or need. McKinley 
also argues that those who succumb to temptation do so through some rationalization 
process whereby they believe a lie.53  
 Second, there is an object or target of the person’s desire and this object is sinful. 
Third, McKinley argues that there is some kind of internal conflict but little detail is 
offered regarding the nature or detail of that conflict. Fourth, there needs to be a pathway 
to the target. The implication of this last condition is that where the temptation is not a 
 
 49 McKinley, Tempted, 4, 272. 
 50 McKinley, Tempted, 273. 
 51 McKinley, Tempted, 264. 
 52 McKinley, Tempted, 4. 
 53 McKinley, Tempted, 279. 
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live option, it is not really temptation at all but something else. Perhaps in such cases all 
that happens within the person is an illegitimate or corrupt desire. If there is not a real 
possibility of actualizing X, either because such states of affairs are not possible objects 
of actualization per se, or because there is not a metaphysically possible way for them to 
be actualized, then one of the necessary conditions is missing.  
 
2.4.2 Evaluation of John McKinley 
McKinley’s account is brief and there seems to be two reasons for this. First, he is not 
offering a sustained account of temptation in principle—his account is not a 
philosophical or theological analysis of temptation per se. And, second, the concept 
serves to support a larger argument regarding the practical value of Christ’s temptation. 
Given this second aim, it would strengthen his argument if he offered a more concerted 
analytic investigation of the nature of temptation. In view of its brevity, only a few 
evaluative comments are warranted.  
 Although McKinley notes a distinction between desire/want and affection, he 
does not do much by way of examining this distinction, which would offer further 
robustness to his first criteria for temptation. The key here is whether affections can be 
involved in temptation or only desires. As McKinley has it, affections do not seem to 
play any role. Why they do not do so is left unexplained. What is helpful, though, is the 
distinction between a legitimate desire fulfilled immorally and an immoral desire. This 
adds needed nuance in that it allows for a more fine-grained conception of the nature of 
temptation.  
 Arguing that succumbing to temptation requires rationalization, McKinley is 
treading on what has come to be known as one of Socrates’s paradoxes: no one 
knowingly does evil.54 On McKinley’s explanation, succumbing to temptation requires 
believing a lie, which is to say that the one who acts on temptations does so not out of 
true knowledge. This element further complicates the nature of temptation by closely 
 
 54 For example, Socrates says, “It is clear then that those who do not know things to be bad do not 
desire what is bad, but they desire those things that they believe to be good but that are in fact bad. It 
follows that those who have no knowledge of these things and believe them to be good clearly desire good 
things” (Plato, Meno [77e], trans. GMA Grube, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper 
[Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 1997], 877). See also Protagoras 358c; Gorgias 468c: “For we want 
the things that are good…and we don’t want those that are neither good nor bad, nor those that are bad” (in 
Plato, trans. E.R. Dodds, 812). There are other paradoxes than that which I note here; on those see 
Gerasimos Santas, “The Socratic Paradoxes,” PhR 73, no. 2 (Apr., 1964): 147-64. For a recent exploration 
of the debates surrounding the so-called Socratic Paradoxes see Roslyn Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and 
its Enemies (Chicago: UCP, 2006). 
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relating it to akrasia or weakness of will. Yet, McKinley does not explore this 
connection or engage that larger discussion. His argument could find much support in the 
literature on akrasia/weakness of will. In Chapter 4, section 2, I explore what 
relationship there is between temptation and akrasia or weakness of will. The argument 
of section 2.2, in particular, will fill out the details missing in McKinley’s argument. For 
now, his implicit gesture toward akrasia and succumbed temptation is interesting but 
needs more attention in his argument.  
 The core problem with McKinley’s account of temptation, and this will find 
expression again in engagement with Brian Leftow below, is condition (12): TE can 
obtain X. I will argue in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2, that it is not necessary that there be an 
actual path to obtaining the object of the temptation, or to actualizing the state of affairs, 
for a valid experience of temptation to occur. We can begin to see this line of argument 
by considering an example.  
 Suppose David sees Bathsheba, the wife of another man, bathing and he desires 
to have sex with her; yet he also desires to be obedient to his religious laws that prohibit 
adultery.55 Suppose also that David is not king but is simply a man in the kingdom, thus 
he has no power to facilitate an encounter between himself and Bathsheba. Indeed, he 
does not know who she is, nor will he have opportunity to meet her. Perhaps because he 
has been ordered to battle tomorrow. In this case, David has a desire, which may be 
either legitimate (sex) or immoral (lust)—fulfilling condition (9). This desire conflicts 
internally with at least one other (righteous) desire—obedience to the moral-religious 
law—and there is an object, or state of affairs, that is the target of his desire—fulfilling 
conditions (10) and (11). In this case, all the markers of McKinley’s account are present 
except the last, (12) the path to actualization: David cannot realize his desire. Does David 
not experience temptation simply because he has no pathway to obtaining the sinful state 
of affairs? Even if David knows quite well that he could not actualize his affair with 
Bathsheba, surely he still is tempted. If that is correct, then, contrary to condition (12), 
temptation is possible even without the possibility of obtaining X. McKinley’s final 
condition can be dismissed with no serious loss to his overall account. 
 McKinley’s view of temptation accords well with John Owen’s and A.T. Nuyen’s 
in at least three ways. First, temptation involves psychic attitudes: desire or affections. 
 
 55 The nature of the conflict in McKinley’s approach is often cast in terms of obedience versus 
disobedience (e.g., “Internally, a person faced with temptation must choose according to her beliefs 
between desires that lead to sin and desires that lead to righteousness,” Tempted for Us, 279).  
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Second, temptation is an internal conflict. And, third, temptation has moral weight. A 
solid evidential foundation is emerging for the account of temptation that I constructively 
synthesize and defend in Chapter 3.   
 
2.5 Paul M. Hughes: Temptation  
Paul Hughes’s account of temptation has received no attention by any of the 
contemporary philosophers surveyed here even though he has written three articles 
wrestling with the nature of temptation and related moral issues.56 The details of his view 
is given and defended in “The Logic of Temptation,” and finds much in common with 
previous accounts. However, Hughes consistently disagrees with Day,57 but, even though 
written before Brian Leftow and Adam Pelser (see sections 2.6 and 2.7 below), his 
conception accords well with the other accounts surveyed and evaluated here. Hughes 
argues for a simple yet compelling definition of temptation: “temptation is a 
psychological condition in which someone is disposed toward what he believes is wrong 
or bad…”58 With this as a start, Hughes offers a handful of necessary conditions for 
temptation.  
 
2.5.1 The Necessary Conditions for Temptation 
The psychological condition that is fundamental to temptation is desire.59 Hughes 
contends that while there are other psychological conditions none of them makes better 
sense of our intuitions about temptation than desire. Yet, Hughes argues, not all desires 
are temptation and therefore more precision is needed. The desire, therefore, also has to 
be for something that is believed by the desirer to be morally bad. This makes sense of 
our notions that temptation is morally dubious and comports with standard definitions of 
temptation. But, again, not just any desire taken as bad constitutes temptation. Hughes 
argues: the mere presence of a desire believed to be bad, or for a bad object, is not 
enough to make for desire. Such a view would give “temptation” too much scope. Thus, 
 
 56 Paul M. Hughes, “Temptation, Culpability, and the Criminal Law,” JSP 37, no. 2 (Summer 
2006): 221-32; “The Logic of Temptation,” op. cit.; and “Temptation and Manipulation,” op. cit.  
 57 Hughes’s “Temptation and Manipulation” has no defense of his own account and is instead a 
running critique of Day’s account. 
 58 Hughes, “Logic of Temptation,” 89. This is the same definition in all three articles and since 
this article has the most concerted and robust unpacking defense of this definition, it is the one that I will 
use.  
 59 Hughes, “Logic of Temptation,” 92.  
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temptation has to have an effective desire, one that has motivational strength.60 It is not 
enough to have just any pro-attitude and, according to Hughes, desires are simple pro-
attitudes because desires are not motivations. Desire must couple with motivation and 
become an effective desire in order for temptation to be possible, argues Hughes. Two 
reasons give plausibility to this. First, some person might want or wish or desire 
something bad but have no intention of acting on such pro-attitudes. It is difficult to see, 
Hughes contends, that such cases count as temptation since no action, which he construes 
very broadly (mental or physical), would be forthcoming. Second, allowing that just any 
pro-attitude would count as possible temptation, again, broadens the scope of temptation 
too widely, turning obvious cases of non-tempting desire into temptation. One further 
element is necessary, Hughes argues: moral vacillation, or conflict with some “negative 
evaluative attitude” toward the effective desire, or object of desire.61 To experience 
temptation, then, requires the following necessary conditions:  
(13) TE effectively desires X 
(14) TE believes that X, or the desire for X, is morally bad 
(15) TE has a negative evaluative attitude that conflicts with X, or the desire for 
X 
 
2.5.2 Evaluation of Paul Hughes 
Paul Hughes’s argument has a host of strengths. First, Hughes offers the only defense of 
why focusing on the experience of the temptee is logically prior and therefore more 
fundamental to an account of temptation than focus on a tempter. Second, while many 
others assume that desire is fundamental, Hughes offers a rationale for this intuition. 
Temptation is a psychological condition and therefore any account of temptation will 
need to identify the psychic states involved. This offers needed rational evidence to the 
standard starting place for desire-based accounts of temptation. Third, and finally, 
Hughes offers an argument for why the temptee only needs to believe that the desire for 
X is bad rather than know that it is bad. Making the epistemic condition as strong as 
knowledge has two problematic implications, Hughes contends. First it raises the 
epistemic standard too high given that knowledge requires both justification and true 
belief. Moreover, knowing rather than believing would also require a temptee to have a 
moral scope of knowledge that is unreasonable. Both of these lead to the second reason 
 
 60 Hughes, “Logic of Temptation,” 93-4. Hughes is adopting “effective desire” from Harry 
Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” JPh 68, no. 1 (January 1971): 5-20.  
 61 Hughes, “Logic of Temptation,” 93.  
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why belief is more apt than knowledge: it keeps the scope of temptation reasonable. If 
knowledge is the standard for condition (2), TE [knows] that X…is bad, then many 
intuitive cases of temptation are no longer temptation because the high standard of 
knowledge is not met.  
 The first condition, “TE effectively desires X,” and its ranging rationale invites 
analytic critique. Hughes does not delineate what his operative theory of desire is and 
this undermines the precision of his account. What is clear, however, is that Hughes’s 
theory of desire is not action-based, which is the view of desire as “to be disposed to act 
to bring about what is desired.”62 Of course, there are many theories available, but the 
action-based theory is the most widely held view among philosophers of action.63 Thus, 
when Hughes divorces desire from motivation some justification is needed, even if it is 
by way of simple appeal to another theory of desire. At best, he could hold to a pleasure-
based theory of desire since the desire for X in Hughes’s account also includes, but not 
necessarily, “anticipatory delight.”64 The “not necessarily” qualifier, however, leaves the 
account of desire less precise and unclear. Ultimately, Hughes’s account needs a clear 
conception of desire: what is the operative theory of desire and are the relevant desires of 
temptation intrinsic, instrumental, occurrent, standing, or dispositional? 
 
2.6 Brian Leftow 
In a recent article on Jesus’s temptation, Brian Leftow, as a way of grounding later 
arguments, offers a brief analysis of temptation.65 He begins by offering three answers to 
the question, what does “was tempted” mean? Leftow’s primary concerned is Jesus’s 
temptation and therefore he is not analyzing what condition(s) is or are necessary for 
succumbing to temptation but only what constitutes the experience of temptation.  
 
2.6.1 The Meaning of “Was Tempted” 
The three ways we can understand “was tempted” are: First, someone deliberately brings 
a state of affairs to the mind of another “in order to arouse his/her desire and thereby 
 
 62 Tim Schroeder, “Desire,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2020 Edition), 
https://plato.stanford.edu /archives/sum2020/entries/desire/, §1.1. 
 63 Schroeder, “Desire,” §1.  
 64 Hughes, “Logic of Temptation,” 95. 
65 Leftow, “Tempting God,” 4-11. 
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produce a course of action.”66 To be tempted, then, is to have a tempter arouse in a 
temptee a desire for some state of affairs, the desire of which will produce action aimed 
at obtaining the desired state of affairs. Second, “was tempted” could mean a person 
encounters a situation not deliberately offered by another, which encounter brings “to 
mind a state of affairs apt to arouse his/her desire and thereby produce a course of 
action.”67 The example Leftow uses is that of a pedestrian coming across a dropped 
wallet. The situation may arouse the pedestrian’s desire for the wallet and this desire 
produce the plan of action of picking up the wallet and keeping its contents; thus, the 
pedestrian “was tempted” to take the wallet. Third, and finally, to experience temptation 
could be the result of some inner state. Leftow does not offer much explanation as to 
what this might mean except to say that this could not be ascribed to God given what the 
Letter of James claims: “God cannot be tempted by evil” (1.13 NIV). Perhaps what this 
third answer says is that temptation as an inner state is one that is not aroused by outside 
conditions but arises completely internal to the one experiencing temptation. Such 
temptation might look like this: suppose Sam desires to be an incredibly successful 
entrepreneur and one way that Sam can accomplish this is by being an unscrupulous 
business owner. Completely internal temptation might arise for Sam, based on the desire 
for financial success, to maintain dishonest accounting ledgers in order to pay less taxes. 
Sam’s situation is unlike Leftow’s first and second way of unpacking “was tempted” but 
plausibly fits the third. In sum, Leftow articulates three connotations for “was tempted”: 
(i) a tempter (TR) tempts a temptee (TE), (ii) TE encounters a situation where external 
factors arouse temptation, and (iii) temptation arises entirely internal to TE.  
 
2.6.2 Necessary Conditions for Temptation 
Leftow gives six clear necessary conditions for temptation. However, he argues against 
their being jointly sufficient since there may be more to temptation than he is exploring. 
His considerations are constrained by a larger argument about Jesus’s temptation; 
therefore, Leftow does not offer a full analysis of temptation. Yet, his account is 
substantial. Leftow argues that a TE experiences temptation if TE experiences the 
following conditions conjunctively: 
(16) TE is considering a state of affairs, X  
(17) TE wants X to obtain 
 
66 Leftow, “Tempting,” 4. 
67 Leftow, “Tempting,” 4. 
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(18) There is a type of act that TE believes will bring about X 
(19) TE occurrently wants to do an act of the type that will bring about X   
(20) TE has something against X (for example hesitation or ambivalence)  
(21) X must be a live option for TE 
 
 Temptation is not tied to immorality in Leftow’s explanation. He makes this clear 
with the running example that unpacks the necessary conditions, namely that of being 
tempted to eat a cookie. The first condition is straight-forward since there is no 
explanation of it. However, it is not entirely clear what is meant by “considering” a state 
of affairs except that Leftow offers, “my experiencing the pleasure of eating the 
cookie.”68 In the other conditions, volition factors in prominently so we may gather that 
here too “considering” is more than simply thinking about X, it is thinking about X in a 
way that arouses desire or volition, which condition (17) makes apparent. This condition 
needs more explanation and Leftow provides it. It is not just any desire that condition 
(17) references. A standing desire, a desire that plays no active role in the person’s 
psychic space, is not sufficient for temptation since one could then be tempted while 
merely dreaming of eating cookies.69 The kind of desire necessary for temptation, Leftow 
argues, is an occurrent desire—a desire that plays an active role in the person’s psychic 
space.70  
 Being in a state of temptation requires a conflict (like Owen, Nuyen, and 
McKinley): it involves both wanting X and having something against X. To amend 
Leftow’s example: I want to complete this chapter but it would be odd to say that I am 
tempted to complete it since I have no occurrent state of mind against that desire. The 
implication of this condition and its rationale is that simply wanting something evil is not 
enough to constitute being tempted. If someone does evil wholeheartedly, as Leftow 
says, then they do it without being tempted.71 This holds even if the state of affairs that 
someone wants is offered or presented by an outside party. That said, simply because the 
desire for the state of affairs is aroused by outside factors does not mean temptation has 
occurred—one has to have something against X that is occurrent and concurrent with the 
desire for X. Moreover, what the TE has against the state of affairs cannot be trivial. The 
 
68 Leftow, “Tempting,” 4. 
69 Leftow, “Tempting,” 5; Schroeder, “Desire,” §2.4. 
70 Leftow, “Tempting,” 5. 
71 Eleonore Stump doubts that anyone can be wholeheartedly for evil, see Wandering in Darkness: 
Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (New York: OUP, 2010), 125-6.  
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person tempted to actualize X needs to have some thick, robust sense of hesitation or 
ambivalence toward X rather than a thin, weak resistance—in which case, the person is 
almost wholeheartedly for X.72 Leftow argues that one must be “significantly invested in 
not” actualizing the state of affairs.73   
 For Leftow, obtaining X needs to be a live option for the tempee—condition (21). 
If the occurrent desire against X is so strong that one never really gives serious 
consideration to it, then one is not really tempted since X is not a live option. Leftow’s 
wanting a cookie may be mitigated so strongly by his desire to keep working that he 
never really takes seriously eating the cookie, and thus eating the cookie is not really a 
temptation for him. “So to constitute a temptation, a desire to act must be salient: strong 
enough and so-related to other desires as to make doing what that desire is a desire to do 
a live option.”74 Leftow adds a fascinating stipulation to this condition: it is possible to 
experience temptation unconsciously; that is, a desire does not need to be conscious in 
order to be part of temptation. Some desire may be hidden from our consciousness 
because we are self-deceptive and especially so with shameful desires. The example 
Leftow offers is one’s having a desire for admiration. On account of self-deception one 
might not realize that some foolish stunt is a temptation to garner admiration. Yet, all the 
same, one could want admiration and want to bring it about that one is admired, and be 
aware of some actions that will bring about such admiration (foolish stunts, for example), 
and even want to do those actions (fulfilling conditions (16)-(21) and, thus, experience 
temptation.  
 
2.6.3 Evaluation of Brian Leftow 
I find Leftow’s brief enumeration of temptation compelling and insightful. However, 
there are two areas that raise worries for coherency: “desire” in condition (16) and 
condition (19) itself. First, while Leftow’s account is instructive, any robust account that 
takes desire to be a core ingredient needs to conceptualize more clearly the nature of 
desire. Leftow argues for occurrent rather than standing desires but does not address 
intrinsic or instrumental desires and possibly equivocates between “standing” and 
 
72 Leftow, “Tempting,” 6. 
73 Leftow, “Tempting,” 5. 
74 Leftow, “Tempting,” 6. 
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“dispositional” desires. More nuance is needed on this point, and, while building on 
Leftow’s strong foundation, I argue for this nuance in Chapter 3, section 3.1. 
 Conditions (18), “there is a type of act that TE believes will bring about X,” and 
(19), “TE occurrently wants to do an act of the type that will bring about X,” are clearly 
interconnected. Yet Leftow offers these two without explanation. I argue that condition 
(19) is not necessary for temptation especially given condition (20)—“TE  has something 
against X.” An example will make the point. Suppose an addict not under addictive 
compulsion is considering the state of affairs of experiencing the high from a particular 
drug, X, and the addict wants X to obtain—he wants to experience the high. The addict 
knows of an act which will bring about X—taking some set of pills, for example. So far, 
the addict has satisfied conditions (16)-(18). But now also suppose that the addict does 
not want to take the pills, ~(19). Even though he has them on hand and is able—meeting 
condition (21)—he does not want to take them because the addict has something against 
getting high. Thus, he also meets condition (20): perhaps he wants to reform his ways 
and not be an addict. It would still be the case that the addict is genuinely tempted to 
obtain X even if the addict does not want to perform the action type that will obtain X. 
Condition (19), then, would not be necessary for temptation. Dropping this condition 
would in no way radically undermine Leftow’s account, particularly since condition (18) 
should remain.  
 The tight connection between conditions (18), “there is a type of act that TE 
believes will bring about X,” and (21), “X must be a live option for TE,” is not obviously 
brought forth in Leftow’s explanation, but the intimacy of the two is clear upon closer 
examination. In fact, dropping condition (19) (TE occurrently wants to do an act of the 
type that will bring about X), bears no overall weakness to the argument precisely 
because conditions (18) and (21) should remain. While we can reject condition (19), it is 
considerably harder to reject condition (18). Suppose again our addict is facing a desire 
to obtain X, but this time there is no clear action that could bring about X for the addict. 
It could be that our addict is simply ignorant and cannot see any action type that would 
obtain X, and, so believes that no action type will obtain X; or it could be that the addict 
has been part of a rehabilitation program which administers a counter drug that inhibits 
the high-inducing effect of any other drug. In either case, the addict believes that there is 
no action type that would obtain X. It is not clear that the addict is now experiencing 
temptation. Rather, he is merely experiencing an occurrent desire for the experience of 
being high, which Leftow has already precluded as not being enough for temptation to 
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occur. That condition (18) is necessary where condition (19) is not should be clear and 
thus all that is really necessary on Leftow’s account are conditions (16)-(18), (20), and 
(21).  
 From Leftow’s argument a number of key factors come forward that will serve as 
evidentiary support to the coming argument for the constructive account of temptation 
offered and defended in Chapter 3. In agreement with the previous thinkers, Leftow 
confirms and gives more analytic precision to the notion that temptation includes desire 
and involves some kind of internal conflict. His greater analytic precision will inform the 
argument to come.  
 
2.7 Adam Pelser: Temptation as Enticement to Vice 
Adam Pelser has recently argued that Jesus was sinless, not fully virtuous, and developed 
virtue in his overcoming temptation. In order to substantiate his thesis, Pelser offers a 
brief account of temptation.75 He offers a clear and simple definition of temptation: 
“enticement to act in a way that would be contrary to virtue.”76 Attending carefully to his 
account will give more evidential substance to the argument I construct in Chapter 3.  
 
2.7.1 The Nature of Temptation  
Pelser explains the nature of temptation in terms of three elements. First, temptation is 
action-directed.77 That is, when someone is tempted, they are tempted to do something. 
Pelser argues that “action” should be understood as volitional—it is willful—and broad 
so as to include mental (entertain thoughts, fanaticize, indulge emotion, etc.) and 
physical actions. Second, desire is an essential component of temptation.78 Pelser adopts 
a good-based theory of desire whereby desires are perceptions or beliefs about the 
goodness of the object of desire: to desire X, is for X to appear good.79 While he admits 
that perhaps not all desires are best characterized by the good-based theory, most 
experiences of temptation involve those kinds of desires. Thus, temptation “often, though 
 
 75 Pelser, “Temptation,” 81-101. 
 76 Pelser, “Temptation,” 84. 
 77 Pelser, “Temptation,” 83.  
 78 Pelser, “Temptation,” 83.  
 79 Pelser, “Temptation,” 83; cf. Graham Oddie, Value, Reality, and Desire (New York: OUP, 
2005); Dennis W. Stampe,“ The authority of desire,” PhR. 96, no. 3 (1987): 335–81. 
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perhaps not always, involves what I call desiderative perception.”80 And, third, in 
temptation the object of desire is morally bad.81 On Pelser’s argument, disagreeing with 
John Owen’s, “morally bad” is not “sin” but “contrary to virtue.”82 
 Here, then, are the necessary conditions for temptation on Pelser’s account: 
 (22) TE has some desire/desiderative perception for X—sees X as good for 
  TE 
 (23) X is some mental or physical action 
 (24) X is contrary to virtue 
 
2.7.2 Evaluation of Adam Pelser 
A great benefit of Pelser’s account for this project is that it shows the current trajectory 
of connecting temptation to virtue is ripe for analytic exploration. As Pelser notes, the 
relationship between temptation and virtue has largely been left unconsidered by 
Christians, especially how this might come forward in the life of Jesus Christ.83 Thus, his 
account, and therefore my own, are attempts to redress an unattended-to moral problem.  
 A strength of Pelser’s argument that is missing in other accounts is his attempt to 
locate his view of desire in one of the philosophically common theories of desire 
(namely, good-based theories). By leaving open that desire could be captured accurately 
by other theories (for example, action-based or pleasure-based), Pelser’s argument allows 
that his account of temptation might accord well with other accounts of desire. However, 
by not investigating deeper into desire theory, Pesler’s account leaves unanswered what 
kinds of good-based desires are operative in temptation (for example, intrinsic, 
instrumental, occurrent, standing, or dispositional). A fully orbed account of temptation 
that takes desire as a central component will, therefore, have to more precisely and 
specifically describe the concept of desire that is operative. I do this in Chapter 3, section 
3.1. 
 Perhaps the greatest problem with Pelser’s account, and what puts him at odds 
with all other accounts examined above except John Owen, is that his does not include a 
conflict component. On Pelser’s view, it is enough to have a desire for that which is 
contrary to virtue for it to be temptation. But this radically departs from intuitive, and 
 
 80 Pelser, “Temptation,” 84.  
 81 Pelser, “Temptation,” 84.  
 82 Pelser, “Temptation,” 84.  
83 Pelser, “Temptation,” 81. 
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considered, accounts of temptation. This threatens the coherence of his account: it may 
remain plausible on its own, but it will have trouble cohering with our intuitive moral 
conception of temptation by making the scope of temptation too great. As Pelser argues, 
the fully virtuous person does not experience most, perhaps no, temptation.84 This is 
because the fully virtuous person’s desiderative perception is rightly attuned to virtue 
such that they do not perceive as good those actions which are bad.85 However, if Pelser 
is right about temptation, then his argument would imply that the fully vicious person 
experiences nothing but temptation all, or most of, the time. Since the fully vicious 
person’s desiderative perception is mal-attuned, they would constantly desire mental and 
physical actions that are contrary to virtue—they would constantly be experiencing 
temptation. But that seems highly problematic: wholeheartedness precludes temptation. 
Pelser’s account could add a necessary condition regarding conflict without threat to his 
larger argument and thereby bolster his definition of temptation. 
 
2.8 Biblical-Theological Considerations 
Work in analytic moral theology must consider and engage biblical and theological 
sources. Some theological sources have already been considered above therefore I now 
turn my attention to the Christian scriptures and biblical scholars who help to exegete 
and interpret those texts.  
 While the Christian Bible does not offer an explicit account of the nature of 
temptation, it does yield a few important insights that can inform an analytically precise 
concept toward which this project aims. Furthermore, in order to be robustly Christian in 
the traditional sense, any analytic theological account of temptation should find in 
Scripture, where possible, a normative starting place. This follows the methodology 
outlined in Chapter 1, section 3.4. There I noted Max Baker-Hytch’s three activities that 
analytic (moral) theology deploys in bringing the Christian scriptures to bear on the 
theological enterprise: (i) to find within the text of the Bible topics for philosophical-
theological analysis; (ii) to develop philosophically robust Christian theology by 
unpacking what is entailed by scriptural data; and (iii) to take claims made by the Bible 
as premises in developing arguments. What follows, then, is an intentionally brief 
 
84 This is also endorsed by John McDowell, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives,” 
PAS 52 (1978): 13-42 and Susan Stark, “Virtue and Emotion,” Noûs 35 (2001): 440-55. 
 85 Pelser, “Temptation,” 85. 
 55 
application of these three activities such that the limited data from Scripture will serve as 
a conceptual starting place and guiding parameters (as noted below in section 2.7.3). 
There are two experiences of temptation in the Christian scriptures that we need 
to distinguish and note for the purposes of this project. First there are Jesus’s temptations 
and second there are everyone else’s temptations. A quick look at both will give further 
substance to the nature of temptation argued for in the next chapter. As this is a work in 
analytic moral theology and not biblical exegesis, the following exploration will 
necessarily be limited. There are two chief reasons for this. First, the textual data 
requisite for analytic construction is both limited and does not offer explicit or clear 
guidance regarding the philosophical nature of temptation. Second, space and the 
argument’s goal also prohibit in-depth examination of every temptation story or 
reference. Consequently, I will focus my attention on selected texts from the New 
Testament. There are two reasons for this narrowed focus. First, most philosophical or 
theological accounts of temptation begin with, or at least mention Jesus’s temptation. For 
Christians, starting with Jesus makes theological sense and his experience might bring 
illumination to the nature of temptation. The second reason the New Testament will be 
prioritized is because it is there that we find moral reflection on temptation in a way that 
is conducive to building a theological account. There are a host of temptation 
experiences in the text of Scripture and, while these texts can be instructive, it is difficult 
to develop a robust analytic account from only narrative. Therefore, it is reasonable for 
this study to attend specifically to those texts that either have functioned as informative 
for other accounts of temptation or offer promise for informing an analytic account of 
temptation.   
 
2.8.1 The Temptation of Christ 
Although Day references Jesus’s temptation as a paradigm example, it is not clear that, in 
fact, Jesus’s temptations are paradigmatic for non-Messianic humans. If what Day has in 
mind are the three temptations of Jesus by Satan as recorded in the synoptic Gospels 
(Mark 1.12-13; Matthew 4.1-11; Luke 4.1-13), and it seems he does, then many scholars 
suggest a contrary view: namely, that Jesus’s temptations are not typical to normal 
human experience.86 There are two ways to understand the difference from normal 
 
86 Jeffrey B. Gibson, “Jesus’ Wilderness Temptation According to Mark,” JSNT 53 (1994): 3-34; 
Luigi Schiavo, “The Temptation of Jesus: The Eschatological Battle and the New Ethic of the First 
Followers of Jesus in Q,” JSNT 25, no. 2 (2002): 141-164; Jacques Roets, “The Victory of Christ Over the 
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human experience. On the one hand, Jesus’s temptation seems most closely tied to his 
Messianic vocation.87 Since, in the Christian theological tradition, Jesus is the only 
Messiah it follows that no other persons can experience temptation with reference to 
Jesus’s messianic vocation. To be sure, humans are called into fellowship with God and 
this call comes with an empowered vocation to do what Jesus did/does. In this sense, 
then, Jesus’s temptation, as the Second Adam and New Humanity, could be paradigmatic 
for human temptations.88 However, this parallel is much more narrow than the standard 
moral conception of temptation and, therefore, in a more generalized moral conception, 
which is the focus of this study, Jesus’s temptation is not paradigmatic: it is not a 
“typical” experience of temptation. 
 On the other hand, Jesus’s temptation bears a similarity and a difference to 
standard human temptation in his wilderness experience: namely, that it is a test or trial. 
The Greek (peirazo) behind the English translation carries the connotation of “to put to 
the test,” or “to try,” as in “put through a trial” or “to attempt,” and it aligns with other 
usage (earlier Greek writing, Septuagint, and the Pseudepigrapha) where it carries the 
idea of “to ascertain or demonstrate trustworthiness.”89 The obvious similarity is that 
non-messianic humans also face trials and tests in order to determine trustworthiness. 
Yet, and here is the substantial difference, our normal use of “temptation” is not only or 
merely to talk about tests or trials but to talk about internal moral conflicts and their 
relation to actions. To be sure, some trials are temptations, and perhaps even all 
temptations are trials of some kind, but not all trials are temptations. Thus, in the 
standard, everyday moral usage, “temptation” is not synonymous with “trial.” Humans, 
therefore, might find some overlap between their generalized experience of temptation, 
but Jesus’s wilderness temptation cannot be the paradigm example of everyday, run-of-
 
Tempter as Help to the Believer’s Fight Again Sin: A Reflection on Matthew 4:1-11,” Mid-America 
Journal of Theology 22 (2011): 107-127; Eleonore Stump, Atonement (New York: OUP, 2018), 240-244.  
87 Roets (“The Victory of Christ Over the Tempter”) very clearly draws out this peculiar aspect to 
Christ’s temptations. See also, Denny Burk, “Is Homosexual Orientation Sinful?” JETS 58, no. 1 (2015): 
95-115.  
88 I am indebted to Jesse Stone (PhD candidate, University of St. Andrews) for pointing out this 
theological overlap between Jesus’s temptation and humanity’s temptation. 
89 Gibson, “Jesus’ Wilderness Temptation;” especially see Gibson’s collation of the sources 
substantiating this meaning (10-11). 
Seesemann suggests the bulk of the occurrences of peirazo—or some equivalent—in the LXX and 
the NT carries the idea of “testing;” although, this isn’t to suggest that “testing” and “temptation” do not 
overlap (see Heinrich Seesemann, sv. πειρα, πειπαω, πειραζω, et al., in TDNT, ed. Gerhard Friedrich, 
vol. VI, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1968], 23-36). 
Clearly some temptations are also tests. 
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the-mill moral temptation. The implication for this project, then, is that while some 
important information can be gleaned from Christ’s temptation either in the wilderness or 
in Gethsemane (for example, that temptations are also trials), we cannot construct an 
analytic account of temptation from these sources alone. Therefore, other New 
Testament mentions of temptation will prove more useful to such a construction.  
 
2.8.2 The Lord’s Prayer 
When instructing the disciples on how to pray, Jesus tells them to pray: “and lead us not 
into temptation” (Matt 6.13; Luke 11.4 NIV cf. Matt 26.41; Mark 14.38: “Watch and 
pray that you may not enter into temptation.” and Luke 22.40: “Pray that you may not 
enter into temptation” NIV). But this translation of peirasmos—“temptation”—is 
contested and not well supported by many scholars.90 Indeed, as C. Clifton Black notes, 
this clause in the passage is particularly troublesome both linguistically and 
theologically.91 From the linguistic perspective, as we saw above with Jesus’s 
“temptation,” the Greek—peirasmos—can, depending on the context, be translated as 
either “temptation” or “testing.”92 Joseph Fitzmyer suggests that the basic meaning of 
peirasmos is “test” or “trial” as in an “action by which one verifies or probes the quality 
of a person or thing.”93 Of course, “temptation” is also a possible meaning. Deciding 
between the two options when translating the Lord’s Prayer is best determined by 
theological considerations and this will show whether and how this prayer is instructive 
for developing an account of temptation.  
 
90 C.F.D. Moule outlines well the various problems both linguistic and theological with translating 
peirasmos. See “An Unsolved Problem in the Temptation Clause in the Lord’s Prayer,” RTR 33, no. 3 
(September-December 1974): 65-75. Cf., Brant Pitre, Jesus, the Tribulation, and the End of the Exile 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 146-8; and N.T. Wright, “The Lord’s Prayer as a Paradigm of Christian 
Prayer,” in Into God’s Presence: Prayer in the New Testament, ed. Richard N. Longenecker (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2002), 144-7. 
91 C. Clifton Black, The Lord’s Prayer, Interpretation: Resources for the Use of Scripture in the 
Church, ed. Smueal E. Balentine (Louisville, KY: WJKP, 2018), 195. 
92 Donald A. Hagner, Matthew 1-13, WBC, vol. 33a, ed. Ralph P. Martin (Nashville, TN: Thomas 
Nelson, 2000), 151.  
93 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, “And Lead Us Not Into Temptation,” Biblica 84 (2003): 260. Hagner 
appears to agree as his own translations of the Greek render peirasmos as “testing” (Matthew, 151); Black 
simply transliterates the Greek before offering the varying views and finally setting on either “testing,” 
“proving,” or “trial” as likely the best translations (The Lord’s Prayer, 205). Without giving any attention 
to arguments in favor of “temptation,” David Clark affirms a “testing” connotation for peirasmos (On 
Earth as in Heaven: The Lord’s Prayer from Jewish Prayer to Christian Ritual [Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2017], 54-55).  
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 To put it simply, if a bit crudely, the theological difference is this: “God is the 
author of trials, the devil the initiator of temptations…God may test and also elicit the 
strength of faith in God’s children, but only the tempter aims to snare humans beings and 
bring them into despair.”94 This captures well the general line of rationale that scholars 
offer when positing “testing” or “time of trial” as the best translation of peirasmon.95 
Praying for God not to lead us into something that, by nature, he would not lead his 
followers into seems nonsensical. The key here is how these authors understand 
“temptation:” for each, temptation involves “enticement to sin.” Little beyond that is said 
about temptation and certainly not any kind of analytic ethical parsing of the concept. 
This does not suggest, however, that there is nothing instructive for an analytic account 
of temptation. A couple observations are available. First, we can reiterate a take-away 
from the previous section, 2.7.1: testing, trials, and temptation are different; not all tests 
or trials are temptations, even if (possibly) all temptations are tests or trials. Second, in 
the language and context of Scripture, according to many commentators, there is 
something inherently bad about temptation. This is not to say that for them the mere 
experience of temptation is morally culpable. Jesus’s temptations and sinlessness would 
present a serious theological problem for this view. Rather, temptation is, for the authors 
in the New Testament context, somehow necessarily connected to immorality or sin.96 
 
2.8.3 The Letter of James On Temptation 
Jesus’s temptation and the Lord’s Prayer are not all that an inquirer has to work from in 
the Christian scriptures. There are other mentions of temptation in the New Testament. 
With one exception, I am not hopeful that other texts will prove more helpful than what 
has already been gained from the look at Jesus’s temptation and instruction on prayer. 
All other texts rely on the same Greek word—“to test/try”—and the texts can be 
reasonably interpreted as referring to trials that are not precisely mere temptations.97 Put 
differently, many of the New Testament texts could just as well be talking about testing 
 
94 Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Trial and Temptation: An Essay in the Multiple Logics of Faith,” TT 
(2000): 327. Gregersen offers perhaps the best arguments for retaining “temptation” as an appropriate 
translation of peirasmos based on particular Jewish theological concepts about God.  
95 Dale C. Allison suggest that peirasmos may have a particular reference in the Synoptics’ mind: 
the messianic woes, especially those in Revelation 3.10. See “Matthew,” in The Gospels, OBC, eds. John 
Barton and John Muddiman (New York: OUP, 2001), 43. 
96 Black notes that this is not the case in everyday locution where we often describe our 
enticement for another “piece of pie” as a typical usage of “temptation” (The Lord’s Prayer, 198). 
97 Both Black and Hagner briefly mention other New Testament passages with this in mind. 
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one’s character in a non-temptation manner.98 This suggests that they will be no more 
informative for an analytic construction than either Jesus’s Wilderness Temptation or the 
Lord’s Prayer.  
 The exception is James 1.13-15. Some caution is in order, however, since James 
is not offering moral philosophy but a pastoral response.99 Yet, some lines of analytic 
approach come through. Here is the text:  
Let no one say when he is tempted, “I am being tempted by God,” for 
God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one. But each 
person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire. Then 
desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin, and sin when it is fully 
grown brings forth death (James 1.13-15 ESV).  
 
A few observations are worth mentioning and each reiterates other observations noted 
above.100 First, a distinction is at work between testing and tempting, and second 
temptation is connected to immorality.101 It is not clear that there is a necessary 
connection such that all temptations have to do with evil, but the text does indicate in 
that direction.102 This seems to be built on the following idea: if God is omnibenevolent, 
and temptation is morally dubious, then God cannot be a tempter.103 The third 
observation is that temptation springs from an internal aspect of persons, namely, 
 
98 A possible exception is 1 Cor 10.13. See Wright, “The Lord’s Prayer,” 145-6. 
99 Scot McKnight, The Letter of James, NICNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 
2011), 73. McKnight points out that there is some debate about the meaning of peirasmos in this pericope 
(“test” or “temptation”), although he argues for the view that “temptation” is the appropriate meaning (but 
thinks that “test” is the right connotation in verses 1-12). 
100 These observations come from McKnight, The Letter of James, 73-76; and Marie E. Issacs, 
Reading Hebrews and James: A Literary and Theological Commentary, RNTS (Macon, GA: Smyth & 
Helwys Pub. Inc., 2002), 187-89. 
101 McKnight suggests that a solid translation of vs. 13 should read: “Let no one say when he is 
tested, “I am being tempted by God…” (italics added). The point being, the reader should not confuse 
testing with temptation. Ralph P. Martin seems to agree with McKnight but offers no explicit discussion of 
“temptation” (James, WBC, eds. David A. Hubbard, Glenn W. Barker, John D.W. Watts, and Ralph P. 
Martin [Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1988], 77).  
102 If temptation is something God never does, which is what the text appears to indicate, and it is 
connected to evil, even if not in explicitly stated in every case, then it would appear that temptation is 
closely tied to immorality. Douglas Moo notes that God does test/try his people and so what James has in 
mind for peirazo in vs. 13 cannot merely be testing (James, TNTC, ed. Leon Morris [Grand Rapids, MI: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1987]).  
103 On God’s being omnibenevolent see: William Mann, “The Divine Attributes,” APhQ.12, no. 2 
(April 1975): 151-59; Edward Wierenga, “Intrinsic Maxima and Omnibenevolence,” IJPR 10, no. 1 
(1979): 41-50; David Basinger, “In What Sense Must God be Omnibenevolent?” IJPR 14, no. 1 (1983): 3-
15; and Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz, The Divine Attributes, Exploring the Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. Michael L. Peterson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2002).  
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desire.104 These elements track in broad ways with what previous authors have posited 
and this suggests a common foundation upon which an account of temptation can be 
built. Below, in section 3, I give a protoaccount of temptation based on the data gathered 
here and then argue for and defend that conception in Chapter 3. The philosophical 
account to follow will take the biblical data—(a) that temptation is not mere testing, (b) 
that it is related to desire, and (c) that it is morally dubious—as both a minimal 
normative-reflective starting place and as the governing parameters. This fulfills the 
methodological activities (ii) and (iii) from Baker-Hytch discussed in Chapter 1 (sections 
2.1.1 and 3.4)105 and it works to ensure the argument produces an account that is globally 
coherent, that “hangs” with, the biblical data. 
 
3 Conclusion: Summary and A Protoccount of Temptation 
This chapter has surveyed and evaluated the most pertinent literature on the nature of 
temptation in order to develop the evidence needed to construct an analytic account of 
the nature of temptation. This review provides the necessary groundwork from which a 
robust concept of temptation can be constructed. In turn, this concept will help make 
sense of a fundamental aspect of the ultimate claim of this thesis, if human persons are to 
develop the moral virtues, then the possibility of temptation is necessary. Moving toward 
an affirmation of that notion requires a careful and considered account of temptation. 
 I have reviewed seven philosophical-theological accounts of temptation: John 
Owen, J.P. Day, A.T. Nuyen, John McKinley, Paul M. Hughes, Bryan Leftow, Adam 
Pelser, and the pertinent biblical-theological data. Based on the above examination and 
evaluation, I will formulate a working definition and the necessary and (potentially) 
sufficient conditions of temptation in Chapter 3. While the authors and data surveyed 
herein have roughly charted a path forward, none has offered a robust analytic account of 
temptation. This has left a gap in the literature on philosophical-theological moral 
psychology. My incipient account below—further developed and defended in Chapter 
3—begins to fill this gap while also being internally consistent and coherent with moral 
philosophy and theology. Thus, it has plausibility and conceptual fit with other moral 
intuitions and frameworks.  
 
104 What is possibly meant by “desire” is nicely considered by Marie Issacs, Reading Hebrews and 
James, 189. 
105 That is, (ii) to develop philosophically robust Christian theology by unpacking what is entailed 
by scriptural data and (iii) to take claims made by the Bible as premises in developing arguments (cf. 
Baker-Hytch, “Analytic Theology,” 351). 
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 Analytic moral theology, as argued in Chapter 1, section 3, is motivated by the 
ambition to gain theologically and philosophically informed knowledge about morality. 
This is done by drawing from sources in the analytic tradition of moral philosophy and 
theological data from sacred Scripture and church tradition. Above I have attended to the 
pertinent arguments and data from both of those spheres. In what follows I will gather 
this evidence and formulate it into an emerging constructive analytic conception of 
temptation, which, when combined with the defense in Chapter 3, is a substantial 
contribution to both moral philosophy and moral theology.  
 The definition of temptation that I will defend coheres well with the relevant 
literature but also responds and improves on those places where the other accounts are 
either missing nuance or offer problematic conditions. On the one hand, then, there will 
be very little overlap between my account and J.P. Day’s concept of temptation—his 
account was too troubled to be wholly informative. On the other hand, the commonality 
of the other data regarding the role of desire in temptation and the presence of conflict 
shows that my account of temptation has promising coherence with thinkers above. 
Ultimately, the definition I defend gathers and constructively synthesizes evidence from 
a variety of sources and brings that evidence into a novel and robust account capable of 
withstanding analytic scrutiny. As a protoaccount of temptation, I offer the following: 
temptation is an internal conflict that involves desire and is morally problematic. 
 In Chapter 3 I will expand this protoaccount into a technical definition and argue 
for substantiation of it by defending six necessary conditions for experiencing temptation 
and offer analytic evidence for the coherency of those conditions. With the definition of 
temptation made robust, I can then turn, in Chapter 4, to the question of how it is related 
to another experience in moral psychology: namely, akrasia or weakness of will, which 
is widely discussed by philosophers and, importantly, often used synonymously with 
temptation. Chapters 2 through 4, then, cumulatively provide a precise notion of 
temptation which can then function in the final defense of the claim that moral virtue 
formation requires the possibility of temptation. Following the analytic mode of 
argumentation, this means dissecting large concepts into their smaller core parts, 
analyzing those parts, and bringing them back together in a way that is logically 
consistent and coherent. Part of this task is accomplished in Chapters 2 through 4, the 
final part will be completed in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 3: An Analytic Account of the Nature of 
Temptation 
 
1 Introduction: Methodology and Contextualizing the Argument  
Based on the critical engagement with the extant literature on temptation in the previous 
chapter, this chapter offers a constructive account of the nature of temptation that avoids 
deficiencies in other accounts and articulates a more complete understanding of this 
important moral experience.1 The developing argument here seeks a more adequate 
understanding of temptation that is more realistic to our common moral experience, an 
understanding articulated and processed using the current tools of analytic philosophy 
and analytic theology, and situated well within what we may call the relatively new and 
emerging field of Christian analytic moral theology. In fact, if this study is successful, 
then, at this time, it will be not only one of the only extensive accounts of temptation, but 
it will also be the only account on the topic that employs new analytic methods. Thus, 
this project as a whole is intended to make dual contributions to analytic moral theology 
are in terms of both content and method. 
 
1.1 The Application of Analytic Moral Theology to a Definition of Temptation 
The aim in this chapter is to contribute to the development of the overarching argument 
of this project by providing a constructive account of temptation expressed in analytic 
terms and taking the literature review as background. Such an account will exemplify the 
thesis’s analytic methodology of making distinctions by breaking complex propositions 
down into component parts. Furthermore, this analytic work will mark clearly what is 
meant by “temptation” in the project’s thesis: if human persons are to develop the moral 
virtues, then the possibility of temptation is necessary. Developing this account of 
temptation will involve several methodological components or elements, including the 
following.  
 One element of the groundwork for this investigation in analytic moral theology 
is the necessarily brief scriptural work in Chapter 2. A core ambition of analytic moral 
theology is to provide clear, coherent, and rigorous explanations of our moral 
 
1 I am indebted to the valuable feedback from persons present at my reading of an abbreviated 
portion of this chapter at the Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Region Conference, Asbury 
University, September 2017. 
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experiences in a way that makes sense of theological data. This includes attempting to 
evaluate and explain our common moral experiences in a way that both comports to and 
is informed by biblical considerations. Thus, in this chapter, data from the scriptural 
investigation in Chapter 2 will, on the one hand, set the parameters for analytic defense, 
and, on the other hand, will give grounding insight. Put differently, the constructive 
account, and analytic defense, in this chapter will take its start from the biblical data and 
effect a definition that will comport with the biblical data. Thus, the philosophical moral 
psychology and philosophy of action sources that I marshal in defense of the necessary 
conditions for temptation are deployed in order to make analytically precise the limited 
biblical data that set the conceptual parameters. 
 The next element in the investigation takes seriously the common ideas from the 
authors evaluated in Chapter 2 that can be reasonably defended and thus deserve 
consideration as aspects of any final, well-considered theory. This component, too, is 
both an exemplification of the analytic methodology—informed by relevant arguments in 
the analytic, anglophone literature base—and indicative of my account’s coherency with 
other philosophically and theologically reflective positions. 
 Another component of this argument is a set of background assumptions that 
function to narrow the scope of the argument. The account I develop is for paradigmatic 
experiences of temptation in healthy, sane, adult human persons. There are two working 
assumptions, then. The first is that there is a such thing as “paradigmatic experiences of 
temptation.” What I mean by this is that I argue as if there are “every day,” “normal” 
experiences of temptation and that our reflective intuition gives us access to those 
experiences and the account that I argue for is located there. The second assumption built 
into the argument is that the account of temptation presumes that healthy, sane adult 
human persons are the center of the experience. Psychological and biological pathologies 
and immaturity complicate human moral psychology and it is a standard convention in 
philosophical moral psychology and philosophy of action to bracket those cases out of 
the argument.2 I follow this convention in the arguments of this chapter and project. 
Moreover, the argument I advance is focused on analysis of the reflective human 
understanding of the concept of temptation in moral contexts. Thus, “temptation,” unless 
otherwise noted, will not refer to common, popular, and non-moral uses; for example, 
 
2 For exceptions see Richard Holton, “Addiction, Self-Signalling and the Deep Self,” Mind & 
Language 31, no. 3 (2016): 300-13; Neil Levy, “Autonomy and Addiction,” CJP 36, no. 3 (2006): 427-47; 
and Kent Dunnington, Addiction and Virtue: Beyond the Models of Disease and Choice (Downers Grove, 
IL: IVP, 2011). 
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“I’m tempted to eat another cookie.” My argument takes no critical view of such 
locutions but instead focuses more specifically on the concept of temptation that is 
relevant for careful, analytic moral philosophy and theology. Thus, the intuitions to 
which I appeal and the case studies are aimed to clarify and argue for a concept of 
temptation that is applicable for the moral significance of motivations, actions, virtue, 
and character.  
 The final and largest methodological component of this chapter is the analytic 
defense of the definition of temptation that I articulate below. Here one aspect of analytic 
philosophy’s methodology is overtly deployed. This begins with a formal definition 
following the conventions of analytic philosophy, using variables to signify important 
propositions and terms. For this project, (T) will stand for the formalized conception of 
temptation that is defended; (1), (2), and so on, will signify the necessary conditions that 
make up this definition; TE will signify the person experiencing temptation, the temptee; 
X will signify the state of affairs desired; and φ will signify some action. The 
substantiation of (T) will come in the explanation and defense of the individual necessary 
conditions that are entailed by (T). This argumentative process will follow the method of 
reflective equilibrium described in Chapter 1, section 3.2. Hence, the argument for (T) 
flows from the analytic examination and defense of the six necessary propositions that 
logically follow from (T). The bulk of this chapter, then, is examination and defense 
aiming toward reflective equilibrium.  
 
1.2 Avoiding Mistakes and Discerning Important Insights in Extant Theories 
In what follows I argue for a more robust account of (T) via evaluation of the best 
available theories. Essentially, the argument progresses by utilizing several key 
desiderata: (i) analyzing the theories of temptation in the context of data from action 
theory and moral psychology, fields where the concepts of desire and action are most 
discussed; (ii) reflecting on how the developing theory here comports with our common 
moral sense; and (iii) assessing how the developing theory remains consonant with 
scriptural data and coherent with moral philosophy. 
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1.2.1 (T) as a Person’s “State of Experiencing Temptation”  
Agreeing with A.T. Nuyen, Paul Hughes, and Brain Leftow, but pace J.P Day, I take 
“temptation/tempted” to be a “try-verb.”3 Thus, the phenomenon under examination and 
explication here is the “state of being tempted,”4 rather than the state of having 
succumbed to temptation (as Day’s “success-verb” usage would have to mean5). In 
Chapter 2, section 2.2.2, I argued that Day’s “success-verb” connotation of temptation is 
problematic for two reasons (i) it does not comport with intuitive usage and (ii) it would 
relegate many experiences commonly understood as temptation into something else, and 
this has the unacceptable consequence of too tightly narrowing the scope of 
“temptation.” Instead, if we understand “temptation” as it is commonly and generally 
used—a state of experiencing temptation—then the scope is sufficiently wide to include 
intuitive cases of temptation while not automatically precluding those “temptations” that 
also sometimes signify someone’s having succumbed to temptation. Recall Casey from 
the beginning of Chapter 2. She is “tempted” to quit grading papers and relax with a 
favorite book and glass of wine. Yet, if Day’s “success-verb” conception is right, then 
Casey is not tempted so long as she continues to grade final papers. This is true for the 
business owner wrestling with whether they should cheat on their taxes—so long as they 
are only conflicted and not yet acting, on Day’s account, they are not tempted. Both of 
these run deeply counter to the intuitive moral usage of “tempted.” Instead, if 
“temptation” allows for the experience of conflict without yet having succumbed, then 
both of these examples count as temptation. Therefore, “temptation” and “tempted” 
herein reference the state of experiencing temptation without also negating the possibility 
that “tempted” can also mean “succumbed to temptation.” 
 
1.2.2 (T), the Source of Temptation, and the Need for a Tempter  
Moreover, with Nuyen, Hughes, and Leftow, I argue that (T) may present from two 
horizons: internal and external.6 That is, the temptation may find its origin, spring, or 
source either from factors inside or outside the person experiencing (T). It may come 
from without by other agents and therefore involve a tempter. It may also come from 
 
3 A.T. Nuyen, “The Nature of Temptation,” SJP 35 (1997): 91-103; Paul M. Hughes, “The Logic 
of Temptation,” Philosophia 29 (2002):89-110; Brian Leftow, “Tempting God,” FPh 31, no. 1 (2014): 3-
23. 
4 Paul M. Hughes, “Ambivalence, Autonomy, and Organ Sales,” SJP 44 (2006): 241. 
5 J.P. Day, “Temptation,” APhQ 30, no. 2 (1993): 175-81. 
6 Nuyen, “Temptation,” 91-3; Hughes, “Logic of Temptation,” 91; Leftow, “Tempting God,” 6. 
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within the person through some encounter with the external world or by desires entirely 
internal to the person. Temptation, then, may involve a tempter but (T) does not require 
an external tempter (contra Day). The business owner internally debating tax fraud does 
not need another agent to present to them the possibility, means, or enticement of 
financial benefit in order for them to authentically experience (T). This matches our 
intuitions about temptation and it also coheres with biblical data: “each person is tempted 
when they are dragged away by their own evil desire…” (James 1.14 NIV).  
 The account of (T) I defend here neither presumes nor assumes the presence of a 
tempter. In fact, this account will work whether there is a tempter or not. This is because 
Paul Hughes’s observation is surely right: that the internal experience of the one 
experiencing temptation is paramount in any investigation of temptation precisely 
because temptation is fundamentally internal to the person experiencing it regardless of 
the presence of a tempter.7 Ultimately, then, (T) is the internal experience of some 
person. Properly speaking, one does not experience temptation merely because some 
offer or enticement is made by a would-be tempter (pace Day). When we say, “she 
was/is tempted,” we are saying, I argue, that there was some internal state of affairs 
about the person regarding that person’s mental and volitional states, which state of 
affairs may include some external tempter or not. Thus, temptation does not have the 
presence of a tempter as a necessary or sufficient condition. 
 
1.2.3 (T) is Fundamentally Connected to Desire 
A key insight from the brief consideration of the biblical letter of James, which has the 
only insight into the nature of temptation, is that temptation involves an internal state of a 
person, namely desire (Chapter 2, section 2.7). Indeed, this is a running theme in all 
theories of temptation examined in Chapter 2, suggesting that any reasonable account 
should begin with the idea that temptation is strongly—and necessarily—tied to desire.  
 If to desire something is to want that thing, then to be tempted involves wanting 
something.8 This comports with our intuitions about the nature of temptation such that it 
makes it possible to use various thought experiments and intuition pumps about 
 
7 Hughes, “Logic of Temptation,” 89. 
8 Joel Marks, “Introduction,” in The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on 
the Concept of Wanting, ed. Joel Marks (Chicago: Precedent Pub., Inc., 1986), 2. This entire volume takes 
“desires” and “wants” to be largely interchangeable, but also notices that various nuances might 
distinguish the two. “Want” and “desire” are interchangeable for Alfred Mele in Springs of Action: 
Understanding Intentional Behavior (New York: OUP, 1992), 47. 
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temptation. It is because Casey wants both to finish grading and to quit and read that we 
can begin to understand her situation as possibly (T). If, instead, I was to say, “Casey is 
tired of grading term papers and she is intending to quit before she is done and read a 
book,” this does not get close enough to approximating temptation. Exchange 
“intending” with “planning,” “thinking about,” “feeling like,” “rationalizing,” or the like 
and Casey’s experience will not appear to be temptation. However, substitute 
“intending” with “wanting” or “desires” and suddenly her experience is much closer to 
temptation. Not only, then, does the biblical and philosophical data suggest desire/want 
as the appropriate internal state for temptation but so does reflective intuition. Therefore, 
desire is the apt internal state for (T). Below I will offer a further argument for desire in 
section 2 and more development of it in section 3.1. 
 
1.2.4 (T) is a Morally Dubious Experience  
A second important insight, not only in the letter of James, but also in the wider biblical 
data, is that temptation is tied to morality (Chapter 2, section 2.7). This view is also 
shared by John Owen, J.P. Day, and Adam Pelser. Yet, there is some intuitive conflict 
with the idea that temptation is or could be immoral. Against the common intuition but in 
agreement with the biblical data, Owen, Day, and Pelser, I argue that (T) is a morally 
dubious experience.9 The fuller defense of this claim will come in sections 3.3 and 3.5 
below but for now I offer a brief line of reasoning. Suppose that temptation is an internal 
conflict (I argue for this in section 3.4), and this conflict is between a desire for 
something and some other internal state either cognitive or conative10 (see sections 2 and 
3.5 below), and that part of this conflict involves a moral judgment between the 
conflicting states such that one is considered morally superior to the other (see section 
3.5 below). On this account of (T) the person experiencing temptation is treading on a 
breakdown of internal moral integrity: their internal states are not aligned, as with the 
integrous person, but are mismatched with one being morally worse off than the other. 
 
9 Although all three connect temptation to immorality, Owen and Day would likely disagree with 
Pelser. Pelser’s view is more constrained than either Owen’s or Day’s. For Pelser, temptation is connected 
to vice; and according to his argument, vice is a narrower category than sin/immorality. At this point, I 
need not adjudicate between the two views, thus I use the vaguer “morally dubious experience.” I use this 
locution to signal broad agreement with the biblical data, Owen, Day, and Pelser. 
10 Conative states are internal, non-cognitive, non-feeling states that are types of pro-attitudes; 
e.g., desire, hope, wish, expectation, and so on. (see Connie S. Rosati, "Moral Motivation,” SEP, ed., 
Edward N. Zalta [Winter 2016 edition], https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-
motivation/). It is perhaps Immanuel Kant that offers philosophy the first fullest account of the internal 
division between cognitive, conative, and feeling (see Leonard D. Katz, “Pleasure,”SEP, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta [Winter 2016 edition], https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/pleasure/). 
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The failure of moral integrity in a person is a morally negative experience. Therefore, if 
(T) involves a breakdown of moral integrity, then (T) involves a morally negative 
experience.11 While this conclusion might run counter to general intuition, it comports 
with the biblical and some philosophical data and, moreover, is consonant with other 
commitments in moral philosophy and theology. Thus, the idea that (T) is a morally 
dubious experience is conceptually coherent.  
 
1.2.5 (T) and Psychic Conflict 
It is not generally difficult to discern which of our experiences are temptation and which 
not. A fundamental component of temptation that helps us mark it off from other 
phenomenon is the kind of internal conflict that comes with temptation. Indeed, 
temptation seems to be just some kind of internal conflict. This is agreed to by most of 
the thinkers evaluated in Chapter 2; only John Owen and Adam Pelser are exceptions. It 
is this conflict that makes sense of the business owner example that I have used above. If 
they had no “struggle with” or “conflict with” the idea of tax fraud, then they would 
simply not be tempted. To recall my other example, if Casey had no internal conflict 
over continuing to grade or quit, then she is not actually “tempted to quit.” Internal 
conflict is intuitively necessary for temptation. More than that, though, conflict is also 
necessary in order to sufficiently narrow the scope of “temptation” so that it brackets out 
the right experiences. I unpack and defend this necessary condition in section 3.4 below.  
 So far, I have argued that (T) is not merely the state of having succumbed to 
temptation but also, and chiefly for this project, it is a state of experiencing temptation. 
Moreover, this state of experience does not require a tempter. Most pointedly, I have 
contended that (T) necessarily involves some internal conflict and desire. Furthermore, I 
have given reason for why (T) is a morally dubious experience. Given the arguments for 
these grounding concepts I can now offer a technical definition and then turn to the 
analytic defense of the necessary conditions entailed by that definition.  
 The analytically precise definition, and the defense of its necessary conditions, 
will allow me in Chapter 4 to compare and contrast (T) to akrasia/weakness of will and 
this will further the main argument of this project in two ways. First it will further clarify 
the concept of temptation, distinguish it from other related moral concepts, locate it in 
 
11 This does not imply that temptation is sometimes or always morally culpable. In Chapter 4 I 
will argue that at least some experiences of (T) are morally culpable but not all temptations are 
blameworthy.  
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moral philosophy/theology, and, finally, make coherent the account of (T) that I have 
defended. Second, this will serve, on the one hand, to make clear a major component of 
the main thesis of this project, and, thus, on the other hand, show the coherency of the 
main thesis. If the claim is that the possibility of (T) is necessary for the development of 
moral virtue, then it is required that we have a robust account of (T) so that it can be 
consistently and coherently interfaced with a neo-Aristotelian account of virtue 
formation. What follows will begin to fulfill that requirement.  
 
2 Toward a Precise Analytic Definition of (T) 
The conception of (T) emerging from critical analysis running through this study centers 
on desire but not to the exclusion of other psychic states or propositional attitudes, which 
may also function in the experience of (T). In fact, among the alternative ways to 
characterize temptation, one approach is to see it in terms of rationality. There are four 
essays that purport to describe temptation in this vein.12 Yet, their examinations are not 
about temptation per se—in fact, not a single essay attempts to offer an analysis of 
temptation; rather what is in view is akrasia.  
 In Chapter 4 I will argue that (T) is not the same as akrasia, but that temptation 
succumbed-to might, on some occasions, be akrasia (see section 2.2). Part of that 
argument is motivated by the ubiquitous equivocation between temptation and akrasia in 
the philosophical literature on akrasia. The bulk and force of my argument against the 
two being synonymous, however, rests on the general conception of akrasia as a rational 
conflict. If we accept that temptation just is akrasia—a kind of rational conflict whereby 
agents act against their better judgment—then we have an entire class of experiences that 
are no longer intuitively classifiable as temptation. That is to say, once temptation 
becomes a rational experience, what then becomes of the regular human experience of 
desire conflict formerly known as temptation? It can no longer be “temptation” but must 
be something else. Thus, if temptation is a rational experience, then the most common 
examples of temptation—for example, Casey and the business owner above—are not 
temptation. The implication of this is that temptation is a rather more rare occurrence 
than we typically think. This runs strongly counter to reflective intuition.  
 
12 Chrisoula Andreou, “Temptation and Deliberation,” PhSt 131, no. 3 (Dec. 2006): 583-606; 
Chrisoula Andreou, “Temptation, Resolutions, and Regret,” Inquiry 57, no. 3(2014): 275-92; and John 
Bigelow, Susan M. Dodds, and Robert Pargetter, “Temptation and the Will,” APhQ 27, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 
39-49; Michael Bratman, “Toxin, Temptation, and Stability of Intention,” in Rational Commitment and 
Social Justice, eds., Jules L. Coleman and Christopher W. Morris (New York: CUP, 1998), 59-83.  
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 It is pertinent that temptation as a rational experience faces another problem. 
Such a view would likely have to accept that human actions are primarily motivated by 
reason or belief, the so-called Anti-Humean theory of action and moral psychology.13 
The Anti-Humean theory of human action is defensible but it is also freighted with 
serious problems, so argue the proponents of the so-called Humean theory of action and 
moral psychology.14 Grounding temptation in a conative state, like desire, does not 
require adoption of either Anti-Humeanism or Humeanism, since both allow that some 
desires are motivational. Therefore, not only does grounding (T) in desire comport well 
with the biblical data—no small issue for analytic moral theology—but it also coheres 
with data in moral philosophy and positions the account quite well for adaptation by 
competing views in philosophy of action and moral psychology.  
 Here, then, is the precise analytic definition of (T) that culminates the preceding 
arguments:   
(T)=def. Temptation is an internal psychic conflict whereby a temptee TE desires 
some state of affairs, which state of affairs or the desire for the state of affairs the 
TE judges to be bad, and simultaneously the TE has some other psychic state 
that conflicts with the obtaining of or desire for the bad state of affairs and which 
state is seen as morally superior. 
 
A couple of explanatory points are needed before I draw out the necessary conditions 
entailed in this definition and offer their defense. First, by “psychic” I mean a broad 
semantic range of either cognitive, conative, or affective states; where “cognitive” refers 
to rational states such as belief, reasons, judgment, resolutions, and so on; where 
“conative” refers to non-rational, pro-attitude states such as desire, hope, wish, intention, 
and so on; and where “affective” refers to both emotional and appetitive states. Second, 
“state of affairs” refers to some aspect of the way the world is that can either obtain, be 
actual, or not obtain, not be actual.15 States of affairs can be action(s) or ends/goals. For 
 
13 Russ Schafer-Landau, “A Defense of Motivational Externalism,” PhSt 97 (2000): 267-91; Russ 
Schafer-Landau, “Moral Motivation and Moral Judgment,” PhQ 48 (1998): 353-8; Thomas Scanlon, What 
We Owe Each Other, (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1998); John McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” Monist 62 
(1979): 331-50.  
14 Michael Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation,” Mind 96, no. 381 (Jan., 1987): 36-61; 
Mark Schroeder, “The Humean Theory of Reasons,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed., Russ Schafer-
Landau, vol., 2 (New York: OUP, 2007), 195-219; Neil Sinhababu, “The Humean Theory of Motivation 
Reformulated and Defended,” PhR 118, no. 4 (2009): 465-500.  
 Its being called the “Humean theory” does not necessarily indicate that this is precisely what 
David Hume held, only that this view has affinity with Hume’s views (Smith, “Humean Theory,” 52). For 
a comparison view on Hume, see Annette C. Baier, “The Ambiguous Limits of Desire,” in The Ways of 
Desire, 52-7.  
15 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (New York: OUP, 1974), 44. 
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example, a temptee might desire the state of affairs “possessing Bill Gates’s watch” or 
“verbally degrading my supervisor.” The use of “state of affairs” is to intentionally 
capture the innumerable variety of possibilities that a temptee might desire in 
experiencing (T).  
 In the remainder of the text, following methodological conventions in analytic 
philosophy, as noted above, I will use the following variables: (T) for the specific 
account of temptation, TE for “temptee,” the person who is experiencing the state of 
being tempted; “P” for a general person or agent when there is not a specific experience 
of temptation being discussed (for example, P desires to eat a cookie); and “X” for that 
which is desired by TE or P, which may be an object, action(s), or goal— what I call a 
“state of affairs.” Finally, following the conventions in philosophy of action, I will use 
the Greek letter “φ” to signify possible action(s). For example, “TE desires to φ” or “P is 
φ-ing.” 
 
3 The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Experience of (T) 
It is now time to scrutinize various necessary conditions that are entailed in the precise 
analytic conception of (T) I have argued for above. This will serve to further substantiate 
the concept while also making more precise the account of (T). Chapter 4 will build on 
this foundation by comparing the account of (T) here to the nature of akrasia. The 
argument of that chapter is that akrasia and (T) are different but that temptation 
succumbed-to is sometimes akrasia. Furthermore, these necessary conditions work to 
clarify a chief component of the thesis of this project, namely: if human persons are to 
develop the moral virtues, then the possibility of temptation is necessary. The arguments 
of this chapter and the next will ensure the puzzle pieces of the final argument fit 
together consistently and coherently.  
 Here, then, are the necessary, and potentially jointly sufficient, conditions that 
follow from my definition. In order to experience (T), a person must experience 
conditions (1)-(5) conjunctively:16 
(1) The temptee TE has a desire for some state of affairs, X, or action φ. 
(2) TE’s desire for X is such that it could motivate to action in order to do φ or 
obtain X. 
(3) TE believes X/φ or the desire for X/φ, or both, is bad. 
 
16 As the following argument line unfolds, these conditions will frequently be cited simply by 
their number in order to be both efficient and accommodate typical analytic style. 
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(4) TE has, concurrent with a desire for X/φ, some other psychic state, Y, that 
conflicts with X’s obtaining, with desiring X, or with φ-ing. 
(5) TE sees Y as morally superior to X/φ. 
 
Under analysis, it is reasonable to hold that these conditions being met does not suffice 
for one to have succumbed to (T). Rather this set of conditions merely characterizes 
analytically what “the state of being tempted” is. Whether TE has succumbed to 
temptation or not is not entailed by this set. For TE to succumb to temptation, one further 
condition needs to be met: 
(6) TE pursues actualization, in some capacity, of the desire for X or φ and gives 
up, rejects, or ignores the psychic conflict, Y. 
 
When conditions (1)-(5) are met, then (T) is experienced; the addition of condition (6) 
moves the experience of (T) simpliciter to succumbing/-ed to temptation. This argument 
is further reinforced by fuller critical evaluation of the proposed conditions—a task to 
which we now turn. In developing the argument for this I will not focus on temptation 
succumbed-to. I turn to that in Chapter 4 where I argue the distinction between akrasia 
and (T). Moreover, I contend that conditions (1)-(5) are necessary for temptation but 
only that they may be jointly sufficient. It is not the burden of the argument here to 
establish this logically stricter position. 
 
3.1 Condition (1): TE’s Desire for X and the Nature of Desire 
In Chapter 2, I criticized the desired-based accounts of temptation for not being clear on 
their conception of desire by either not offering any account of desire or by presuming 
some account but offering no explanation or defense. Lest I make the same mistake, I 
will argue for a particular view of desire. Indeed, there are several ways in which desire 
might be understood.17 Therefore, I argue that the best conception of desire for (T) is that 
(i) “to desire” is “to want;”18 (ii) desires of this kind can be either “volitive desire” or 
“appetitive desire;”19 (iii) these desires may be either intrinsic, extrinsic, hybrid, or 
realizer desires20 but not merely physical states; and, finally, (iv) the kind of desire 
 
17 For a clear differentiation of the various theories of desire see Tim Schroeder, “Desire,” SEP, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2015 edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/desire/. 
18 Alfred Mele, Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior (New York: OUP, 1992), 
47. 
19 Wayne Davis, “The Two Sense of Desire,” in The Ways of Desire, 63-4. 
20 Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, In Praise of Desire (New York: OUP, 2014), 6-13. 
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involved in (T) is occurrent (current and active) rather than standing (backgrounded) and 
not merely fleeting (non-motivating and ephemeral). 
 
3.1.1 Tempting Desire is to Want 
Put simply, to desire something is to be in a particular psychological state, the state of 
wanting that thing: for P to desire X, P wants X.21 But, as Harry Frankfurt has contended, 
the relation between want and desire requires further clarification. I submit that 
Frankfurt’s contribution on this point is crucial to our progress, and I further argue that 
his distinction between first- and second-order desires adds necessary nuance to my 
account of (T).22  
 To desire X is to have a volitional inclination23 (that is, to want) for some state of 
affairs that puts the person in an internal posture that could lead them to act in whatever 
way that the person believes could bring about X.24 Robert Stalnaker captures the view 
well: “To desire that [X] is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to bring it about 
that [X] in a world in which one’s beliefs, whatever they are, were true.”25 Thus 
conceived, I argue for an action-based account of desire that takes as its target states of 
affairs. Put more simply, to desire X is to want X in a way that disposes the person to act 
in such a way that the person thinks they will get X.26 In Wayne Davis’s account, the 
sense here is “volitive desire,” which he takes to be synonymous with “want,” “wish,” 
 
21 Joel Marks, “Introduction,” in The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on 
the Concept of Wanting, ed. Joel Marks (Chicago: Precedent Pub., Inc., 1986), 2. This entire volume takes 
“desires” and “wants” to be largely interchangeable, but also notices that various nuances might 
distinguish the two.   
 22 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in The Importance of 
What We Care About (New York: CUP, 1988), 12-13. Unless otherwise noted all quotations from 
Frankfurt’s works will come from this collection.  
23 Some philosophers distinguish  “volition” understood as “will” between a mental faculty that is 
the power to choose and an attitude or collection of attitudes (cf., Laura W. Ekstrom, “Volition and the 
Will,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, eds. Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis 
[Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2010], 99-107). Either account will work with my argument, but my 
argument assumes the view that volition is an attitude or set of attitudes (following Harry Frankfurt). 
Those who hold to the faculty view can excise “volition” from my arguments without any loss to the 
argument itself. 
24 This argument, then, agrees with the standard view held variously by Nomy Arpaly, Timothy 
Schroeder, Michael Smith, Alfred Mele, Michael Bratman, whose works are cited throughout the 
following arguments. Candace Vogler differs from this “psychologism” view and offers instead a 
“calculative view; see Reasonably Vicious (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 2002). 
25 Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 15; quoted in Peter Railton, 
“That Obscure Object, Desire,” APA 86, no. 2 (November 2012): 22.  
26 This account tracks broadly with G.E.M. Anscombe’s view on intention, desire, and action (see 
Intention, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1963]), but follows the more nuanced accounts of Wayne 
Davis, Joel Marks, and Dennis Stampe found in The Ways of Desire, as well as Michael Smith, op. cit. 
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and “would like.”27 While there are nuances of grammatical difference in these different 
locutions, they all capture the meaning of desire-as-want defended here.  
 Although at this stage of development here, the important conception of desire is 
rather broad, it is not just any pro-attitude and must be further parsed.28 The conception 
of desire I am advancing here is coextensive with Frankfurt’s concept of first-order 
desires. However, Frankfurt contends that “want” is not coextensive with first-order 
desire but conceives it as going beyond desire by being a stronger inner state.29 
Frankfurt’s distinction between will and desire is that the term “will” is used to mean 
something more motivating than mere desire: “will”—in the sense of “P wants to φ”—
“is the notion of an effective desire—one that moves (or will or would move) a person all 
the way to action”—to φ.30  
 It is important here to observe that the kind of desire pertinent to (T) need not be 
fully motivating to action.31 An inner state is still legitimately a desire state or desire if it 
“merely inclines an agent in some degree to act in a certain way,” which is Frankfurt’s 
point regarding first-order desires. Therefore, in the experience of (T), a person’s desire 
for X need not in all cases (although it may in some) be the kind of desire that will, as a 
matter of fact, move that person all the way to action. All that is needed for temptation’s 
desire is that the desire could lead to action, a point I defend more fully below (section 
3.2). Certainly, Frankfurt’s effectively motivating desire fits the parameters of condition 
(1), but so does the less effective version. That is to say, if condition (1) can be met with 
a kind of desire that is less motivating than Frankfurt’s “will,” then all the more will it be 
met by his greater motivating “desire.” My account of (T) accommodates desire as both 
strongly motivating (will act) and weakly motivating (could act). The crucial point is that 
(T) involves a desire that has motivational force. A desire for something that has no 
actual motivating power for a person is not the kind of desire that would make for 
temptation. For example, suppose that Stéphane Breitwieser, the world’s greatest art 
 
27 Wayne Davis, “The Two Sense of Desire,” in The Ways of Desire, 63-4.. 
28 Jennifer Hawkins, “Desiring the Bad Under the Guise of the Good,” PhQ 58, no. 231 (Apr., 
2008): 245. 
29 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will,” 14. 
 30 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will,” 14. Robert Audi, along different lines, also makes a 
distinction between wanting and desiring but it is clear in his conception that there is inclusive overlap (see 
“Intending, Intentional Action, and Desire,” in The Ways of Desire, 21).  
31 A pure action-based theory of desire would suggest otherwise: to desire X just is to be disposed 
to act to obtain X. This seems to be G.E.M. Anscombe’s view (see Intention, 68; cf., Schroeder, “Desire,” 
§1.1). I agree with Arpaly and Schroeder’s argument that in healthy and sane agents some desires do not 
motivate to action (see In Praise of Desire [New York: OUP, 2014], 95-100). 
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thief, is perusing a local small-town history museum.32 The exhibits are quaint and hardly 
interest piquing for the professional. There is one particular carving that is nice: it is 
small and well-detailed. Breitwieser wants the statue for his collection—he desires the 
statue. But his desire is not very strong. In fact, he is not at all motivated to steal the 
statue. It is nice, he would not mind having it, but he is not inclined to take it, although 
he could with ease. Although Breitwieser has a desire for X, it is not enough to constitute 
(T): Breitwieser is not tempted to take the statue. This makes intuitive sense and is 
coherent with reflective opinion on desire. Temptation, therefore, requires a kind of 
desire that is minimally motivating. 
 Motivating desires sometimes arise in persons unbidden. Indeed, R. Jay Wallace 
rightly argues that desires can be the kinds of mental experiences that persons just find 
themselves having;33 and, that at least some desires are the kinds of volitions that precede 
deliberation.34 Indeed, one such class of these desires is called “appetitive desires” and 
these desires are aptly described by Wayne Davis as “hungering,” “craving,” “yearning,” 
“longing,” and “urge.”35 But it is not simply appetitive desires that sometimes arise 
unbidden; so do volitional desires. Could unbidden desires constitute a desire that makes 
up (T)? I contend that the answer is yes. To be in a state of “could be motivated to 
action,” which state is required for (T), is not relegated only to reflective or bidden 
volitional or appetitive desire. Both volitional and appetitive desires are the kinds of 
desires that could motivate to action and are subject to moral judgment—they can be 
judged to be bad. Unbidden desires, then, can meet conditions (1), be a desire, (2), be a 
motivating desire, and (3), be a desire that is judged morally bad. Consider again 
Breitwieser the art thief. This time he is visiting his favorite target, the Art & History 
Museum in Brussels, Belgium—he has already stolen 13 items from here. This is to be a 
reconnaissance visit, but he notices an antique chalice and immediately he has a desire to 
steal it. The desire strikes him unbidden and it is strong enough to potentially move 
Breitwieser to action: he is tempted to steal the chalice. The intuitive sense this case 
makes substantiates the argument that even desires that strike unbidden can be the kind 
involved in (T). So far, then, the kind of desire needed for (T) is that which is minimally 
 
32 For a fascinating write-up on Stéphane Breitwieser see Michael Finkel, “The Secrets of the 
World’s Greatest Art Thief,” GQ Magazine, 28 February 2019, https://www.gq.com/story/secrets-of-the-
worlds-greatest-art-thief; accessed, 06 July 2020.  
33 R. Jay Wallace, The View from Here: On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret 
(New York: OUP, 2013), 54. 
34 Wallace, The View from Here, 55. 
35 Wayne Davis, “The Two Sense of Desire,” 64. 
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motivating, can be either volitional or appetitive desires, and these desires can be the 
kinds that persons simply find themselves having. Yet, there is another class of states tied 
to appetites that persons just find themselves having, are these the kinds that could be 
involved in temptation?  
 Mere appetitive states, like basic hunger, for example, which are generally due to 
our animal nature shared with the rest of the animal kingdom, do not constitute desire in 
the precise sense in which we are focusing for (T) and thus do not play a role in the 
temptation process per se. This means that a person cannot experience (T) on the basis of 
their mere physical drives per se; instead, these drives must be cognized somehow and 
made part of one’s mental life. In this case, the kind of desire that must be involved for 
(T) to possibly occur are conative—that is, they are a distinct part of the psychic space 
from physical appetites. The mere physical urge to eat or procreate, for example, are not 
the kinds of “wants” that constitute desires necessary for (T). Temptation is an 
experience, in this sense, limited to persons who have a complex moral psychological 
structure such that they can differentiate between desires, or objects of desire, that are 
good or bad. Mere physical states are neither good nor bad. Casey’s state of mental 
exhaustion due to grading is not enough to constitute her being tempted to quit grading. 
Once it couples with a volitional or appetitive desire, however, (T) is possible. The 
nature of desire in (T) is now clearer. However, more refinement is needed.  
 
3.1.2 Tempting Desires Can be Intrinsic, Instrumental, or Hybrid 
To further clarify the nature of desire involved in (T), we must note the distinction 
between intrinsic, instrumental, and hybrid desires and determine which if any are the 
kinds involved in (T). I argue that either intrinsic or instrumental desires could satisfy 
condition (1) above. As Wayne Davis has contended, “A desire is [instrumental] if its 
object is desired as a means to something else that is desired, intrinsic if the object is 
desired as an end in itself.”36 Wanting a blanket is normally an instrumental desire since 
the blanket is a means to another desire (warmth, comfort, etc.).37 For instance, being 
 
 36 Davis, “Two Senses of Desire,” 69. 
37 David Chan argues that “instrumental desire” is theoretically redundant because, as such, it 
doesn’t add nuance or clarity to discussion of action and motivation: “Are There Extrinsic Desires?” Nous 
38, no. 2 (Jun, 2004): 326-50. Chan doesn’t deny that conative states motivate in complicated ways, but he 
does contend that instrumental desire is an unnecessary distinction once we properly have desire and 
intention understood. This position is troubled. Not least because it runs counter to prevailing scholarship 
on desire (e.g., see Arpaly and Schroeder, In Praise of Desire, 6-14), but more importantly this view is 
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desirous of joy is intrinsic since, normally, joy is sought for its own sake and not as a 
means to another end. Some desires are neither merely instrumental or intrinsic but 
hybrid—they are an integration of instrumental and intrinsic desire. Socrates’s 
conception of goods in the Republic is illustrative here: some things are good 
independent of the consequences, others are good only in virtue of the consequences, and 
still others are good in both senses.38 Socrates’s own example of this third category 
makes my current point. People desire health and knowledge both for their own sakes 
and also for their consequences, which are also desired (for example, physical well-being 
and greater competency in the world).  Thus, something can be desired for its own sake 
and for the sake of something else. 
 Regarding (T), this distinction between intrinsic, instrumental and hybrid desires 
is illuminated by considering some examples. The idea that an intrinsic desire can qualify 
as a possible desire that is active in (T) is not likely to be controversial, since most 
simplistic cases of temptation seem to involve just such desires. For example, 
Breitwieser’s desire for an ivory carving—he desires it for its own sake and therefore his 
temptation involves an intrinsic desire. While not as simplistic as intrinsic desire, 
instrumental desires add needed nuance to make sense of many typical cases of 
temptation. For example, Breitwieser’s desire to steal a painting is elucidated by 
attention to the variety of desires operative in him. Typically, a painting might be a kind 
of thing one owns for its own sake. However, some of Breitwieser’s thefts were for the 
thrill of getting away with it. The desire to steal the painting was only instrumental to the 
desire to take something of value and not get caught. Thus, when he is tempted to steal, 
the operative desire could be instrumental. This makes intuitive sense and is coherent 
with the arguments forwarded to this point. Temptation, therefore, can involve 
instrumental desires. Finally, Hybrid desires also comport with this account of (T). 
Persons can experience (T) based in a desire that is both instrumental and intrinsic. 
Consider, again, the intrepid art thief Stéphane Breitwieser, who never sells any of the art 
 
problematic because, as a matter of fact, instrumental desires offer a category of nuance to human action 
that cannot be made sense of by intrinsic desires alone. 
 38 Plato, Republic, 2.357b-358a, trans. GMA Grube, in Plato: Complete Works, ed., John M. 
Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Pub. Co., 1997), 998-9. See also, Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering 
Right & Wrong, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), 61-2. For a variant reading 
of Plato, see Robert Heinaman, “Plato’s Division of Good in the Republic,” Phronesis 47, no. 4 (2002): 
309-35. For convenience I will ignore the interesting and important debate regarding the true source of 
information in Plato’s writings. Nothing in the present project rides on whether it is actually Plato or 
Socrates, thus I will variously use either name to reference the work (mostly) written by Plato purportedly 
to be about his teacher Socrates without indicating in one direction or another whose thoughts I aim to be 
utilizing.  
 78 
he steals. His temptation to steal some portrait is not based in a mere instrumental desire 
to gain more wealth. Yet, he has said that when stealing it is often not the piece of art 
alone that draws his desire but also the process of the theft.39 When facing temptation to 
take some artwork, his desire for the art is both instrumental and intrinsic: he desires the 
art for itself but also for the thrill of stealing. As with both intrinsic and instrumental 
desires in (T), this is intuitively sensical and coherent with the arguments offered thus 
far; therefore, (T) can also involve hybrid desires. This is true, as I argue above, so long 
as these desires have some motivational force for the temptee.  
 To this stage, I have argued that (T) involves desire understood as “to want” 
either volitionally or appetitively, but not merely physically; that tempting desire is at 
least minimally action motivating; and that tempting desire can be either instrumental, 
intrinsic or a hybrid of both. I have left in the background an assumption that needs 
attention and defense, namely that the desire in (T) needs to be occurrent rather than 
standing. I will argue for this in the next section.  
 
3.1.3 Tempting Desires are Occurrent Desires 
I contend that the desire required for (T) must be occurrent rather than simply standing. 
An occurrent desire is one that plays some active role in the mental life of the agent.40 
More technically, an occurrent desire is “a desire that takes the form of an episodic 
mental event that a person has at a particular moment when the relevant conditions are 
satisfied.”41 Casey’s actively wanting to break from grading such that she’s cognizant of 
her desire constitutes having an occurrent desire to quit grading. Standing desires, 
however, “are desires one has that are not playing any role in one's psyche at the 
moment.”42 Standing desires are “background” wants that “are not motivation 
encompassing” attitudes; that is, they do not motivate agents to action.43 Suppose that 
while driving to the art museum, Breitwieser has a desire to leave empty-handed this 
time but upon entering the Johannes Vermeer exhibit this desire recedes to the 
background of his psychic space—Breitwieser has a standing desire to leave the museum 
 
39 Finkel, “Secrets of the World’s Greatest Art Thief.”  
40 Schroeder, “Desire,” §2.4. 
41 Caj Strandberg, “Expressivism and Dispositional Desires,” APhQ 49, no. 1 (2012): 83. 
42 Schroeder, “Desire,” §2.4. 
43 Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency (New York: OUP, 2003), 33. To be a “motivation-
encompassing attitude,” Mele argues, is for an attitude to include or constitute motivation (34).  
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free of any purloined art. To this conception of standing desire, Alfred Mele offers a 
further distinction that will help nuance the argument: a standing desire for X is the 
ongoing tendency to desire X based on having had frequent occurrent desires for X.44 Let 
us call these further distinguished standing desires “dispositional-standing desires.” 
Dispositional-standing desires are wants that are psychically inactive and that spring 
from a history of having occurrent desires of that type. We now have three iterations of 
desire’s role in a person’s mental life: occurrent desires, standing desires, and standing-
dispositional desires.  
 Occurrent desires are the paradigmatic desires involved in (T): the experience of 
temptation necessarily involves being aware of one’s desire, thus this desire must occupy 
active psychic space in the temptee. A dispositional-standing desire is a tendency to 
desire something and this tendency, along with typical standing desires, holds no active 
or motivating role in the agent’s psychic space. I argue that desires that play no active 
role in the person’s mental space could not constitute (T). Standing desires fail to 
motivate and thus fail condition (2). Failing one of the necessary conditions entails 
failing to be tempted; thus, standing desires fail to meet the standard of (T). Arguably, 
Breitwieser has a standing desire to steal art. When he is next in an art gallery and not 
actively having the desire to steal art, it would be nonsensical to say that he is tempted to 
steal art based on his non-motivating, psychically inactive tendency to desire to steal art. 
Temptation based in standing desire is incoherent and therefore false: (T) requires 
occurrent desire. This occurrent desire in (T), however, can stem from a dispositional-
standing desire: a tendency that has formed from frequent occurrent desires of the same 
type, so long as this occurrent desire is motivational.  
 In this section I have argued that the kind of desire needed in order to be in a state 
of (T) is (i) a “want” for something, (ii) it is occurrent, that is, it plays some active role in 
the psychic life of the temptee, (iii) it is motivational, it is the kind of desire that could 
motivate to action, and (iv) it can be either intrinsic, instrumental, or hybrid. This section 
has substantiated the account of (T) I argue for in a way that previous accounts have not. 
It has clearly located the notion of desire at work in the landscape of philosophy of action 
and moral psychology. In so doing this section as set the stage for two further arguments: 
first in Chapter 4 where (T) is compared to akrasia and second in Chapter 5 where (T) is 
located within the process of virtue formation. Both of these forward the ultimate 
 
44 Mele, Motivation and Agency, 35. 
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argument of this project. The next section offers further explanation and argument for the 
second condition: that the tempting desire must be motivating.  
 
3.2 Condition (2): On the Link Between Desire, Motivation, and Action 
This section furthers the current argument in two ways. First it further substantiates the 
precise analytic definition initially defended in section 1.2 by arguing for the consistency 
of one of the entailed necessary conditions—condition (2). Second, in giving reasons for 
condition (2), this section argues for the coherency of the constructive account of (T) that 
I defend. Moreover, this contributes to the project’s thesis by incrementally establishing 
its coherency: for the thesis to be coherent, each of its parts must be individually 
consistent. This section will also aid Chapter 4’s argument that (T) and akrasia are 
different but related conceptions by showing that (T) is an experiential state prior to 
action whereas akrasia is a state of action or past action. 
 Recall Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between first-order desires and “will” 
discussed in section 3.1.1 above. According to Frankfurt, an agent who “wants”/“wills” 
something is motivated to, as a matter of fact, act to obtain their desire.45 First-order 
desires, where they are not coextensive with “want”/“wills,” Frankfurt notes, do not 
necessarily motivate.46 I argued that either conception, the “weaker” first-order desires or 
the “stronger” “will,” meet condition (1), “TE has a desire for X.” However, the question 
at hand is this: does this weaker conception of desire/wanting meet the requirements of 
(2): “TE’s desire for X is such that it could motivate to action”? In this section, I argue 
that it does meet condition (2). I establish this by arguing that (T) does not require a 
strong “will motivate” conception of desire but only a weaker “could motivate” 
conception of desire. 
 
 
45 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will,” 12-13.  
46 Roy Baumeister construes wanting simply as motivating such that to want or desire something 
just is to be motivated for that thing; although it is recognized that not all wants/motivations issue in action 
(cf. “Toward a General Theory of Motivation: Problems, Challenges, Opportunities, and the Big Picture,” 
MoEm 40 [2016]: 1-10).  
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3.2.1 (T) and Desire’s Motivational Strength 
It is widely accepted among philosophers of action that desires come in degrees of 
strength.47 Persons experience volitional inclinations in more or less motivating 
degrees.48 Therefore, for a desire to be a temptation, according to my argument, is for it 
to be of the kind that could motivate a person to action. The desire that instigates (T) is 
not necessarily “the desire which actually prevails, the desire on which the agent acts.”49 
Desire for X, then, need be only “contingently” motivating rather than “essentially” 
motivating. Alfred Mele explains the difference between contingently and essentially 
motivating:  
An attitude of an agent S essentially encompasses motivation to A if and 
only if it encompasses motivation to A not only in S’s actual situation but 
also in all possible scenarios in which S has that attitude; and an attitude 
of an agent S contingently encompasses motivation to A if and only if 
although, in S’s actual situation, it encompasses motivation to A, this is 
not the case in some possible scenarios in which S has that attitude.50  
 
Clearly, if a person were to have a desire so weak that it could not motivate them to 
action at all, then that desire would not meet the demands of (2). Such desires are 
possible, as R. Jay Wallace has argued: “[o]ne can feel drawn toward a course of action 
without actually intending to pursue it.”51 Yet, (T) requires desires with some 
motivational force, some inclination to act, even if not the kind of desire that “essentially 
encompasses motivation.” 
 This argument is reinforced by analyzing a basic case study of the biblical Eve:52  
Suppose that when the serpent offered to Eve the forbidden fruit with the concomitant 
option to become like God in a certain respect, Eve had some desire to become like God, 
but that this desire was so weak she would never act on it (perhaps because she had other 
 
47 Schroeder, “Desire,” §2.3. For a dissenting argument see Irving Thalberg, “Questions About 
Motivational Strength,” in Actions and Events, eds. Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1985), 88-103. 
48 Alfred Mele, “Motivational Strength,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, eds. 
Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2010), 259-60.  
49 Mele, “Motivational Strength,” 259. 
50 Mele, Motivation and Agency, 15.  
51 Wallace, The View from Here, 54. Arpaly and Schroeder argue for this as well; see Nomy 
Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, In Praise of Desire (New York, OUP, 2014), 94-97.  
52 Genesis 3.1-7 tells the story. My argument and analysis do not require or presume any 
interpretive framework or outcome of the temptation narrative in Genesis 3. As such I do not attend to the 
varied and vast literature regarding historical, theological, or textual issues in this pericope. I merely use 
the story as possible human case study.  
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more strongly motivating desires to obey God’s command not to eat the fruit or to fulfill 
the human task set before her and Adam). In this case, Eve meets condition (1)—she has 
a desire, X—but she fails to meet condition (2) because her desire is not motivating 
enough such that it could issue in action (either because it is always overridden by 
another desire or simply because it is not something she wants to the extent that the 
volition will move her to action). Thus, in this telling, Eve fails to be tempted and this is 
intuitively true for any person who has a desire so weak that it could not motivate them 
to action—that desire could not constitute temptation. Recall Stéphane Breitwieser, the 
world-renowned art thief mentioned above. If, while skulking through the French 
painting exhibit, he sights Georges de la Tour’s The Cheat with the Ace of Diamonds, 
and has a desire to steal it but the desire is very weak—too weak to even slightly 
motivate him to steal it—then Breitwieser is not tempted to steal the painting. These two 
cases indicate that the mere presence of desire does not constitute (T). Rather, the desire 
that meets condition (1) must also be the kind that could motivate to action, thus meeting 
condition (2).  
 
3.2.2 (T) and the Metaphysical or Epistemic Possibility of Obtaining X 
To further support my argument, let us consider an important alternative set of arguments 
that turn on an important distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility in 
regard to (T). One side of the argument contends that a temptee need not have the 
metaphysical possibility (that is, ability) of satisfying a desire for X in order for (T) to 
occur, but only the epistemic possibility (that is, involving thought or belief) of satisfying 
a desire for X in order for (T) to occur.53 In contrast, the other side contends that both 
metaphysical possibility and epistemic possibility are necessary for (T) to occur.54  
 The latter, more stringent, view—call it the “ability+belief view”—contends that 
to be in a state of experiencing temptation there must be both (i) a desire that is 
metaphysically able to be satisfied in the actual world and (ii) an epistemic attitude 
regarding the metaphysical possibility of the satisfaction of the desire for X.  For 
example, in order for Eve to be tempted it must be metaphysically possible for her to 
obtain her desire for X and she must believe that it is possible to obtain X. The former, 
more permissive, view—call it the “belief-only view”—by contrast, contends that 
 
 53 Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 
147-53. 
54  David Werther, “The Temptation of God Incarnate,” RelStud 29, no. 1 (Mar. 1993): 47-50.  
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metaphysical ability is not necessary for (T) but rather all that is needed is epistemic 
possibility—the temptee needs merely believe (even if mistakenly) that the ability to 
satisfy their desire for X is an actual-world possibility. This epistemic state is possible 
even if there is no metaphysical or actual-world possibility. Which view is condition (2), 
and the arguments of this chapter, most consistent with, the “ability+belief view” or the 
“belief-only view”? 
 Returning to the case study of David and Bathsheba (adapted from 2 Sam 11 and 
used in Chapter 2, section 2.4.2), I argue that it shows the “belief-only view” is all that is 
needed for an experience of (T). Careful reflection on our informed intuitions affirms 
that (T) does not require metaphysical ability plus epistemic possibility. David, not the 
Israelite king but a regular soldier, is walking the city walls one evening and spots 
Bathsheba bathing on her rooftop. He has an occurrent, volitional, and motivating desire 
to sexually liaise with her—David meets conditions (1) and (2). As it turns out, however, 
what David sees is not a woman bathing but a play of shadows, the setting sun, and 
drying laundry. He thinks he sees a woman bathing, and, further, he believes he knows 
who she is—his commanding officer’s wife. Although David believes it is possible that 
he could rendezvous with Bathsheba, as it turns out, he is not only looking at the wrong 
house, with no actual person present, Bathsheba, unbeknownst to David, has recently 
died. There is no actual-world possibility of obtaining David’s desire. Yet, despite that, 
David is experiencing (T) (let us assume the other conditions are met).  
 If we accept that (T) requires the “ability+belief view,” then we are left with an 
intuitively absurd conclusion, namely that some “temptations” are not temptation at all 
but some other phenomenon. For example, Justin is unwittingly a part of a social science 
study on honesty. The experimenters in the study have created a hologram of a dropped 
wallet that appears quite real and full of money. Part of the experiment includes a clear 
plexiglass partition before the hologram that is so clear and seamless participants cannot 
see it. It is impossible to pick up the wallet: it does not exist nor is access to the spot 
passible. As Justin walks along, he sees the wallet and he has a desire to take the wallet 
(condition (1) is met). No one is around; it is a secluded area; he believes he is capable of 
picking up the wallet, and with the weight of student loans pressing, his desire is 
motivating (condition (2) is met). Yet, Justin is conflicted: he believes his desire to take 
the wallet is bad (meeting condition (3)) and he desires to be honest, which he knows is 
morally better (meeting conditions (4) and (5)). Justin is not experiencing (T) if the 
“ability+belief view” is true because Justin has no actual-world possibility of obtaining 
 84 
his illicit desire. But that is intuitively absurd: Justin’s case is a “textbook” instance of 
(T). Therefore, in order to experience (T), a temptee need only believe that their desire is 
possibly obtainable in the actual world. Temptation, thus, does not require the more 
stringent “ability+belief view” but only the more permissive “belief-only view.” 
 In this section I have argued that condition (2), “TEs desire for X is such that it 
could motivate to action,” requires only that the temptee’s desire have some motivational 
force. If a desire is not motivating at all, then it is not a desire implicated in temptation. 
Furthermore, I have argued that (T) does not require that the desire for X be 
metaphysically possible. Rather, all that (T) requires is that the temptee believe that their 
desire for X is metaphysically possible. This section establishes the broad scope of 
consistency that this condition has with reflectively intuitive cases of temptation and, 
therefore, further argues for the coherency of the account as a whole. The next section 
will examine condition (3), “TE believes X/φ or the desire for X/φ, or both, is bad.” 
 
3.3 Condition (3): Moral Judgment and Objective Morality in (T)  
This section argues that Condition (3)—“TE believes X/φ or the desire for X/φ, or both, 
is bad”—is self-consistent and essential for being in the state of (T).55 This contributes to 
the argument of the chapter by showing that the account of (T) argued for here is 
coherent. The following argument unfolds in two parts. First, I defend the claim that 
“X/φ or the desire for X/φ, or both, as bad” is necessary for (T) and that this condition 
makes sense of the intuition that temptation is morally troublesome. Second, I argue that 
belief rather than knowledge is required for (T). Finally, I address a line of objection to 
this condition and argue it fails to defeat it. Together, these arguments show that 
condition (3) is coherent.  
  
 
55 As I argue in section 3.2, my view of desire is informed by the leading theory of desire called 
“the action-based theory of action” (Schroeder, “Desire,” §1.1). This view of desire leaves open the 
relation between desire and pleasure and desire and goodness (Timothy Schroeder, “Desire and Pleasure,” 
in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action [Malden, MA: Blackwell, Pub., 2010], 115). Thus, my 
argument does not depend on the falsity of the good-based theory of desire (for a defense of this view see 
Graham Oddie, Value, Reality and Desire [New York: OUP, 2005]), but my argument would need revision 
if the good-based theory is true (for an argument for action-based desire see Michael Smith, “The Humean 
Theory of Motivation, op. cit.). My argument is more friendly to the pleasure-based theory of desire (for a 
defense of this view see Galen Strawson, Mental Reality, 2nd ed. [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010]) and 
my argument needs only slight changes if the reader is committed to the pleasure-based theory of desire.  
 85 
3.3.1 The Moral Dubiousness of (T) 
The third necessary condition is that the person believes the desired state of affairs is 
bad.56 A major factor distinguishing tempting desires from other desires is that there is a 
normative judgment made by the person about either the desire for X, action-φ, or X 
itself, or perhaps all three. Under this description, (T) is an internal conflict between a 
desire and a moral judgment, which judgment is seated in some other psychic state. 
Thus, it is an internal phenomenological conflict within the person’s consciousness. 
Furthermore, it is this conflict that gives (T) its “morally dubious” nature.57 Therefore, I 
will argue that the badness of X, the desire for it, or both serves two needed functions in 
temptation: (i) it is a distinguishing factor that brackets temptation off from other psychic 
conflicts and (ii) it makes sense of both the intuition that temptation is sometimes 
morally problematic and the biblical data that connects temptation to evil.  
 Temptation is not the only conflict of desire that persons experience. In Harry 
Frankfurt’s argument for first- and second-order desires, he frequently describes various 
desire conflicts, none of which does he assign to temptation and many of which are not 
obvious cases of temptation.58 To borrow an example from Richard Swinburne, the 
“desire to meet Linda in London on Monday evening and a desire to meet Elspeth in 
Edinburgh on Monday evening”59 are conflicting desires, but this is not a case of (T). The 
presence of desire conflict alone is not enough to constitute (T). It is a peculiar kind of 
conflict that accrues in (T). There are innumerable kinds of psychic conflicts that involve 
desire. Therefore, in order to mark off an appropriate subset of these experiences as 
temptation, some distinctives must attach to (T) that do not attach to other conative 
conflicts. I contend that it is the morally dubiousness of the fundamental desire that 
separates (T) from other experiences of desire conflict. Indeed, this makes intuitive sense 
of the casual and ubiquitous use of “temptation” to describe, for example, the desire to 
 
 56 I use the very general “bad” so as not to encumber the argument with normative or theological 
debates. Yet, it is “bad” as in “immoral.” I avoid other locutions of negative moral value for the following 
reasons. If “wrong” were used, then this might unduly locate the argument in deontological territory. Or, if 
“sin” were used this would both unnecessarily constraint the account theologically and narrow the scope of 
the badness to be coextensive with sin. Thus, I agree with Adam Pelser’s argument against connecting 
“sin” to temptation, but also disagree that the correct connection is virtue, as that would, again, too 
constrain the account from possible applicability to other ethical frameworks. Ultimately, I hold to the 
virtue ethical framework, and defend this is in Chapter 5, but want the account of (T) argued for here to 
coherent with a variety of normative and theological positions.  
 57 Hughes, “Logic of Temptation, “89. 
 58 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will,” 8, 9, 11-13.  
 59 Richard Swinburne, “Desire,” Philosophy 60, no. 4 (1985): 437.  
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eat another cookie60 or have cake instead of fruit.61 What marks these cases off as 
experiences of (T) in the mind of the temptee is that they think that the desire is illicit. 
Thus, judgment that X, φ, the desire for X, or all three is bad is necessary to (T), in part, 
because it is this judgment that makes the psychic conflict temptation and not some other 
kind of conflict.  
 Another argument for the necessity of the morally negative judgment toward X, 
φ, the desire for X, or all three is that it is this judgment that, in part, undergirds the 
notion that (T) is morally problematic. Not only does this judgment distinguish (T) from 
other internal conflicts but it also substantiates the intuition that (T) is sometimes morally 
bad. A couple of examples argue for this. The first example will argue that without the 
negative moral valuation, the reflectively intuitive moral weight of temptation is missing. 
The second example will argue that it is the moral judgment itself that contributes to the 
moral dubiety of temptation. Both of these arguments will be reaffirmed in section 3.5 
below. 
 Having narrowly passed the social science experiment involving the holographic 
wallet, Justin has just paid the coffee shop barista and notices that he has received too 
much back in change. It is no small error: he received back more than he paid by double. 
Justin has a desire to keep the extra money—meeting condition (1). It is obvious that the 
barista has missed the error and no one else notices the mistake. He also remembers his 
student loan payment and he is motivated to keep the extra money; thus, he meets 
condition (2). While he does not think his desire to keep the money is bad, he does not 
prefer his desire and he is concerned about the possible social stigma if others found out 
that he kept the money—Justin meets condition (4): he has a psychic state that conflicts 
with his desire to keep the money. This case is intuitively troubling. On the one hand, we 
want to say Justin is tempted but, on the other hand, something is wrong because this is 
not like temptation. I argue that what makes this case problematic for temptation is the 
missing element of moral evaluation. Merely not preferring a desire that is motivating 
and conflicts with another psychic state is short of what is needed for (T). This would be 
true for the range of attitudes that Justin might take toward his desire to the keep the 
money if those attitudes fail to also involve a negative moral judgment. We might judge 
that Justin is himself morally problematic, but it is odd to conclude that he is 
 
 60 Leftow, “Tempting,” 4-5.  
 61 Anirban Mukhopadhyay, Jaideep Sengupta and Suresh Ramanathan, “Recalling Past 
Temptations: An Information-Processing Perspective on the Dynamics of Self-Control,” JCR 35, no. 4 
(2008), 587, 594. 
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experiencing (T). If, however, his dislike changes to a negative moral judgment, then his 
scenario obviously becomes (T). This shows that condition (3) is necessary.  
 Aside from casual uses, “temptation” describes an experience that is itself 
morally freighted. Rarely is “I’m tempted to eat a second slice of pie” considered 
morally problematic, but neither is “I’m tempted to cheat on my spouse” considered 
morally neutral. This second thought experiment argues that condition (3) makes sense 
of why the state of being tempted is morally dubious: because paradigm cases of 
temptation involve states of affairs that are considered morally bad by those experiencing 
temptation. When David sees Bathsheba and desires a sexual encounter with her, this 
desire alone is not enough to constitute (T). After all, this desire might simply be 
expressive of his animal nature, a simple sexual appetite. However, when the situation is 
filled in, the morally problematic nature comes out. David desires to have sex with 
Bathsheba—meeting condition (1). This is not a mere fleeting, physical urge; it is an 
occurrent, volition, and motivating desire; thus, it meets condition (2). As a committed 
Hebrew, David knows that sex with another person’s spouse is morally forbidden and, 
therefore, he believes his desire for Bathsheba is bad—David meets conditions (3), (4), 
and (5). What makes David’s experience of temptation morally problematic cannot only 
be the mere fact that he has a sexual desire for Bathsheba, even a volitional, motivating 
desire. Rather, it is problematic in light of condition (3): David desires something that he 
judges to be bad. The point of this argument is not that David is morally culpable, rather 
it is only that David’s experience of (T), which in form if not detail is paradigmatic, is 
itself morally troubling.  
 Here is a second line of argument for (T) being morally dubious that parallels 
philosophical reflection on moral integrity.62 I contend that (T) is a kind of threat to the 
TE’s moral integrity (here “moral integrity” is understood as a quality of a person63) and 
as such is a morally dubious experience. To act with moral integrity is to act without 
internal conflict regarding one’s value judgments. As Morten Morgelssen argues, “Moral 
integrity implies having an internally consistent set of basic moral ideas and principles, 
 
 62 The literature most helpful here comes from discussions of conscientious objection in medical 
ethics and bioethics. See especially, Morten Magelssen, “When Should Conscientious Objection be 
Accepted?” JME 38, no. 1 (January 2012): 18-21; Mark R. Wicclair, “Conscientious Objection in 
Medicine,” Bioethics 14, no. 2 (2000): 205-27; and Vicki D. Lachman, “Conscientious Objection in 
Nursing: Definition and Criterial for Acceptance,” MEDSURG Nursing 23, no. 3 (May-June 2014): 196-
98.  
 63 Grant R. Gillet, “Informed Consent and Moral Integrity,” JME 15, no. 3 (1989): 121. 
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and being able to live and act in accordance with these.”64 In other words, moral integrity 
is consistency in one’s moral judgments, beliefs, desires, and actions—it is the state of 
being undivided or whole.65 Moral integrity is what Harry Frankfurt calls, in a different 
context, “wholeheartedness”—a person who is undivided within themselves: their desires 
and will are aligned.66 A person with moral integrity does not believe their desires run 
counter to their other normative psychic states. The experience of (T) is a threat to moral 
integrity in that it requires an internal divide that mirrors the breakdown of moral 
integrity. As Lynne McFall contends, the person who succumbs to temptation suffers a 
loss to their moral integrity.67 The argument here is not that temptation itself is a lack of 
moral integrity. Rather, we should notice that moral integrity has already been fractured 
prior to temptation and the experience of temptation further threatens to undermine a 
person’s already fragile moral integrity. This is how the one who overcomes temptation 
has stronger moral integrity than the one who succumbs—yet they both are suffering a 
loss of wholeheartedness.68 Thus, (T) is a morally dubious experience because it is at 
once a moral experience involving an “outlaw”69 desire and is simultaneously predicated 
on an internal moral conflict. 
 This section has argued that condition (3) is a necessary condition for (T) because 
(i) condition (3) serves to differentiate (T) from other desire-psychic conflicts, and (ii) 
condition (3) gives justification to the intuition that (T) both involves moral desires and 
moral judgment and is an experience that is morally weighted.  
 
3.3.2 Believing or Knowing that X is Bad in (T)  
In analyzing this phenomenological conflict, I emphasize the subjective “believes” in 
condition (3) because it is not necessary that X, φ, or the desire for X be objectively 
immoral, although it may be. Rather, as I argue in this section, it is only necessary that 
the person believe it to be the case that one or more is immoral in order to experience 
 
 64 Magelssen, “Conscientious Objection,” 18.  
 65 Lynne McFall, “Integrity,” Ethics 98, no. 1 (1987): 7. 
 66 Harry Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in Perspectives on Moral 
Responsibility, eds. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (Ithaca, NY: CUP, 1993), 176; cf. Damian 
Cox, Marguerite La Caze, and Michael Levine, “Integrity,” SEPI, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2017 
edition),  https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/integrity/, §1. For a view different than 
Frankfurt’s see Gabriele Taylor, “Integrity,” PAS 55 (1981): 143-59. 
 67 McFall, “Integrity,” 7, 9.  
 68 McFall, “Integrity,” 7. 
69 Cox, La Caze, and Levine, “Integrity,” §1. 
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(T). Paul Hughes poses the question this section answers, “does temptation require 
knowledge or merely the belief that the object of temptation is evil?”70 I argue that 
knowledge is not required and, thus, only belief is required. 
 The first reason that belief is enough for condition (3) is because knowledge is 
too stringent of a requirement. While there is much debate in philosophy regarding the 
nature of knowledge, the traditional account of “to know” is that this mental state 
requires “justified true belief.”71 In order to know something, then, a person must have a 
belief that is both justified and true. Thus, for TE to know that X is bad is for TE to 
believe it is bad and for that belief to be both true and justified. While settling the 
requirements of justification is hard enough, I argue that it is the truth requirement that 
suggests (T) does not require knowledge. Suppose Casey is conflicted between her desire 
to finish grading papers and her desire to quit and relax. If (T) requires knowledge then 
Casey must know that her desire to quit is immoral and this requires the truth of the 
following proposition, p, “quitting and relaxing at this time and in this way is immoral.” 
The truth of p, however, depends upon the truth of other very contentious ethical claims. 
First, in order for p to be true, then ethical objectivism or relativism is true and moral 
anti-realism is false.72 Yet, the mere experience of (T) cannot ride on whether this 
sophisticated ethical debate is settled truthfully in the mind of the TE. Second, in order 
for p to be true, then some normative ethical theory is true, and Casey is aware of it such 
that she is justified in believing that p is true. Again, the experience of (T) cannot be 
determined by TE’s justified belief in complex and contested ethical theory.73 Not only 
are these two areas of ethics highly contentious among dedicated philosophers in the 
field, very few non-specialists are aware of the prevailing theories let alone the detailed 
arguments. Therefore, if knowledge is required for (T), then for anyone to be tempted 
they will need to be moral philosophers. This standard is absurdly high and entirely 
counterintuitive and therefore not required. All Casey needs in order to be tempted is the 
belief that her desire to quit and relax is bad.  
 
 70 Hughes, “Logic of Temptation,” 95.  
 71 Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Matthias Steup, “The Analysis of Knowledge,” SEP, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2018 edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-
analysis/, §1; cf. Matthias Steup and Ram Neta, “Epistemology,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2020 
edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/epistemology/, §2.3. 
 72 On the arguments for/against ethical objectivism, relativism, and anti-realism see Russ Shafer-
Landau, The Fundamentals of Ethics, 3rd ed. (New York: OUP, 2015), chs. 19-21. 
 73 On the debate between various normative theories see Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit, and 
Michael Slote, The Methods of Ethics, Great Debates in Philosophy, ed. Ernest Sosa (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Pub., 1997). 
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 The second reason that belief is enough for condition (3) is related to the first: the 
strict standard of knowledge will entail that nearly all paradigm cases of temptation are 
not (T) but some other phenomenon.74 Imagine, for example, that Jesse is holding to a 
religious fast and believes that it is immoral to eat meat on Wednesdays and Fridays. Let 
us suppose that his belief is mistaken. He is at a friend’s house one Friday evening who 
has prepared his favorite dish, Beef Wellington. Jesse is conflicted: he genuinely believes 
it would be wrong to eat the meat but he sincerely wants to. If knowledge is required, 
then Jesse is not tempted to break his fast—by eating Beef Wellington—because Jesse 
fails to know that it is wrong to eat meat on Fridays. Paul Hughes’s response is surely 
correct, “But this is extremely counterintuitive, for what else could it be but 
temptation?”75 Therefore, (T) does not require knowledge. 
 
3.3.3 An Objection to Condition (3): Good Desires Believed to be Bad 
An objection threatens condition (3) that has fundamentally to do with TE’s belief that X 
is bad. If we accept condition (3) then incoherency threatens the account of (T), says the 
objection. Here is the problem: condition (3) allows for a person to believe something is 
bad that is intuitively and uncontroversially good and therefore to be “tempted” by 
something that is actually good. According to my argument, the objection claims, (T) can 
occur with desires for that which is good and, at the same time, be a morally dubious 
experience. There lurks in the account of (T) an intuitive incoherency because of 
condition (T). 
 To give concreteness and clarity to the objection, let us envision an example in 
which a TE desires, X: to save a small child drowning in a shallow lake. Suppose further 
that this situation meets the criteria for (T) presented earlier (section 3): TE’s desire for 
X is of the kind that could motivate to action (satisfying condition (2)). Yet, suppose we 
add that TE believes saving the child is bad (satisfying condition (3)); that TE has some 
other internal state, Y, against acting in order to bring about bad states of affairs 
(satisfying condition (4)); and that TE also sees Y as morally superior to X (satisfying 
condition (5)).  On my account of (T), TE is tempted, and to be tempted is a morally 
dubious experience (section 3.3.1 above). Yet, desiring to save a drowning child is 
neither intuitively a temptation nor morally dubious. How is this not intuitively 
 
 74 Hughes, “Logic of Temptation,” 95; the example that follows is adapted from Hughes.  
 75 Hughes, “Logic of Temptation,” 96. 
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incoherent and therefore a telling counterexample? I argue that this account of (T) is not 
incoherent, even if it has some counterintuitive aspects. That which is counterintuitive in 
my account, I argue can be given reasons that bring the account back to reflective 
equilibrium. 
 My defense against this potential objection has two lines of approach. First, my 
account of (T) coheres with, and improves on, the reflective judgments of previous 
analytic accounts. With a single exception, all previous accounts of temptation have been 
subjective.76 All subjective accounts of temptation are susceptible to the above potential 
objection given their locating temptation almost wholly inside the TE’s psychic life.77 
Thus, if the prevailing considered accounts agree, then it is the counter-intuition that is 
suspect. That is, it may be that it is the counter-intuition that is problematic, given the 
robust considered reflection in favor of the theory that produce the purported counter-
intuition.  
The second line of response to the objection is to accept that TE’s experience is 
counter-intuitive and choose to “bite the bullet.” In philosophical analysis, to “bite the 
bullet,” is to remain committed to a claim even in the face of counter-intuitive 
evidence.78 Given the arguments of this chapter and the critical evaluations in Chapter 2, 
the account of (T) that I defend is more explanatorily powerful than the others. It, 
therefore, is the best current analytic explanation of temptation. If it entails a counter-
intuitive claim, then the best coherent path is to “bite the bullet” and accept that both the 
account of (T) is true and the above example is counter-intuitive—but not enough to 
defeat the arguments in favor of this account of (T). I accept that being “tempted” to save 
a drowning child is a counter-intuitive description of (T). However, if (T) is 
fundamentally a subjective experience that involves a person’s morally judging their 
desire and the person judges against their desire, so long as the other conditions are 
fulfilled, then it is an experience of (T). This remains true even for examples that are 
problematic. Therefore, the above objection does not show that condition (3) is 
incoherent or that the account of (T) argued for here is inherently troubled.  
 
 76 Adam Pelser’s argues for an objective account of (T) (“Temptation, Virtue, and the Character of 
Christ,” 81-101). See Chapter 2, section 2.7.2 for my critical evaluation of Pelser.  
 77 Paul Hughes explicitly recognizes this potential problem and therefore argues that there is no 
necessary connection between temptation and immorality (“Logic of Temptation,” 97-104).  
 78 Alfred Mele, “Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting,” JE 17, no. 3 (2013): 170. 
Caspar Hare lists five ways “bullet biting” is used by philosophers (see The Limits of Kindness [New York: 
OUP, 2013], x-xi). 
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 This section has argued for the self-consistency and global coherency of 
condition (3), “TE believes X/φ or the desire for X/φ, or both is bad.” There were three 
movements to this defense: First, I argued that condition (3) is necessary in order to 
distinguish experiences of (T) from other experiences of psychic conflict. In addition, I 
contended that the moral judgment involved in (T) explains the intuition that temptation 
is sometimes morally dubious, and this comports with the biblical account of temptation. 
Second, I forwarded the argument that (T) only requires that the TE believe that X is 
bad—knowledge of the X’s being bad is not required. And, third, I offered a defense 
against the objection that condition (3) leads to a defeating counter-intuitive claim. These 
three lines of argument show that condition (3) is both coherent and necessary for an 
experience of (T), which further goes to show that the larger argument I make in this 
chapter is consistent and coherent. The next section argues for the coherency and 
necessity of condition (4): “TE has, concurrent with a desire for X/φ, some other psychic 
state, Y, that conflicts with X’s obtaining, with desiring X, or with φ-ing.” 
 
3.4 Condition (4) and the Conflicted Psychic State in (T) 
To further establish condition (4) as necessary to (T), I argue for two positions: first, in 
conjunction with section 3.3.1 above, psychic conflict is necessary to (T); and second, a 
Frankfurtian hierarchy of desires contributes to the conception of (T) defended here. As 
with the previous sections, the arguments here show the conceptual veracity and 
coherency of (T).  
 
3.4.1 On Why Psychic Conflict is Essential to (T) 
Essential to (T) is a conflict of desire—that is, a state in which a desire is in conflict with 
another mental state of the temptee. As I note above in section 2, “psychic state” is used 
synonymously with “mental state” in order to signify a broad range of cognitive, 
conative, or affective states a person may have, which states could play a role in moral 
motivation. Thus, (T) is an internal conflict between a person’s desire and some internal 
state opposed to that desire. This account of (T) is limited in one way and open in 
another way. First, it is limited by holding that (T) initially has to do with desire rather 
than belief, reason, intention, or some other psychic state.79 In this sense, the theory I 
 
79 That desires differ from reasons is both intuitive and uncontentious in the philosophy of action 
scholarship. However, the relationship between desires and beliefs and desires and intentions is more 
contentious. I differentiate desire both from beliefs and intentions. For an argument that desires are beliefs 
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advance limits what counts as the experience of temptation in order to distinguish it from 
other similar internal conflict experiences (see section 3.3.1)—for example, from 
weakness of will or akrasia (I articulate this distinction more fully in Chapter 4, section 
2.2). Second, the account is open in that (T) also includes a person’s other psychic states 
like belief(s), reason(s), intention(s), resolutions, or other cognitive, conative, or affective 
states. In this second sense, the theory of (T) that I advance is open in allowing that many 
other internal psychic states within a person may conflict with the desire for X. Put more 
formally, in an experience of (T), TE has a desire for X or to φ, believes X/φ is bad and 
TE’s desire for X must conflict with another of TE’s psychic states (for example, TE’s 
reason(s), desire(s), intention(s), etc. against X’s obtaining or φ-ing). To conceive of (T) 
as having this structure appropriately demarcates it from other experiences of moral 
psychic conflict like akrasia, pragmatic conflicts, inconsistent moral belief sets, practical 
irrationality, or conflicting moral intention, to name only a few. Furthermore, I argue that 
this conception of (T) captures a fundamental intuition about temptation, namely, that is 
it a conflicted state.  
 Why is conflict essential to temptation? It is because of the oddity in supposing 
that a person does precisely what they wanted, with no internal conflicts at all, and yet 
was tempted. Following Harry Frankfurt on this point, to say that someone acted 
“wholeheartedly”—with their first- and second-order desires aligned—and, at the same 
time, was tempted in their action is deeply counter-intuitive which signals conceptual 
confusion.80 Suppose Justin is what we might call a “passive actor.” He fits Frankfurt’s 
descriptive of a person who “take[s] no evaluative attitude toward the desires that incline 
him to act.”81 This kind of person would not experience any internal conflict toward their 
motivating desires. If Justin desires to steal a wallet and, as a passive actor, experiences 
no internal conflict, then Justin is not tempted to steal the wallet—he just desires to steal 
it simpliciter. The oddity is indicative of the error in claiming that temptation sans 
conflict is possible. However, being odd is not the only reason that temptation is 
typically thought to necessarily involve conflict. If we analyze the ordinary, non-moral 
 
see Philip Pettit, “Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation,” Mind 96, no. 384 (Oct, 1987): 530-33. 
Against this conception see Michael Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation,” Mind 96, no. 381 (Jan, 
1987): 36-61. For an overview of the arguments for/against desire as intentions see Alfred Mele, 
“Intention,” in Companion to the Philosophy of Action, eds. Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2010), 108-113. 
 80 Harry Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in The Importance of What We Care 
About (New York: CUP, 1988), 165; see also, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 5-9. 
81 Frankfurt, “Identification,” 164. 
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understanding of the experience of temptation as typically reflected in our concepts and 
language, then (T) is an experience that on all accounts involves some internal clash. For 
example, when Jesse declares, “I am tempted to have another slice of pie!” we intuitively 
and reflexively understand that he is expressing an internal conflict about eating more 
pie. Thus, built into the notion of temptation is some kind of conflict and this is true 
whether the notion be a common, casual, non-moral usage or whether the notion is in the 
domain of reflective moral philosophy. 
 
3.4.2 Hierarchy of Desires and Psychic Conflict in (T) 
Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchy of desires offers important nuance to the account of 
temptation as a particular kind of internal conflict. According to Frankfurt’s hierarchy, 
there are two orders of desire: first and second.82 First-order desires, discussed above in 
section 3.3.1, are desires for non-conative states of affairs. Second-order desires are 
desires about another conative state: first-order desires.83 His hierarchy presents us with a 
few options in understanding the psychic conflict, which is fundamental to (T): the 
conflict could be between (i) two first-order desires, (ii) between first- and second-order 
desires, and (ii) between second-order desires. The simplest of the three options is (i) a 
conflict between two first-order desires. A temptation of this kind pits a first-order desire 
for X, or action φ, against another first-order desire that is either ~X/~φ or some other 
first-order desire, Y, that is inconsistent with X’s obtaining or with φ-ing (assuming the 
other conditions are met). David’s temptation to rendezvous with Bathsheba from above 
shows the truth of this. David might be experiencing just this kind of inconsistent first-
order desire set: (possibly) he has both a first-order desire for sex with Bathsheba and a 
first-order desire to obey the law prohibiting adultery.  
 However, it could be argued that it is possible that David’s conflict is between 
first- and second-order desires. On this view, his sexual desire for Bathsheba may be the 
first-order desire where his other desire is to be the kind of person who does not have 
desires that conflict with the law—in this case, to be the kind of person who does not 
desire adultery. Here the second-order or “higher” desire ranks over the lesser, “lower” 
 
 82 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will,” 5-20. Frankfurt’s argument has been the subject of many 
debates. One core problem for his view, which need not be settled here as nothing in my argument rides on 
this objection, is that it is liable to manipulation cases; cf. James Stacey Taylor, “Introduction,” in Personal 
Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, ed. James 
Stacey Taylor (New York: CUP, 2005), 1-32.  
 83 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will,” 7-9. 
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desire—that is, it is a desire about desire. Like the previous first-order conflict, this first-
to-second-order conflict makes good intuitive sense, and this suggests its coherency. 
Thus, the psychic conflict required for (T) could be first-to-first-order conflict or first-to-
second-order conflict.  
 I argue further that (T) can consist in second-to-first-order desires and between 
second-order desires, but these kinds of temptation are more complicated. In her revision 
of Frankfurt’s hierarchical structure, Eleonore Stump adds a nuance to second-order 
desires that is missing in Frankfurt’s account.84 Stump argues that “an effective second-
order desire is one which moves the agent all the way to the action of making the 
corresponding first-order desire his will.”85 This adds a necessary motivational element 
to second-order desires, which Frankfurt limited to “reflective self-evaluation,”86 that 
enables them to meet condition (2)—the desire must be the kind that could motivate to 
action.  
 To make this kind of temptation apparent, let us return to the example of 
Stéphane Breitwieser, the world-renowned art thief. Given that Breitwieser has a 
standing desire to steal art, it would not be an unreasonable stretch to suppose that he 
also has a desire to want to steal art—that he has a second-order desire to be the kind of 
person who desires art thieving. Let this be condition (1): Breitwieser has a second-order 
desire, X, to be the kind of person who wants to steal art. Suppose his second-order 
desire is strong enough that it could motivate him to action—the action of making the 
corresponding first-order desire to steal art. Breitwieser, then, also meets condition (2). 
In a rare clear-eyed moment, he believes his desire to be the kind of person who wants to 
steal art is bad—meeting condition (3). Breitwieser has a newly formed first-order desire 
in his moment of moral clarity: a desire not to steal, which he takes to be morally 
superior to his motivating second-order desire. This meets conditions (4) and (5). 
Although this might not be a paradigmatic example of (T), it meets all the necessary 
conditions and does so while remaining conceptually coherent. Therefore, it is possible 
to experience (T) with a second-to-first-order conflict. Of course, if this is true, then it 
 
 84 Eleonore Stump, “Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt’s Concept of Free 
Will,” JPh 85, no. 8 (1988): 395-420. 
 85 Stump, “Sanctification,” 401. Recall Frankfurt’s distinction between “desire” and 
“will”/“volition” where a “will”/“volition” is a desire that moves the agent all the way to action and a 
“desire” is a conative state that does not necessarily move to action although it is motivational. Stump 
retains that distinction.  
 86 Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will,” 9; David Velleman conceptualizes the hierarchy of desires 
differently than Frankfurt but agrees that they are non-action motivating; cf. David Velleman, “The 
Possibility of Practical Reason,” Ethics 106, no. 4 (1996): 717. 
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would follow, mutatis mutandis, that second-to-second-order temptation is plausible and 
coherent. That kind of temptation would center on a conflict regarding what kind of 
person the temptee desires to be.  
 In this section I have argued that the desire for X and a conflicting psychic state 
Y is necessary for (T). I have also contended that the conflict in (T) can be either first-to-
first-order conflict, first-to-second-order conflict, second-to-first-order conflict, or 
second-to-second-order conflict. This section, therefore, serves as another argumentative 
pillar substantiating the conceptual coherency of (T). In the next section I analytically 
defend the final condition for (T): “TE sees Y as morally superior to X/φ.” 
 
3.5 Condition (5):  Y is Morally Superior to X 
This final section argues for the coherency and necessity of condition (5): “TE believes 
Y is morally superior to X.” First, I begin with a clarification about the key phrase 
“morally superior” and then I advance an argument for the necessity of (5). This 
argument corrects a possible objection, namely, that (5) is entailed in conditions (3), “TE 
sees X/φ or the desire for X/φ, or both, as bad,” and (4), “TE has, concurrent with a 
desire for X/φ, some other psychic state, Y, that conflicts with X’s obtaining, with 
desiring X, or with φ-ing.”87 I argue that the reasoning in favor of this objection is 
unconvincing and that it is crucial to be explicit that (5) is a necessary condition for (T), 
and that condition (5) actually helps further illuminate the nature of (T). 
 
3.5.1 What Does “Morally Superior” Mean? 
In this sub-section I offer a simple clarification regarding what “morally superior” 
means. Below I argue that (T) necessarily involves believing one of the conflicting inner 
states Y, is “morally superior” to the tempting desire X. How do I use “morally 
superior”? In my argument, being “moral superior” does not mean “perfectly moral” or 
“unsurpassably moral.” Rather, it means only that TE believes Y to be morally better 
than X/φ or the desire for X/ φ-ing. Hence, Y need not actually be morally good for (T) 
to occur but only that TE believe Y to be morally better than X/φ, the desire for X/φ-ing. 
 
 87 Part of the feedback from the reading of a portion of this chapter at the Society of Christian 
Philosophers Easter Conference (2017) was this point. The response especially from Kyla Ebels-Duggan 
especially pressed me to think more clearly and strengthen this section. 
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Now, of course, Y’s actually being good would count in an experience of (T), assuming 
all other conditions are met.  
 
3.5.2 On the Necessity of Evaluative Ranking Between X and Y in (T) 
In section 3.3 above, I argued that temptation is a moral experience, which is partially 
captured in (3): for TE to believe X is “bad” is to make a moral valuation rather than, 
say, a purely pragmatic valuation. Yet, if all that were necessary for (T) to occur was for 
a person to believe their desire for X/φ is bad (satisfying condition (3)) and to have some 
psychic state against either X’s obtaining or φ-ing (satisfying condition (4)), then it is 
possible for temptation to range semantically over any or all psychic conflicts that are 
between equally bad options. Surely such conflicts happen, but they hardly count 
technically as temptations. As I have argued above (see 3.3.1), temptation is a particular 
kind of experience that needs to be distinguished from other kinds of psychic conflicts. 
This means that not just any kind of conflict can count for (T) but that it is a peculiar 
kind of motivational disequilibrium, which involves moral evaluation between 
competing psychic states. Michael Bratman’s terminology is to my point: temptation on 
my developing account necessarily involves “evaluative rankings”—and these rankings 
are distinctively moral evaluations.88 Even our very casual uses of “temptation” in 
everyday language captures this evaluative ranking. For example, to say “I’m tempted to 
have another cookie,” has built in the assumption that “not having another cookie” is the 
better option—otherwise it is not temptation. I argue that the more morally weighty 
paradigmatic cases of temptation also need this evaluative ranking.  
 For substantiation, let us consider again Professor Casey. She is ending a long 
and hard term—too many students and too many papers. In any case, she is nearing the 
end of a rather long and technical paper discussing moral psychology and philosophy of 
action—it has been tedious. An occurrent, volitional, and motivating desire to toss the 
pages aside and reach for her wine glass and the awaiting Jane Austen novel rises in 
Casey’s psyche (conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied). Casey believes her desire to quit 
and read is bad (satisfying condition (3)). Earlier in the week, she made a resolution to 
finish all grading tonight and that conflicts with her desire to quit (condition (4) is 
satisfied). Yet, suppose, that Casey also believes her resolution is equally bad—perhaps 
it was hastily or irrationally or coercively made—thus, condition (5) is not satisfied. 
 
88 Michael Bratman, “Toxin, Temptation, and Stability of Intention,” in Rational Commitment and 
Social Justice, eds., Jules L. Coleman and Christopher W. Morris (New York: CUP, 1998), 60. 
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Some kind of internal conflict is occurring but it is not at all intuitive that it is temptation. 
Casey’s scenario is more like a moral dilemma—a choice between two or more bad 
options—than it is like (T). A person who believes they only have bad motivational 
options to choose from is not experiencing temptation. Thus, (T) requires that the 
conflicting state be believed to be morally superior. This is consistent with the argument 
I forwarded in section 3.3.1 above and together with that section this argument shows 
that condition (5) is necessary.  
 In this section I have built on the arguments in sections 3.3 and 3.4 above in order 
to further contend that condition (5) is both conceptually coherent and necessary for any 
experience of (T). Together with the previous arguments, this section shows the 
conceptual consistency and coherency of (T) and in so doing culminates the developing 
account for (T).  
 
4 Conclusion 
The argument of this chapter is readily summarized. I have constructed an analytic 
ethical conception of the nature of temptation that develops and improves on important 
implications of the philosophical accounts of temptation evaluated in Chapter 2 in order 
to arrive at a set of necessary conditions for the state of being tempted, (T). My line of 
reasoning began with an explication of a common understanding of temptation as both 
involving desire and being morally dubious. Indeed, the biblical-theological data from 
the letter of James set the parameters that (T) must incorporate desire and immorality. 
From this common understanding and biblical-theological data, I argued for an 
analytically technical conception of (T) such that it is an internal, conative conflict 
whereby a person desires some state of affairs X or action φ, which the person believes 
is bad, and the person simultaneously has some internal, psychic state that conflicts with 
X obtaining or φ-ing and is a state believed by the temptee to be morally superior to X/φ. 
In the conception I develop and defend, five necessary conditions for (T) exhibit the 
conceptual power and facility to distinguish accurately (T) from other psychic and 
motivational conflicts: 
(1) The temptee TE has a desire for some state of affairs, X, or action φ. 
(2) TE’s desire for X is such that it could motivate to action in order to do φ or 
obtain X. 
(3) TE believes X/φ or the desire for X/φ, or both, is bad. 
(4) TE has, concurrent with a desire for X/φ, some other psychic state, Y, that 
conflicts with X’s obtaining, with desiring X, or with φ-ing. 
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(5) TE sees Y as morally superior to X/φ. 
 
 As indicated earlier in section 3, these individually necessary conditions may be 
jointly sufficient for an experience to be considered temptation, but that is not the burden 
of my argument on the nature of temptation. My argument to this point has shown that 
(T) is best understood philosophically in this specified technical way. Furthermore, I 
have argued that these conditions are each individually consistent and coherent as a set. 
Thus, this chapter shows the philosophical and theological conceptual coherency of (T) 
and, in so doing, analytically clarifies one of the key components in the thesis of the 
project: if human persons are to develop the moral virtues, then the possibility of 
temptation is necessary. 
 The portion of my argument that is still to be developed in Chapter 5 will show 
that (T) so understood must be possible in order for virtue development. But before 
moving to that ultimate component of the argument, we must first augment this construal 
of (T) in relation to an important area of moral philosophy and virtue ethics: the 
discussion of akrasia, or weakness of will. In Chapter 4, I will argue that (T) and akrasia 
or weakness of will are distinct moral experiences but that there is important overlap 
between the two, namely, that temptation succumbed-to is sometimes akrasia or 
weakness of will. This next step of the argument more fully elucidates the nature of 
temptation here as the key component of my overall argument. 
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Chapter 4: Temptation, Akrasia, and Moral 
Responsibility 
 
1 Introduction: The Structure of the Argument and a Preliminary 
Conception of Akrasia 
Now that a technically precise definition of temptation has been defended and explained 
in Chapter 3, its fuller conceptual contours and texture must be further explicated in 
relation to other elements of moral experience. The present chapter contributes to the 
overarching goal of this project—establishing the claim that growth in moral virtue 
requires an environment in which experiences of temptation (as conceived and defended 
in the previous chapter) are possible—by distinguishing temptation from other 
neighboring concepts on the philosophical landscape with which it is often confused. 
 Most particularly, I will argue in this chapter that temptation and 
akrasia/weakness of will,1 while similar conceptually and experientially, are significantly 
 
 1 “Akrasia” is generally left untranslated and etymologically unexplained in the literature. The 
word comes from the early Greek philosophers and means “lack of control.” When Latin writers are 
working with the same concept they use, incontinentia (the Greek, enkrateia is “being in control” and 
continentia is the Latin equivalent); see Chris Bobonich and Pierre Destrée, “Introduction,” in Akrasia in 
Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus, eds. Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destrée (Boston, MA: 
Brill, 2007), xv. It is a Greek term that finds use in both Plato/Socrates and Aristotle. Aristotle gives much 
more attention to the concept and sets the stage for much later discussions. Akrasia has been translated as 
“incontinence,” “want of self-control,” “weakness of will,” and on occasion “backsliding” and is 
understood to be the counterpart to enkrasia or self-control/continence (Alfred Mele, Backsliding: 
Understanding Weakness of Will [New York, OUP, 2012], 13, and Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, 
Self-Deception, and Self-Control [New York: OUP, 1987], 4; “Backsliding” seems to originate with R.M. 
Hare in Freedom and Reason [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963]).  
 There is debate in contemporary scholarship regarding which locution is most appropriate 
akrasia, weakness of will, or incontinence. In various writers akrasia is used synonymously with 
“weakness of will” (e.g., Sarah Stroud and Larisa Svirsky, “Weakness of Will,” SEP, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta [Fall 2019 edition], https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/weakness-will/).  However, 
not all philosophers agree that akrasia and weakness of will are the same phenomenon, and, indeed, I have 
found Richard Holton’s argument to that end persuasive (and will note it below; Willing, Wanting, Waiting 
[New York: OUP, 2009], 70-96; and “Inverse Akrasia and Weakness of Will,” online: 
https://www.academia.edu/2363790/Inverse_Akrasia_and_Weakness_of_Will).  
 To be sure, not all philosophers follow Holton’s distinction but it has made enough of an impact 
that Alfred Mele, one of the major contributing voices in the various debates, has not merely mentioned the 
distinction between akrasia/weakness of will as a consideration but has adjusted his terminological use 
(Mele does not fully side with Holton but takes the distinction as something needing careful consideration; 
see Backsliding, 2; Joshua May and Richard Holton summarize well the debate between Mele and Holton 
in “What in the World is Weakness of Will,” PhSt 157 [2012]: 341-360). Given this possible distinction 
between akrasia and weakness of will, I have opted to not use them interchangeably and to, at the start at 
least, only use ‘akrasia.’ A further reason for this, but one that will only have a subsidiary role in this 
chapter, is that I think akrasia  can work as a kind of umbrella concept under which the other terms can 
find a place; to put it differently: akrasia is the set in which we find ‘weakness of will,’ ‘incontinence,’ 
‘want of self-control,’ etc. (i.e., akrasia = {weakness of will, incontinence, want of self-control, etc.}). 
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different. In pressing toward this fuller and clearer conceptual placement of temptation, I 
build momentum toward the following chapter in which I argue that the very precise 
conception of temptation here is actually essential to moral character formation.  
To complete the conceptual placement of temptation in this chapter, I also 
analyze its connection to moral culpability. This further supports the overall project, first, 
by treating the concept of temptation here as importantly related to key concepts in moral 
philosophy and theology, which are best accounted for in a neo-Aristotelian framework 
of virtue ethics. Unfortunately, not all ethical frameworks—utilitarianism and moral 
subjectivism, for example—have robust theories of virtue and its development. Thus, the 
analysis of temptation is not in a vacuum but fits best and most naturally within the 
philosophical context that also takes seriously and makes sense of akrasia and moral 
culpability.  
 I argued in Chapter 2 that temptation has received scant philosophical reflection 
and investigation. However, if temptation is exactly identical to akrasia, then my 
contention would be false, since akrasia has indeed received considerable philosophical 
and some theological attention.2 Although the explicit claim that “temptation” and 
“akrasia” are identical is virtually nonexistent, the two terms are frequently employed 
interchangeably, as if they are synonyms.3 In light of the lack of scholarly focus on the 
relationship between the two, this chapter accomplishes two basic functions in my 
argument. First, it investigates the relationship between temptation and akrasia, showing 
 
 2 Perhaps the best and most up-to-date review of the literature on akrasia is Sarah Stroud and 
Larisa Svirsky, “Weakness of Will.” Cf., Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destreé (eds.), Akrasia in Greek 
Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus (Leiden, Netherlands: Konimklijke Brill, 2007); Sarah Stroud and 
Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (New York: OUP, 2007); Tobias 
Hoffman (ed.), Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present, SPHP, vol., 49 (Washington, D.C.: CUAP, 
2008); Risto Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan (New York: 
E.J. Brill, 1994); and Risto Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought 
(Oxford: OUP, 2011) 
 From the perspective of theology, which engages discussion of akrasia most in response to Paul’s 
words in Romans 7, see the following: A. Van Den Beld, “Romans 7.14-25 and the Problem of Akrasia,” 
RelStud. 21, no. 4 (Dec., 1985): 495-515; Stefan Krauter, “Wenn das Gesetz nicht gesagt hätte,…: Röm. 
7.7b und antike Äußerungen zu paradoxen Wirkungen von Gesetzen,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 
108 (2011): 1-15. 
 3 For example in Straud and Svirsky, “Weakness of Will,” §3.4.2; Kenneth Dorter, “Weakness of 
Will in Plato’s Republic,” in Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present, 21. Paul M. Hughes, “The Logic 
of Temptation,” Philosophia 29 (2002): 90. James Wetzel says that Augustine takes temptation and 
akrasia to be similar, although he does not cite where Augustine makes this connection (“Body Double: 
Saint Augustine and the Sexualized Will,” in Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present, 61). Michael 
Bratman uses “temptation” to name what others describe as akrasia/weakness of will, see Faces of 
Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (New York: CUP, 1999), 35-57; “Temptation and the 
Agent’s Standpoint,” Inquiry 57, no. 3 (2014): 293-310; and Structures of Agency: Essays (New York: 
OUP, 2007), 257-82.  Talbot Brewer equates temptation-resisted with enkratia and temptation to akrasia; 
Talbot Brewer, “The Character of Temptation,” PacPh 83, no. 2 (2002): 103-30. 
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that, while there can be overlap between the two, they are different. More precisely, 
some akratic experiences may be experiences of temptation succumbed-to but not all 
experiences of temptation are experiences of akrasia. Second, this chapter evaluates and 
explicates how temptation is, if ever, morally culpable. This point further substantiates 
my previous point in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.1) that temptation is, in general, a morally 
dubious experience. In fact, I show that, in some cases, experiencing temptation, even 
when one does not succumb, is—perhaps contrary to common intuition—morally 
blameworthy.  
 
2 The Conception of Akrasia and Weakness of Will in Analytic 
Philosophy and Theology 
Although  writers do not all agree, and sometimes add specific clarifications, the basic 
definition of akrasia/weakness of will/incontinence has been: “free, intentional action 
contrary to the agent’s better judgment.”4 The contemporary discussion of this particular 
concept of akrasia—chiefly wrestling with whether such a phenomenon is possible—has 
exploded since the publication of Donald Davidson’s essay “How is Weakness of Will 
Possible?” in 1970.5 The ensuing discussion and debate has subjected akrasia to serious 
question—particularly  whether it is possible or not—which has resulted in a variety of 
conceptions of akrasia, one of which is a actually a distinction between akrasia and 
weakness of will.6  
 
 4 Mele, Irrationality, 4; Cf. Donald Davidson, “How is Weakness of Will Possible?” reprinted in 
Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. (New York: OUP, 2001), 20; Mele, Backsliding, 8; Holton, Willing, 
Wanting, Waiting, 94; Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, “Introduction,” in Weakness of Will and 
Practical Irrationality, eds. Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (New York: OUP, 2003), 2; Stroud, Sarah 
and Svirsky, Larisa, “Weakness of Will;” Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral 
Agency (New York: OUP, 2003), 35; Daniel Westberg, Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and 
Prudence in Aquinas (New York: OUP, 1994), 210; and Robert Sokolowski, Moral Action: A 
Phenomenological Study (Washington, DC: CUAP, 2017), 124; Tobias Hoffman, “Introduction,” in 
Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present, ix. 
 A recent and related development in analytic philosophy, though not the focus here (which further 
suggests the need to differentiate) is “epistemic akrasia.” According to David Owens, the epistemically 
akratic person is one who believes something that she things she ought not believe; like the akratic person, 
so the analogy goes, does something that he thinks he ought not do (Owens is not the first to wrestle with 
this question, but he is the first to label it epistemic akrasia, see “Epistemic Akrasia,” The Monist 85, no. 3 
[2002]: 381-97). Cf., Allen Coates, “Rational Epistemic Akrasia,” APhQ.49, no. 2 (April 2012): 113-24; 
Heather Battaly, “Epistemic Indulgence,” Metaphilosophy 41, no. 1/2 (2010): 214-34; Sophie Horowitz, 
“Epistemic Akrasia,” Noûs 41, no. 4 (2014): 718-44. 
 5 Op. cit., Essays on Actions and Events, 21-42. 
 6 Richard Holton, “Intention and Weakness of Will,” JPh., 96 (1999): 241–262; Seyyed 
Mohammad Hossein Mir-Mohammadi, “Is the Contemporary Account of Weakness of Will Complete?” 
RI 2, no. 3 (Winter and Spring 2013): 91-101. 
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 The distinctions that have emerged from this conversation will help both to locate 
and clarify the concept of temptation I defended in the previous chapter. In a brief 
examination of the various ideas of akrasia and related concepts, it becomes clear 
whether temptation under the present conception counts as either akrasia or weakness of 
will, both, or as something else. At a minimum, this examination will situate this project 
within an ongoing discussion in moral philosophy, moral psychology, and philosophy of 
action. Yet, the examination to follow can provide further benefit than mapping 
theoretical relations in moral philosophy. This section, then, follows the leads that come 
from the analysis of akrasia to determine if or when temptation is actually akrasia, 
weakness of will, or something else. For this purpose, I provide a critical overview of the 
scholarly debate that, while not pursuing the myriad nuances, specifically tracks with the 
most informative voices for Western analytic philosophy (and theology). 
 
2.1 A Historical-Contemporary Survey of the Concept of Akrasia and Weakness of Will 
Philosophical discussion of akrasia did not originate with Donald Davidson’s famous 
article in 1970; it has been part of Western philosophy from the beginning.7 
Unsurprisingly for Western philosophy, Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle largely set the 
parameters of the discussion, including discussions within the analytic tradition. Also 
unsurprising is that any work in analytic moral theology must consider the towering 
figures of Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, both of whom also shape analytic 
philosophy as we know it. In fact, the contemporary discussion almost entirely focuses 
on the initial dilemma set up by both Socrates/Plato and Aristotle: is it possible to act 
against what one knows is good (or put differently, is all moral weakness based in 
ignorance)? Although resolving this question is not the present aim, it is prelude to 
clarification of the concept of the akrasia to be compared and contrasted with the 
concept of temptation here defended.  Nonetheless, relevant references to the positions of 
these key thinkers are inevitable as we analyze the very large topic of akrasia.  
 
2.1.1 Plato and the Platonic Socrates on Akrasia 
Through Plato, we have Socrates declaring that akrasia is not possible: “no one who 
knows or believes there is something else better than what he is doing, something 
 
 7 Indeed, Davidson is responding to R. M. Hare’s denial of akrasia in two texts, The Language of 
Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) and Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).  
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possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be doing what is 
better” (Protagoras 358b).8 What is it exactly that is supposedly not possible? It is acting 
against one’s judgment—knowledge or belief—that some course of action is better in 
favor of another, lesser course of action. This is Socrates’s/Plato’s conception of akrasia, 
which he thinks is impossible. 
 
2.1.2 Aristotle on Akrasia 
The question of whether Aristotle agrees with Socrates on the possibility of akrasia is 
much debated.9 Aristotle’s remarks that seem to agree with Socrates are located in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (Book VII) where he discusses incontinent and continent persons, 
persons who are neither fully virtuous nor fully vicious but fall somewhere between the 
two poles.10 As Aristotle explains, “the incontinent man, knowing what he does is bad, 
does it as a result of passion, while the continent man, knowing that his appetites are bad, 
 
 8 Plato, Protagoras, trans., Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell, in Plato: Complete Works, ed., 
John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., Inc., 1997), 787. Other passages in Plato raise and 
then deny the idea of akrasia, but this passage is most frequently cited; see, Thomas C. Brickhouse and 
Nicholas D. Smith, “Socrates on Akrasia, Knowledge, and the Power of Appearance,” in Akrasia in Greek 
Philosophy, 1-17; Chris Bobonich, “Plato on Akrasia and Knowing Your Own Mind,” in Akrasia in Greek 
Philosophy, 41-60. Roslyn Weiss argues against the “standard view” that Socrates is denying akrasia. 
Instead, Socrates is arguing against a particular hedonistic ethic/philosophy (see The Socratic Paradox and 
its Enemies [Chicago: The UCP, 2006]; and “Thirst as Desire for Good,” in Akrasia in Greek Philosophy, 
87-101). Cf. the essays in Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destrée (eds.), Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: 
from Socrates to Plotinus; especially the following, Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, “Socrates on 
Akrasia, Knowledge, and the Power of Appearance,” 1-18; Chris Bobonich, “Plato on Akrasia and 
Knowing Your Own Mind,” 41-60; Christopher Shields, “Unified Agency and Akrasia in Plato’s 
Republic,” 61-86; and Gabriela Roxana Carone, “Akrasia and the Structure of the Passions in Plato’s 
Timaeus,” 101-18. 
 9 Norman O. Dahl, Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of Will (Minneapolis, MN: UMP, 
1984), 139-41. Dahl defends the view, which he calls “An Alternate Explanation” (188-218), that Aristotle 
disagrees with Socrates and that weakness of will is possible. This contrasts with the “Traditional View,” 
namely, that Aristotle agrees with Socrates. Terence Irwin traces Aristotle’s comments through three of his 
writings, the Magna Moralia (commonly thought to be pseudepigraphal but Irwin suggests authenticity), 
and the Eudemian Ethics, and the NE, to suggests that Aristotle’s view develops chronologically from 
more critical of and antagonistic to Socrates (MM), to more favorable (EE), finally to more indifferent but 
sympathetic (NE); “Aristotle Reads the Protagoras,” in Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present, 22-41.  
 10 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, revised by J. O. Urmson, in The Complete 
Works of Aristotle, the Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: PUP, 
1984), 1808-25. Cf.: A. W. Price, “Acrasia and Self-Control,” in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s NE, 
ed. Richard Kraut (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2006), 224-54. 
 105 
does not follow them because of his reason” (NE, 1145b.11-13).11 With Aristotle, as with 
Socrates, akrasia pertains to acting against one’s knowledge or judgment.12  
 It is Socrates’s/Plato’s and Aristotle’s conception that sets the stage for all further 
discussion in Western philosophy.13 Since the details of that discussion, which is 
centered on the possibility or impossibility of akrasia, are not essential to the present 
argument, I will not pursue the debate further. It does appear that either position—on the 
possibility or impossibility of akrasia—is compatible and unproblematic for the position 
that I articulate and defend: that akrasia and temptation are generally two different, yet 
related, experiences.  
 
2.1.3 Augustine of Hippo on Knowingly Doing Bad 
Because the current project is not simply a work in analytic moral philosophy but also a 
contribution to analytic moral theology, the major voice of Augustine from church 
tradition must help inform our discussion.14 With Augustine we get a change from 
Socrates/Plato and Aristotle, who argued that wrong acts, acts that evidence a lack of 
 
 11 Aristotle, NE, 1809. Although the details are not essential to the argument here, Aristotle 
technically offers two kinds of incontinence: “impetuosity” and “weakness” (NE, 1818; 1050b.19). 
Theodore Scaltsas argues that there are two kinds of “weakness”: strong and weak akrasia in Aristotle’s 
conception (“Weakness of Will in Aristotle’s Ethics,” SJP 24, no. 3 (1986): 375-382. The point here is that 
I am glossing over a very technical discussion and debate in Aristotelian scholarship but even still this 
small look captures enough of Aristotle’s account to inform a more generalized philosophical account of 
akrasia that is pertinent to the argument at hand. 
 12 To be clear, it is not this simple in the Aristotelian scholarship: “Rather, in any case of  what 
appears to be akrasia, there is a real question whether the agent acts against his considered judgment of 
what is better, or rather acts against a judgment  the commitment to which is too tenuous to render the 
action akratic” (Heda Segvic, From Protagoras to Aristotle: Essays in Ancient Moral Philosophy, ed. 
Myles Burnyeat [Princeton, NJ: PUP, 2009], 122). Cf., David Wiggins, who tentatively offers “a more 
Aristotelian account [of akrasia] than Aristotle’s” (“Weakness of Will Commensurability, and the Objects 
of Deliberation and Desire,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 250). Perhaps instead of “knowledge,” akratic 
action is action taken in opposition to one’s understanding, which is a heightened and more puzzling 
phenomenon. Hendrik Lorenz argues that Aristotle’s use of the Greek verb epistasthai is better translated 
“understanding” than “knowledge,” given that ‘understanding,’ in English, is closer to the notion of 
expertise than is ‘knowledge,’ which what is behind the Greek verb (as it’s used by Plato and Aristotle).  
See Hendrik Lorenz, “Aristotle’s Analysis of Akratic Action,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s 
NE, ed. Ronald Polansky (New York: CUP, 2014), 244-45. That Aristotle’s account is somehow connected 
to epistemology is abundantly clear, even if the Aristotle scholarship is divided on exactly what Aristotle 
was attempting to articulate and precisely how he solved the problem of akrasia; see Amélie Oksenberg 
Rorty discussion of ignorance and akrasia in Aristotle, “Akrasia and Pleasure: Nicomachean Ethics Book 
7,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 267-84. 
 13 Alfred Mele, “Weakness of Will and Akrasia,” PhSt 150, no. 3 (2010): 391. 
 14 Augustine’s thought finds place in a handful of contemporary works on akrasia: James Wetzel, 
“Body Double: Saint Augustine and the Sexualized Will,” 58-81; Daniel P. Thero, Understanding Moral 
Weakness (New York: Rodopi, 2006); Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Medieval Thought; and J. Caleb 
Clanton, “Teaching Socrates, Aristotle, and Augustine on Akrasia,” Religions 6 (2015): 419-433, 
doi:10.3390/rel6020419.  
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control (akrasia), are only possible on ignorance. For Augustine, however, a person 
could act wrongly while knowing and judging that one’s action is less than the best. 
Regarding the possibility of akrasia, the famous pear tree incident appears to 
differentiate clearly Augustine from Socrates/Plato and potentially Aristotle: “I was 
under no compulsion of need…Yet I wanted to steal, and steal I did…I simply wanted to 
enjoy the theft for its own sake, and the sin.”15  
 It might seem that Augustine both endorses the possibility of akrasia and the idea 
that it is constituted by acting against one’s better judgment. However, complicating this 
quick appraisal of Augustine is his robust and nuanced view of the will in human action, 
which is found widely throughout the corpus of his work, none of which explicitly 
addresses akrasia per se.16 Earlier Greek philosophers, by contrast, took human action as 
essentially and fundamentally tied to rationality; not so for Augustine.17 Indeed, as 
Christian Tornau argues, “Augustine comes closer than any earlier philosopher to 
positing will as a faculty of choice that is reducible neither to reason nor to non-rational 
desire.”18 Daniel Thero is correct to argue that Augustine articulates a “significant 
innovation” regarding akrasia with his concept of the will.19 Moreover, Augustine’s view 
will necessarily orient theologically as well as philosophically because the will is 
conceived in relation to God, a point which is far from incidental to his conception of 
akrasia.20 Ultimately, for Augustine, akrasia is not merely acting against one’s better 
judgment but acting in a way that is both against good reason and the will oriented 
toward God.21 Augustine agrees with Socrates/Plato and Aristotle that akrasia involves 
reason/knowledge/judgment but importantly adds that the will can be misaligned, a 
 
 15 Augustine, The Confessions, trans. Maria Boulding, O.S.B. (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 
30; II.iv.9. 
 16 Clanton, “Teaching Socrates, Aristotle, and Augustine on Akrasia,” 427. Augustine wrote in 
Latin not Greek and therefore did not use ‘akrasia.’ Whatever account we offer that is “Augustine’s view 
of akrasia,” will necessarily be interpretive since he neither used the word nor gave the concept any overt 
analysis (Thero, Understanding Moral Weakness, 51). 
 17 Christian Tornau, “Saint Augustine,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2020 edition), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/augustine/. 
 18 Tornau, “Saint Augustine,” §7.4. 
 19 Thero, Understanding Moral Weakness, 51. 
 20 Thero recognizes the theological cast to Augustine’s views but seems to think that Augustine’s 
philosophical views can be exegeted without much overt attention to his theological commitments, so long 
as we bear in mind the metaphysical grounding (Understanding Moral Weakness, 52). I think this is 
mistaken. While we may not need to explicate every detail, more than mere keeping in mind is necessary 
since the condition and orientation of the will, for Augustine, is determined wholly by reference to God.  
 21  Clanton, “Teaching Socrates, Aristotle, and Augustine on Akrasia,” 430; Thero, Understanding 
Moral Weakness, 57; Wetzel, “Body Double: Saint Augustine and the Sexualized Will,” 63.  
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matter pertaining to both knowledge and volition.22 This unique addition to the 
conversation is significant and one generally endorsed by Thomas Aquinas as well.  
 
2.1.4 Thomas Aquinas on Akrasia 
Since Thomas Aquinas, like Augustine, is important to traditions of both analytic 
philosophy and analytic moral theology, a short analysis of his idea of akrasia will assist 
the current argument. Aquinas’s connection to the contemporary discussion is not forced 
by mere methodology here. Indeed, Donald Davidson engages, and ultimately critiques, 
Thomas on akrasia.23 Although Thomas’s account of akrasia is debated, it has received 
less attention than either the accounts of both Socrates/Plato and Aristotle, perhaps 
because he has drawn less attention among contemporary analytic philosophers of action 
and moral psychology.24 Nonetheless, Aquinas is a towering and resounding voice in 
moral theology and analytic theology, although neither discipline has focused on his 
concept of akrasia per se. 
 Acknowledging the influences of Aristotle and Augustine on Aquinas, both in 
general and on the topic of akrasia, Aquinas’s account of weakness of will is 
considerably more complicated because of his more elaborate philosophy of action and 
expansive moral philosophy. Following Augustine, Thomas gives the will a robust role 
in human action but expands it into a much broader conception than Augustine. For 
Aquinas, any “human act” necessarily involves the whole “system” of the human being.25 
 
 22 According to Saarinen, Augustine’s conception of akrasia is more accurately denoted as 
fundamentally about the will (Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Medieval Thought, 37). This is importantly 
substantiated by the phrase Augustine uses to describe what the Greeks called akrasia, invictus facare—
“to do something unwillingly” (Ibid., 20). 
 23 Davidson, “How is Weakness of Will Possible,” 33-35. 
 24 See the various essays defending or clarifying Aquinas in light of Davidson: Paul Hoffman, 
“Aquinas on Threats and Temptations, PacPh. 86 (2005): 225-42; Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on 
Human Nature (Cambridge: CUP, 2002); Bonnie Kent, “Aquinas and Weakness of Will,” Ph&PhenR, 75, 
no. 1 (2007): 70-91; Denis J.M. Bradley, “Thomas Aquinas on Weakness of the Will,” in Weakness of Will 
from Plato to the Present, 82-114; Martin Pickavé, “Aquinas on Incontinence and Psychological 
Weakness,” in Aquinas and the NE, ed. Tobias Hoffmann, John Muller, and Matthias Perkhams (New 
York: CUP, 2013), 184-202; and Steven J. Jensen, Sin: A Thomistic Psychology (Washington, DC: CUAP, 
2018).  
 25 Ralph McInerny explains Thomas’s distinction between “acts of a human,” which are 
animalistic, reflexive, or instinctual, from “human acts,” which are acts humans make qua human—they 
involve all the capacities of intellect, will, and passion (Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of 
Thomas Aquinas, revised ed.[Washington, DC: CUAP, 1997], 79). Eleonore Stump uses “system-level” 
language for Aquinas’s conception of the will in order to distinguish it from other ancient and 
contemporary accounts that make the will a discrete part of some other whole (Aquinas [New York: 
Routledge, 2005], 277. 
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The will, then, is not a lone actor and neither is the intellect.26 As Eleonore Stump 
explains,  
It is apparent, then, that on Aquinas’s account of intellect and will, the 
will is part of a dynamic feedback system composed primarily of the will 
and the intellect, but also including the passions. The interaction between 
will and intellect is so close and the acts of the two powers are so 
intertwined that Aquinas often finds it difficult to draw the line between 
them.27  
 
Aquinas’s view of the nature of akrasia is based on his theological anthropology. Human 
action, for Thomas, is ordered to some end “that is sought as fulfilling or perfective of 
the agent.”28 And it is here that Thomas’s Christian commitments shape his 
anthropology: no created end is perfective of humans, only God, who is goodness itself, 
is perfective of human beings.29  
 Thomas begins his explanation of akrasia, which he calls “weakness” and 
incontinence of the soul,30 with the analogy that it is like weakness of body. The analogy 
sets the conceptual stage:  
Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from 
fulfilling its proper action on account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the 
parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply 
with the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be 
inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for the reason 
is the ruling power of the soul's parts.31 
 
Aquinas, thus, essentially accepts the prior account of akrasia as acting against one’s 
better judgment, but analyzes weakness as more than merely acting against better 
judgment.32 Like Augustine, Aquinas sees akrasia consisting in human action that 
involves the whole of the human being, including the intellect, the will, and the 
 
 26 Thero, Understanding Moral Weakness, 68; Colleen McClusky, “Medieval Theories of Free 
Will,” IEP, eds. James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, https://www.iep.utm.edu/freewi-m/; accessed 17 June 
2020. 
 27 Stump, Aquinas, 282.  
 28 McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, 29. 
 29 McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, 30. 
 30 Steven J. Jensen, following one of Thomas’s locutions, calls akrasia “sin of passion” (Sin: A 
Thomistic Psychology, 125). 
 31 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 77, Art. 3. 
 32 Pickavé, “Aquinas on Incontinence and Psychological Weakness,” 193-96; Bradley, “Thomas 
Aquinas on Weakness of the Will,” 85. 
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passions.33 The intellect, which is ordered to the good and can be influenced by the 
passions, presents to the will that which it apprehends as good and the will motivates 
action.34 Akrasia, then, is action contrary not merely to one’s better judgment but also 
against one’s freedom, since whatever does not orient the will toward its appropriate end 
is binding not freeing.35 
 
2.1.5 Alfred Mele and the Contemporary Philosophical Conception of Akrasia 
Although other thinkers after Aquinas wrote about akrasia, their treatments never made 
much impact.36 We can mark 1970 as the point when contemporary interest in the topic 
exploded, with the publication of Donald Davidson’s essay “How is Weakness of Will 
Possible?” Since the expansion of quality literature on akrasia occurred when analytic 
approaches in philosophy were thriving, I interact herein with the literature of the last 50 
years. After Davidson launched the contemporary analytic discussion of akrasia, Alfred 
Mele37 kept it going, such that his conception is considered standard,38 with the exception 
noted in section 2.1.6 below. 
 
 33 Stump, Aquinas, 283. 
 34 Stump, Aquinas, 341. 
 35 Thero, Understanding Moral Weakness, 77; Stump, Aquinas, 439; 
 36 Some of the previously cited works include chapters on the interim period between Aquinas and 
contemporary scholars. See Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Medieval Thought; Hoffmann (ed), Weakness of 
Will from Plato to the Present; and Risto Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Renaissance and Reformation 
Thought (Oxford: OUP, 2011).  
 37 This is a select bibliography of Mele’s work on akrasia: “Aristotle on Akrasia and 
Knowledge,” The Modern Schoolman 58 (1981): 137-157: “Akrasia, Reasons, and Causes,” PhSt 44 
(1983): 345-68; “Pears on Akrasia, and Defeated Intentions,” Philosophia 14 (1984): 145-52; “Aristotle 
on Akrasia, Eudaimonia, and the Psychology of Action,” HPhQ 2 (1985): 375-93; “Is Akratic Action 
Unfree?” Ph&PhenR 46 (1986): 673-79; Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-
Control (New York: OUP, 1987); “Akratic Action and the Practical Role of Better Judgment,” PacPh. 72 
(1991): 33-47; “Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires,” Noûs 26 (1992): 281-302; “Socratic 
Akratic Action,” PhPa 25 (1996): 149-59; “Autonomy and Akrasia,” PE, 3 (2002): 207-216; “Akratics and 
Addicts,” APhQ 39 (2002): 153-67: “A Libertarian View of Akratic Action,” SPHP 49 (2008): 252-75; 
“Weakness of Will and Akrasia” PhSt 150 (2010): 391-404; Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will 
(New York: OUP, 2012). 
 38 Some of the major conversation partners include Robert Audi, “Weakness of Will and Practical 
Judgment,” Noûs 13 (1979): 173-96 and “Weakness of Will and Rational Action,” AJPh 68 (1990): 270-
81; Michael Bratman, “Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will,” Noûs 13 (1979): 153-71; Justin 
Gosling, Weakness of the Will (New York: Routledge, 1990); Frank Jackson, “Weakness of Will,” Mind 93 
(1984): 1-18; Alison McIntyre, “Is Akratic Action Always Irrational?” in Identity, Character, and 
Morality, ed. O. Flanagan and A. Rorty (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1990), 379–400 and “What is Wrong 
with Weakness of Will?” JPh 103 (2006): 284-311; Sergio Tenenbaum, “The Judgment of a Weak 
Will,” Ph&PhenR, 59 (1999): 875–911; Gary Watson, “Skepticism About Weakness of Will,” PhR 86 
(1977): 316-39. 
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 Mele’s notion of “strict akrasia” has become widely accepted even while the 
debate over its possibility or rationality has grown.39 Since the possibility/irrationality of 
akratic action is not the focus here, I do not delve into those debates. But Mele’s 
definition of “strict akrasia” will be critical to our current analysis and argument: 
An action [φ] is a strict incontinent action if and only if it is performed 
intentionally and freely and, at the same time at which it is performed, its 
agent consciously holds a judgment to the effect that there is good and 
sufficient reason for his not performing an [φ] at that time.40  
 
While largely consonant with ancient definitions, Mele’s definition is more analytically 
precise and somewhat expanded (to include notions of freedom and intentionality). 
 
2.1.6 Richard Holton the Revisionist: Akrasia is not Weakness of Will 
Although Mele’s “strict akrasia” has become the standard conception, a small group of 
thinkers have argued for what they claim is a better conception.41 Chief among these 
revisionists is Richard Holton,42 who argues that there is a difference between akrasia 
and weakness of will.43 Holton’s contention is that “weakness of will” is an everyday 
term that non-philosophers use, which does not mean the same as the technical jargon 
“akrasia”—thus creating problems in philosophical discussions which treat them as 
synonymous.44 On the one hand, then, Holton accepts the foregoing descriptions of 
akrasia while, on the other hand, argues that “weakness of will” requires further 
explication to give precision to the common conception.45  
 
 39 Stroud and Tappolet, “Introduction,” 5.  
 40 Mele, Irrationality, 7. This definition has been nuanced by Mele in more recent work (which 
has not, as yet, received the same attention); he now calls it “core akratic action”: “free, sane, intentional 
action that, as the nondepressed agent consciously recognizes at the time of action, is contrary to his better 
judgment, a judgment based on practical reasoning” (Mele, Backsliding, 8). 
 41 Richard Holton, “Intention and Weakness of Will,” JPh 96 (1999): 241-62 and “How is 
Strength of Will Possible? in Weakness of Will and Practical Rationality, eds. Sarah Stroud and Christine 
Tappolet (New York: OUP, 2007), 39-67. Alison McIntyre, “What is Wrong with Weakness of Will?” JPh 
103 (2006): 284-311. 
 42 The debate between Mele and Holton is captured in the following: Mele, Backsliding and 
Joshua May and Richard Holton, “What in the World is Weakness of Will?” PhSt 157, no. 3 (2012): 341–
360. 
 43 Richard Holton, Willing, Wanting, Waiting (New York: OUP, 2009), 70-1. Alison McIntyre 
agrees, “What Is Wrong with Weakness of Will?” JPh, 103 (2006): 284–311. 
 44 Holton, Willing, 72. 
 45 Holton, Willing, 71. See Mele, Backsliding, 13-32 for a dissenting view. 
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 According to Holton’s argument, the ordinary notion is that weakness of will is 
“when agents are too ready to reconsider their intentions.”46 This first glance, he 
contends, is too imprecise even if largely correct. He offers the following amended, more 
philosophically rigorous view:  
weakness of will is unreasonable revision of a contrary inclination 
defeating intention (a resolution) in response to the pressure of those very 
inclinations.47 
 
The key to Holton’s view is that resolutions are adopted in order to strengthen one 
against disinclinations that might arise when the time comes to act.48 Holton therefore 
describes resolutions as “contrary inclination defeating intentions.”49 Resolutions are 
intentions designed to “defeat” inclinations, like emotions, desires, wants, and the like 
that would otherwise prohibit one from carrying out some intended course of action. On 
Holton’s account, then, weakness of will is not about acting contrary to one’s judgment 
but acting contrary to one’s resolutions or intentions.  
 We now have two concepts in hand: (a) strict akrasia—the free, intentional 
action against an agent’s judgment; and (b) weakness of will—the unreasonable revision 
of a resolution, which resolution was intended to bolster against competing inclinations. I 
now turn to critically evaluating the relation between temptation/(T) and (a) and (b).  
 
2.2 Akrasia and (T): Related but Different 
With the foregoing as prelude, I here engage the following important question: what is 
the relationship between akrasia and temptation? Are they the same, similar, or entirely 
different? Answering this question will further clarify and differentiate the nature of 
temptation that I defended in Chapter 3. My approach will be to show that (T) either is (i) 
identical to akrasia; or (ii) is related to akrasia but distinct in important ways; or (iii) 
entirely unrelated to akrasia, thus suggesting that treating them as analogous or 
synonymous is mistaken. Engaging my previous account of temptation with the 
scholarship on akrasia, I develop an argument that substantiates (ii): temptation and 
akrasia are related but not identical experiences. 
 
 46 Holton, Willing, 71. 
 47 Holton, Willing, 78.  
 48 Holton Willing, 76-7. 
 49 Holton, Willing, 77. 
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 In establishing (ii), two benefits accrue to the overall argument. First, it further 
clarifies the key concept of temptation, which is crucial to my ultimate conclusion: that 
the possibility of temptation is necessary to the development of moral virtue. Together 
with Chapter 3, this chapter then serves to provide a fuller explication of what it is 
exactly that is putatively necessary for developing moral virtue. Second, showing that 
temptation and akrasia are related but different in particular ways justifies the analytic 
account of temptation I defend—which is not simply a repeat of accounts of akrasia. 
Now let us proceed to our task. 
 Recall that the core idea of akrasia in both the ancient and contemporary writings 
is that it is acting against one’s practical judgment, against what it is good to do. As 
noted above, the differences between how Christian thinkers such as Augustine and 
Aquinas unpack this and how Socrates/Plato, Aristotle, and contemporary scholars 
unpack this may make an important difference to the analysis at hand. Before I address 
the complexity raised by Augustinian/Thomistic considerations and by Richard Holton’s 
revisionist account (which countenance favorable overlap between temptation and 
akrasia), I first address their differences. 
 I here repeat the conception of (T) I defended in Chapter 3 to help guide the 
investigation of the current question:   
(T)=def. Temptation is an internal psychic conflict whereby a temptee TE desires 
some state of affairs, which state of affairs or the desire for the state of affairs the 
TE judges to be bad, and simultaneously the TE has some other psychic state 
that conflicts with the obtaining of or desire for the bad state of affairs and which 
state is seen as morally superior. 
 
2.2.1 Akrasia as a Character Trait Contrasted to (T)  
One obvious initial distinction between temptation and akrasia occurs when akrasia is 
taken to describe a character trait. For example, Aristotle sometimes deploys “akrasia” in 
this fashion:50 as a “lack of, or deficiency in, a certain kind of power or strength, namely, 
the power of self-control.”51 Although this deployment is not typical in the current 
philosophical scholarship on akrasia, it is one possible understanding.52 However, taken 
this way, it cannot be equated with temptation because temptation is not a character trait 
but an experience—an internal conative conflict. Certainly, it is possible that a person 
 
 50 For example, in NE 1152a25-27. 
 51 Alfred Mele, Irrationality, 3-4.  
 52 Stroud and Sarah, “Weakness of Will,” n1.  
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experiences temptation due to some character trait, or lack thereof (indeed, perhaps 
akrasia is the character trait that makes for experiences of temptation), but it is extremely 
difficult to argue that temptation itself is a character trait. On this basis, we must 
conclude that akrasia and temptation are different. Yet, while interesting, this point is 
insufficient for completely comparing the two concepts, especially since so few thinkers 
expound akrasia as a character trait.53 For fuller comparison, we must tackle the driving 
question of this section—regarding how akrasia and temptation are related—by 
engaging the commonly received analysis of akrasia in the philosophical tradition.  
 
2.2.2 Strict Akrasia and its Likeness to (T) 
Daniel Thero offers a very helpful schematic presentation of Mele’s strict akrasia that 
makes possible comparison and contrast with (T) and the regnant account of akrasia 
simpliciter. The criteria for an experience to be strict akrasia are as follows:  
(i)   P acts against their fully considered judgment (typically, best 
judgment). 
(ii)  P’s action must be intentional. 
(iii) P’s judgment must be grounded in P’s own values, principles, beliefs, 
and objectives. 
(iv)  P regrets the action afterward. 
(v)   P recognizes, at the time of action, that the action is contrary to their 
judgment regarding that action. 54 
 
We can compare these criteria to the six criteria for temptation defended in Chapter 3:  
(1) The temptee TE has a desire for some state of affairs, X, or action φ. 
(2) TE’s desire for X is such that it could motivate to action in order to do φ or 
obtain X. 
(3) TE believes X/φ or the desire for X/φ, or both, is bad. 
(4) TE has, concurrent with a desire for X/φ, some other psychic state, Y, that 
conflicts with X’s obtaining, with desiring X, or with φ-ing. 
(5) TE sees Y as morally superior to X/φ. 
(6) TE [succumbs to temptation] pursues actualization, in some capacity, of the 
desire for X or φ and gives up, rejects, or ignores the psychic conflict, Y. 
 
 53 Thomas J. Hill, “Weakness of Will and Character,” PT 14, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 93-115; Paulien 
Juliana Snellen, “Akrasia as a Character Trait” (PhD diss., University of Gronigen, 2018), accessed 16 July 
2020, https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/54917606/Complete_thesis.pdf.  
 54 Thero, Understanding Moral Weakness, 9; I have amended Thero’s version for stylistic 
conventions only.   
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 Three observations speak to the key difference between these two concepts. First, 
akrasia is always about a current or past action, whereas for (T), the experience is prior 
to any action. The literature on akrasia discusses it as a state of action that a person is 
either doing or has done. Until the person has succumbed to temptation, no action has yet 
been performed—which is a major difference between the two ideas. Indeed, this 
difference is perhaps enough to state that akrasia and temptation are categorically 
different. The second observation adding strength to the claim that the two concepts are 
different is that (T) is fundamentally about desire first and other psychic states second—
(T) begins with a conative attitude. However, for akrasia, the operative psychic state is 
cognitive: judgment or practical reason. The third and final observation here is that 
temptation is couched in moral terms in a way that akrasia is not; this is clear in the 
literature describing akrasia. In Chapter 3 (sections 3.3 and 3.5) I argued that (T) 
necessarily involves a moral judgment (conditions (3) and (5)), but akrasia can properly 
range semantically over all manner of judgments from moral to non-moral. For example, 
“Joseph [went to college] rather than [apprenticed with an electrician], even though he 
judged that to [apprentice with an electrician] was the better thing to do all things 
considered.”55 All things equal, Joseph’s action is akratic but not morally dubious. This 
example highlights the third distinction between akrasia and temptation. For these three 
reasons, akrasia and temptation are different. In spite of these points of contrast, 
however, an important relationship can be carefully discerned. 
 Joseph’s example raises the prospect that the criteria for succumbing to 
temptation could be described and interpreted as the criteria for strict akrasia (i)-(v). 
Thus, it would be reasonable to argue that akrasia is one particular form of succumbing 
to temptation but not coextensive with (T) broadly. I argue for the overlap between 
condition (6) of (T) and the conditions (i)-(v) of strict akrasia by way of an example with 
Joseph.  
 Joseph is writing his final term paper for the semester. It is hard work. He was 
assigned “the nature of temptation” as his topic, and he has little motivation for the 
course. He heard from a friend about a website where he could pay someone to write his 
paper for him. Joseph desires to pay for a ghostwriter, X, and thus meets condition (1) of 
(T). This option is motivating—he has the available money, there is a guarantee from the 
 
 55 Stroud and Svirsky, “Weakness of Will;” I changed the variables to the phrases in brackets. 
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site that it will pass plagiarism checkers, and there is no way his professor will know—
condition (2) is met. Yet, he knows the professor has a requirement that all work 
submitted must be the student’s own work and he believes paying someone else to write 
his paper is plagiarism. Thus, Joseph believes his desire for X is wrong—meeting 
condition (3). In fact, Joseph judges, Y, that it would be best if he simply got down to it 
and completed the paper; this is, after all, the right and good choice—conditions (4) and 
(5) are met. Joseph succumbs to temptation: his desire for X wins out against his better 
judgment Y and he fills out the form on the website and submits payment—meeting 
condition (6) and (i)-(iii) for strict akrasia. Two days later has he opens the email from 
the ghostwriter with his completed term paper; Joseph regrets hiring someone else to 
complete his work, even though he knew at the time it was a bad idea, and, thus, meets 
condition (iv) and (v). Prior to filling out the form and making payment, Joseph was in a 
state of being tempted and once he acted to obtain X, he succumbed to temptation. 
Furthermore, in succumbing to temptation, Joseph acted akratically: he met conditions 
(i)-(v). Joseph’s example is intuitively coherent and consistent with philosophical 
analysis of temptation and akrasia. Therefore, this example shows that some experiences 
of akrasia are experiences of temptation succumbed-to. 
 This analysis suggests two interesting and clarifying points for philosophy of 
action and moral psychology. First, while akrasia and (T) are different, they are not 
unrelated. In fact, in some cases akrasia is temptation succumbed-to. Second, the 
sometimes-equivocal use of “temptation” and “akrasia,” while not exactly accurate, is, in 
the best cases, only a mistake of timing, as (T) precedes akrasia. Then what about (T) 
and Holton’s concept of weakness of will? Are experiences of (T) also instances of being 
weak willed? 
 
2.2.3 Richard Holton’s “Weakness of Will” and its Likeness to (T) 
Richard Holton’s account of weakness of will, which is different from akrasia, is 
conceived as an “unreasonable revision of a contrary inclination defeating intention (a 
resolution) in response to the pressure of those very inclinations.”56 While Holton 
defends the difference between akrasia and weakness of will, he also suggests that the 
two might overlap on occasion.57 This might suggest that in so far as temptation and 
 
 56 Holton, Willing, 78.  
 57 Holton, Willing, 84; May and Holton, “What in the World is Weakness of Will,” 342.  
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akrasia occasionally overlap, and akrasia and weakness of will occasionally overlap; 
that, therefore, temptation and weakness of will occasionally overlap. This conclusion is 
not guaranteed because it does not necessarily follow that if some T are A, and some A 
are W, that therefore some T are W. Hence, on this basis, we cannot determine that 
temptation and weakness of will overlap simply by appealing to the overlap of weakness 
of will and akrasia. Further investigation is required. 
 Explaining and defending Holton’s account of weakness of will, Joshua May and 
Richard Holton write, “For [Holton], agents display weakness of will only if they violate 
a resolution. To get a case of weakness of will then, [P] would have to resolve to [φ or 
~φ], but then succumb to temptation and continue [~φ or φ].”58 On this account, then, 
weakness of will is temptation succumbed-to, much like some akratic actions are those 
of succumbed temptation. It is reasonable to conclude that this is largely correct, but with 
one caveat: not all instances of weakness of will are instances of (T) succumbed-to, but 
some instances are. The case of Joseph again helps argue this point. 
 It is a new semester and Joseph has made a resolution, Y, to φ: write all his own 
papers. Thus, he now has “a contrary inclination defeating intention,” namely, Y: to φ 
(write all his own papers). Joseph knows that the approaching paper deadline will 
reawaken his feelings of laziness, sense of dread, and proclivity to procrastination that all 
disincline him to write and incline him simply to pay a ghostwriter. To defeat these 
contrary inclinations, he makes his resolution, Y. The end-of -semester deadline for the 
research paper draws near, and familiar contrary inclinations arise in his psyche. As 
before, Joseph desires a ghostwriter, ~φ. The fact that he has the funds coupled with his 
contrary inclinations means he is motivated to ~φ. Just as he did last semester, he 
believes that buying a paper online is cheating and now even thinks that the desire itself 
is bad. Joseph also remembers that he made resolution, Y: to φ (write his own papers). 
Furthermore, he wants to be honest and have integrity in his studies and recognizes that 
buying a paper online is a moral violation of both his specific resolution and his desire to 
be honest. As before, Joseph succumbs to temptation and logs onto the ghostwriting site 
and purchases a research paper. Joseph resolved to φ—to write all his own papers—but 
then succumbed to temptation and ~φ-ed. This shows that May and Holton are right that 
at least some temptations succumbed-to are instances of weakness of will. However, an 
important exception can be identified in that not all instances of weakness of will are 
 
 58 May and Holton, “What in the World,” 343; emphasis added, brackets added to abstract the idea 
from the specific just-so example May and Holton are working with. 
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instances of temptation succumbed-to. The exception pertains to the moral nature of 
temptation. On Horton’s account, if a person unreasonably violates a non-moral 
resolution, they will have acted in a way that is classifiable as weakness of will but this 
weakness of will cannot be classifiable as succumbing to (T) precisely due to the lack of 
morality. 
 All of this brings us to another situation with Joseph who, having just overcome 
his acedia, is now in graduate school in philosophy, and is concerned that he buys too 
many books. Indeed, at the first mention of some interesting text from one of his 
professors or colleagues, Joseph immediate goes to Amazon.com to purchase it. This is 
not a compulsion or addiction, but he does believe his strong inclination to buy so many 
books is problematic for his finances. He therefore resolves to, Y: ~φ—to buy no more 
books for the remainder of the calendar year. Library check-out and interlibrary loan are 
his means of book acquisition from now until 01 January. A colleague mentions Alfred 
Mele’s newest book on free will and neuroscience, a text that is supposed to resolve all 
the scientific problems facing libertarian accounts of free will.59 The inclination to buy 
the book comes. Joseph desires to φ: buy a book. This is not a passing, inconsequential 
desire for him because he has been thinking about the problem of free will in light of 
scientific findings and is sincerely motivated to get good philosophical research on the 
topic. There is in Joseph’s mind nothing immoral about desiring to φ, and certainly 
nothing immoral about owning the book. Yet, he has made a resolution to refrain from 
buying any new texts, Y. Without much reflection, Joseph believes his resolution is non-
moral, that it is merely pragmatic pertaining to his finances. Regardless of his resolution, 
Joseph clicks “Buy Now.” In this version of the story, Joseph does not meet the 
conditions of (T) and therefore he is not experiencing temptation, but he is acting in a 
way that is weak willed according to Holton’s account. That is, Joseph unreasonably 
revised his resolution to ~φ (not buy any books) by φ-ing under the pressure of the 
inclinations that his resolution was made to defeat. 
 As with the previous overlap between (T) and akrasia, this overlap between (T) 
and weakness of will grounds a fascinating insight. Although not as novel as the previous 
temptation-akrasia connection, it confirms and corrects May and Holton’s association of 
weakness of will with temptation. Following this same method would show that it is 
possible that some instances of temptation succumbed-to are also both akrasia and 
 
 59 Alfred Mele, Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will (Oxford: OUP, 2014). Actually, 
Mele does not claim to solve all the problems! 
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weakness of will. I need not belabor the case for this, since a simple combination of the 
first two Joseph stories could, mutatis mutandis, show the truth of this claim.  
 In this section I have argued that (T) is unlike akrasia or weakness of will in two 
ways. First, (T) is not a character trait; thus, if akrasia or weakness of will is a character 
trait, the two are non-identical. Second, akrasia and weakness of will are primarily 
cognitive experiences that are not essentially tied to morality. I have also argued for a 
novel conclusion regarding the relationship between temptation and akrasia and 
weakness of will, namely, that akrasia and weakness of will are occasionally temptation 
succumbed-to. Thus, I have substantiated my claim that (T) is not akrasia or weakness of 
will. Further, establishing this substantive claim distinguishes it as not merely the 
combination of work already done on akrasia and weakness of will but rather shows that 
the account of (T) defended here is a constructive contribution to the scholarship, 
including philosophy of action and philosophical moral psychology. Additionally, this 
section has itself offered a constructive contribution to the literature on akrasia and 
weakness of will by explicating how temptation and akrasia/weakness of will are related 
but different. This section builds momentum for the overall project by further clarifying 
the concept of temptation, which is a fundamental component of the central thesis that 
temptation be possible in a world where moral virtues can be developed.  
 
3 Temptation and Moral Responsibility 
Much of the debate about the possibility of akrasia or weakness of will also involves 
discerning how or if either phenomenon could be morally culpable.60 As I have shown, 
(T) is not the same as akrasia or weakness of will simpliciter, but there is enough of a 
“family resemblance” (to use a common term in the analytic tradition) that the issue of 
temptation’s moral culpability becomes pertinent. Moreover, in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.1) 
I argued that all experiences of (T) are morally dubious experiences, but, even if this is 
true, it does not show that (T) is ever morally blameworthy/culpable. Therefore, in this 
section, I do two things to advance the larger argument: first, I clarify how a distinction 
 
 60 For example, Neil Levy, Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral 
Responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 2011); Gideon Rosen, “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility” PP 18 
(2004): 295–313; and Michael J. Zimmerman, Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of 
Ignorance (Cambridge: CUP, 2008). 
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between an action’s being bad and its being morally culpable is coherent; and second, I 
argue that some but not all experiences of temptations are possibly blameworthy.61 
 In what follows, I first briefly introduce the operative conception of moral 
responsibility that is based in contemporary philosophical discussion of culpability.62 
Once we have a clear view of what it means to be morally responsible, I then provide a 
critical analysis of whether, and how, temptation could be morally blameworthy. This 
will then set the stage for the argument of the final chapter, which culminates the thesis 
of this project: if human persons are to develop the moral virtues, then the possibility of 
temptation is necessary. 
 In the introduction I suggested that the argument of this project is one that is 
parallel to John Hick’s soul-making theodicy and Michael Brady’s suffering and virtue 
 
 61 It is a very common view among my ethics students that no temptation is ever morally culpable. 
I argue that this is mistaken and that at least some temptations are in principle morally culpable (see 
section 3.3 below). In defending this claim, I hope to correct a common misconception about temptation 
and moral responsibility.  
 The view that temptation per se is not sinful or bad, and therefore not morally culpable, is also 
very popular outside my classroom. To be fair, the claim almost never follows any kind of careful 
argument or analysis, so it is possible that under more careful consideration, proponents would nuance and 
change the view. My purpose is to offer the often-missing nuanced analysis. For this popular-level view 
see Kevin DeYoung, “Temptation is Not the Same as Sin,” TCG Blog, 26 September 2013, 
https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/kevin-deyoung/temptation-is-not-the-same-as-sin/; “Is 
Temptation a Sin?” Got Questions Ministries, https://www.gotquestions.org/temptation-sin.html; Oswald 
Chambers, “September 17: Is There Good in Temptation,” My Utmost For His Highest, 
https://utmost.org/is-there-good-in-temptation/; Daniel E. Bollen, Sermons for the Everyday Christian 
(Xlibris, 2012), 227; Bruce Wilkinson, Overcoming Temptation (Eugene, OR: Harvest House Publishers, 
2018), 27; Ben Johnson and Jeremy Postal, Stand: A Call to Uncompromising Witness & Discipleship 
(Langley, BC: Next Generation Ministries, 2012), 160. 
 62 The literature on moral responsibility is vast, even more than that on akrasia (cf. the 
bibliography in the SEP between the entries on “Akrasia,” “Moral Responsibility,” “Blame,” “Skepticism 
About Moral Responsibility, and “The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility”—or simply notice 
that moral responsibility has four entries compared to one for akrasia!). Commenting on this extensive 
literature, Michael Zimmerman notes that it is a mess of various shoots and offshoots (Michael 
Zimmerman, “Varieties of Moral Responsibility” in The Nature of Moral Responsibility, eds. Randolph 
Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith [New York: OUP, 2015], 45). This messy situation is 
undoubtedly due in part to the topic’s connections to discussions of freedom, determinism, and 
compatibility, which form a well-worn problem area in philosophy. Therefore, this section will not survey 
all the various viewpoints or minutia since it is not necessary to carry the argument forward. Hence, much 
of the literature will be left aside. Some of the various sources will be referenced in the footnotes but many 
will be left out. I list here a handful of key, book length, sources in the conversation.  
 John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1993) and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1993); Phillip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility: The Epistemic 
Condition (Oxford: OUP, 2017); David Widerker and Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and 
Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2006); Ishtiyaque Haji, Moral Appraisability (New York: OUP, 1998); Neil Levy,  Hard Luck: How Luck 
Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility (New York: OUP, 2011); Elinor Mason, Ways to Be 
Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 2019); Dana Kay Nelkin, Making 
Sense of Free Will and Responsibility (New York: OUP, 2011); T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: 
Permissibility, Meaning, and Blame, (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 2008); and the Oxford Studies in Agency and 
Responsibility series, volumes 1-6, edited by David Shoemaker (Oxford: OUP, 2013-2019). 
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argument.63 One of the key features to Hick’s argument is that authentic soul-making 
requires a world in which real suffering and evil is possible. Brady echoes this by 
arguing that virtue formation requires a world in which a particular kind of suffering is 
possible. My argument will be more parallel the more that it is capable of mirroring their 
ideas. To that end, substantiating that temptation is bad and sometimes morally culpable 
shows that temptation fits into the description of the world Hick and Brady posit as 
necessary for moral growth. It takes a certain kind of world—with certain structural 
features and not others—for certain valuable or positive states or processes to exist.  In 
other words, some world-feature A is necessary for even the possibility of some valuable 
outcome B. This section, then, progresses the argumentation pattern while also 
analytically refining the pertinent concept of (T).  
 
3.1 What is Moral Responsibility? 
Moral philosophers make an important distinction between actions or dispositions being 
bad and their being morally blameworthy.64 As Ronald Milo notes, just because an action 
is morally wrong does not mean that it is immoral, that is blameworthy.65 Gary Watson 
makes a similar distinction, which I will follow and use, regarding moral behavior: an 
action may be attributable to a person (it is authentically that person’s action) but the 
person may not be accountable, that is, morally responsible, for the action.66 Even with 
these distinctions, a person’s being morally responsible or accountable has been parsed 
in a variety of ways by moral philosophers. In this section I briefly and critically sort 
 
 63 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2010 [originally, 1977]) 
and Michael S. Brady, Suffering and Virtue (New York: OUP, 2018). 
 64 I will focus on blame rather than praise. There is widespread debate over the Symmetry Thesis: 
“praiseworthiness is the positive analogue of blameworthiness, and thus that factors affecting judgments of 
moral responsibility should have symmetrical effects on judgments of praise- and blameworthiness” 
(David Faraci and David Shoemaker, “Huck vs. Jojo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)symmetry of Praise and 
Blame,” in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, vol. 1, eds. Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo, and 
Shaun Nichols [New York, OUP, 2014],  9, accessed 16 July 2020, 
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.003.0002). My argument does not require choosing a position in 
this debate. 
 65 Ronald Dmitri Milo, Immorality, Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy, ed. 
Marshall Cohen (Princeton, NJ: PUP, 1984), 3. Not all agree that this distinction is viable; for an argument 
that it is a mistake to separate bad action from responsible action see Eduardo Rivera-López, “Can There 
Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions?” Ph&PhenR 73, no. 1 (July 2006): 124-142. 
 66 Gary Watson, “Two Faces of Responsibility,” PT 24, no. 2 (1996): 227-248; reprinted in 
Watson, Agency and Answerability (New York: OUP, 2004), 260-88 (my citations are from the reprinted 
version).  
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through the different positions in order to highlight the specific view that functions in my 
argument.67  
 First, culpability might pertain to justifying responses to blameworthy persons 
that seek to modify the person’s future behavior.68 On this view of responsibility, persons 
are “blamed” in order to modify their future behavior—it looks forward rather than 
backward. Some call this view the “consequentialist-based” approach to moral 
responsibility as it is focused on agents as “the proper targets of reprobation or 
punishment for immoral actions on the grounds that such treatment will, say, prevent the 
agent (or other agents) from performing that type of action in the future.”69 This view has 
largely fallen out of favor among philosophers, who instead focus on one of the follow 
two approaches.70 
 Second, blame could be about reactive attitudes.71 Blame is fundamentally about 
the responsive, affective attitudes one person has to another and the implied expectation 
of respect and due regard or “the quality of others’ wills towards us.”72 These reactive 
attitudes include resentment, indignation, anger, and the like.73 This view attempts to 
explain and justify what it is to be held as morally responsible, and not what moral 
responsibility would mean for future behavior or what it would mean to be morally 
responsible.74 
 A third and final approach maintains that blame is about reasons-responsiveness 
and being morally blameworthy.75 This widely held view will be operative in this project. 
 
 67 Matthew Talbert offers a clear overview of these positions with their main proponents and key 
arguments in, “Moral Responsibility,” in SEP, Winter 2019 edition, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/moral-responsibility/, §2. 
 68 The central defender of this view is J. J. C. Smart, “Free-Will, Praise and Blame,” Mind 70 
(1961): 291–306. 
 69 Gregg Caruso, “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 
2018 edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/, §1. 
Gary Watson calls this view the “social regulation” view; see Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits 
of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, 119-48. 
 70 Matthew Talbot, Moral Responsibility (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016), 31.  
 71 P.F. Strawson’s paper offers the classical defense of this view and served as a catalyst for much 
subsequent philosophical analysis of moral responsibility, see “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of 
the British Academy 48 (1963): 1–25; reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza, Perspectives on Moral 
Responsibility, 45-66 
 72 Peter Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 56. 
 73 Fischer and Rivazza, “Introduction,” in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, 4.  
 74 Talbert, Moral Responsibility, 46. 
 75 There is a fourth view that has received only sparse attention, the “ledger view” of 
responsibility. Moral responsibility consists in keeping an accounting ledger of moral deeds. Two key 
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In general, “These [reasons-responsive] approaches ground responsibility by reference to 
agents’ capacities for being appropriately sensitive to the rational considerations that 
bear on their actions.”76 Such a view more closely aligns with the common-sense, 
everyday conception of moral blame in which persons are held accountable for their 
actions—often labeled “desert-based blame.”77 Gregg Caruso explains:  
responsibility is considered to be backward-looking and retributivist in 
the sense that any punitive attitudes or treatments that are deemed 
appropriate responses for an immoral act/decision are warranted simply 
by virtue of the action/decision itself, irrespective of whatever good or 
bad results might follow from the punitive responses.78  
 
 The extensive defense of this view in the philosophical literature, which I will not 
rehearse here, coupled with its resonance with intuitive ideas of responsibility, makes the 
reasons-responsive/desert-based view most reasonable to apply to the concept of 
temptation in my developing argument. More particularly, I utilize John Martin Fischer 
and Mark Ravizza’s version of responsibility because their account does not depend on 
settling the complex debate about the exact nature of free will—and whether 
determinism, compatibilism, or incompatibilism is true.79 Calling their view semi-
compatibilist, they maintain that free will is incompatible with determinism but that 
moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism.80 Hence, their account would 




works represent this view: Jonathan Glover, Responsibility (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970) and 
Michael Zimmerman, An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988). 
 76 Talbert, “Moral Responsibility,” §2.3. The key defenders of this family of views are John M. 
Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility; Dana Kay 
Nelkin, Making Sense of Free Will and Responsibility; R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral 
Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1996); and Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (New York: OUP, 
1990). 
 77 Derek Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (New York, OUP, 2014), 134. I focus 
only on individual culpability not collective culpability. Cf., Marion Smiley, “Collective Responsibility,” 
in SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2017 edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries 
/collective-responsibility/. 
 78 Caruso, “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility,” §1. 
 79 For an overview of the arguments and opponents to an account like Fischer’s and Rivazza’s see, 
Caruso, “Skepticism About Moral Responsibility,” §2.  
 80 Robert Kane, “Introduction,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed., ed. Robert Kane 
(New York: OUP, 2011), 18. 
 81 Fischer and Rivazza, Responsibility and Control, 11. 
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3.2 The Necessary Conditions for Moral Responsibility 
The conditions under which it is appropriate to hold someone morally responsible can be 
traced back to Aristotle, who noted that either ignorance or force could undermine a 
person’s praiseworthiness or blameworthiness.82 In contemporary philosophical 
discussions, it is generally recognized that there are two individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for moral responsibility: [i] “a control condition (also called 
freedom condition) and [ii] an epistemic condition (also called knowledge, cognitive, or 
mental condition).”83 The control or freedom condition captures the sense that for actions 
to be blamed, they need to be uncoerced. And the epistemic condition captures the sense 
that for actions to be blamed, they need to stem from a person’s knowledge or awareness 
of certain facts about the action and acting with certain cognitive elements in place (for 
example, beliefs, intentions, desires, etc.).84 If (T) is sometimes morally blameworthy, 
then what specific conditions of moral responsibility are required for a culpable 
experience of (T)? In the following section, I will clarify what kind of control is needed 
for blameworthy (T) and then determine the relevant epistemic condition for 
blameworthy (T). 
 
3.2.1 The Control Condition for Moral Responsibility 
Deep in our common moral intuitions is the thought that a person must be in control of 
their action in order to be blamed, not just in the attributability sense but also in the 
stronger accountability sense. There is good reason for this. Imagine the case of Zoe who 
is blamed and sanctioned for knocking over and breaking the hip of an elderly woman 
crossing the street next to her when Zoe was hit by a gale force wind. In this case, Zoe’s 
“action” is not attributable to her, let alone one that is accountable, because it is entirely 
outside of her control. But here we face the issue of what is meant by “control”—how 
much and what kind of control is needed in order to be appropriately accountable for 
 
 82 Fischer and Ravizza, “Introduction,” 7; Cf. NE 1109b.30-1111b.5 
 83 Fernando Rudy-Hiller, “The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility,” SEP, ed. Edward 
N. Zalta (Fall 2018 edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/moral-responsibility-
epistemic/, §1. 
 84 Fischer and Ravizza, “Introduction,” 8. 
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one’s actions?85 On these matters, I follow the two-pronged conception of John Martin 
Fischer and Mark Ravizza in their landmark work, Responsibility and Control.86 
 Fischer and Ravizza distinguish between two kinds of control, one of which is 
needed for moral culpability whereas the other is not: (i) “guidance control,” which is 
needed for moral responsibility and (ii) “regulative control,” which is not needed.87 The 
difference between guidance and regulative control answers the question of how much 
freedom is needed in order to be morally blameworthy.  
 Regulative control, which is not needed for responsibility, “involves a dual 
power—for example, the power to freely do some act [φ], and the power freely to do 
something else instead.”88 The denial of regulative control for blame undercuts the 
intuition that a person needs an alternate course of action open to them in order to be 
morally responsible. Fischer and Ravizza’s account, however, is building on Harry 
Frankfurt’s famous observation that we count persons as free even when they do not 
always have another action choice open to them.89  
 When we consider what are now called “Frankfurt-Style Cases,” the point 
becomes more obvious. Imagine that Zoe is committed to voting in the next local 
election for the long-shot independent candidate and tells her friend Joseph about her 
plans. Joseph, needing extra money for books, has taken a job with the independent 
candidate’s campaign and wants to ensure Zoe does indeed vote for his boss. 
Unbeknownst to Zoe, Joseph has implanted a device in her brain that allows him to 
“read” her mental states and intervene to control her actions if necessary. He has done 
this to ensure that at voting time, Zoe will not vote for someone other than the 
independent candidate. On voting day, Zoe is at the booth and she feels the same sense of 
resolve she did the day she told Joseph about her plan to vote. Without hesitation, she 
selects the independent candidate. Joseph is elated, although he was fully prepared to 
 
 85 Attribution is more closely tied to causal responsibility, and while that matters and has 
important bearing on moral accountability (see Gary Watson’s discussion of “self-disclosure” views of 
moral responsibility in “Two Faces of Responsibility,” 261-64), it is not the focus of discussion here. With 
those philosophers who discuss responsibility, it will be assumed that in investigating the nature of control 
regarding moral responsibility, the person is appropriately causally responsible (see Zimmerman, 
“Varieties of Moral Responsibility,” 45-6).  
 86 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 31-41. For contrasting and critical accounts see R. Jay 
Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments; and Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason. 
 87 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 33. 
 88 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 31. 
 89 See Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” JPh 66, no. 3 (1969): 
829–839 and “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” JPh 68, no.1 (1971): 5–20. 
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intervene if necessary. It seems as though Zoe acted freely in voting for the candidate of 
her choice, but it was not actually open to her to vote for someone else, for if she had 
thought differently then Joseph would have engaged his brain device and forced her to 
vote for the independent candidate. In this case, Zoe does not have regulative control 
over her voting: she did not have the power to do other than she did. The power Zoe does 
have, according to Fischer and Ravizza is called “guidance control,” which is what is 
needed for moral responsibility. This kind of control has less scope—it is not control 
“over”—but it is, nonetheless, important. Guidance control “involves an agent’s freely 
performing [an] action.”90 
 To be appropriately accountable for their actions a person needs to act with 
guidance control but they need not act with regulative control: the action needs to be 
under the control of the person, even if there is no other action available to the them. 
Still, “guidance control” is vague and therefore is open to philosophical worry regarding 
its applicability to moral responsibility. Fischer and Ravizza recognize this and say that 
actions that have in their causal history things like hypnosis, brainwashing and 
indoctrination, certain mind-altering drugs, coercive manipulation, psychiatric or 
neurological disorders, or certain coercive threats, can all be “responsibility-undermining 
factors.”91 A person needs two things to meet the control condition, according to Fischer 
and Ravizza: (i) the person’s action mechanism needs to be reason-responsive and (ii) 
the action mechanism needs to be the person’s own.92 
 The concept of reason-responsiveness here is taken in a “moderate” sense in that 
the action process must be in some manner and in some possible scenario responsive to 
reasons to do otherwise.93 Understood this way, the kind of freedom needed for moral 
culpability is freedom such that persons who have it possess the ability to respond, in 
some possible scenario, to some reason or set of reasons. This is fundamentally about the 
possession of a particular rational capacity, not about the reasons themselves or the 
beliefs/knowledge/understanding of the person. If a person is such that their “mechanism 
of action” is moderately reason-responsive and their own, then they meet one of the 
conditions for moral culpability—the control condition.94 This helps explain why persons 
 
 90 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 31. 
 91 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 38. 
 92 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 39. 
 93 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 43, 62-91. 
 94 Fischer and Ravizza use “mechanism” as a shorthand descriptor for “the process that leads to 
the action” or the “way the action comes about;” Responsibility, 38.  
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under the influence of brainwashing and indoctrination are not candidates for moral 
culpability: their mechanism of rationality is not reason-responsive. The example of Zoe 
shows this. If she were to vacillate at the moment of voting and Joseph, the 
“counterfactual intervener,”95 activated the brain device causing her to vote for the 
independent candidate, then the brain device would produce an action mechanism in Zoe 
that is not reason-responsive. Not every loss of reason-responsiveness necessarily 
undermines moral responsibility, however.  
 Using a common example from responsibility literature, suppose that Zoe is 
attending the election celebration ceremony with Joseph and she freely consumes too 
much alcohol. As she attempts to leave the party and drive home, she crashes into the 
newly elected legislator’s Aston Martin causing irreparable damage. In her inebriated 
state, Zoe is not reason-responsive, but for all that, our intuition is that she is still 
blameworthy. How is this so on the present account? To answer this question, Fischer 
and Ravizza introduce the “tracing refinement:” “when an agent is morally responsible 
for an action that issues from a mechanism that is not appropriately reasons-responsive, 
we must be able to trace back along the history of the action to a point (suitably related 
to the action) where there was indeed an appropriately reasons-responsive mechanism.”96 
Applied to Zoe, there was a time prior to her inebriation when, ostensibly, her 
mechanism of action was reasons-responsive. It is this traceable history that makes sense 
of her moral culpability when she is less than reasons-responsive later.  
 The second factor that connects a person’s action process to moral culpability is 
that the mechanism of action is “their own.”97 It is not just that Zoe’s action mechanism 
is reason-responsive, it must also be her own. Fischer and Ravizza summarize the point, 
“In order to be morally responsible for an action, the agent must act from a mechanism 
that is his own reasons-responsive mechanism.”98 
 In order for a person to have guidance control, and therefore possibly be morally 
responsible, they need to be operating from a mechanism that is both reasons-responsive 
and owned by the person. What does it mean to “own” one’s reasons-responsive 
 
 95 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 58. 
 96 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 50-51. “Tracing” has its problems, especially for the 
epistemic condition; see Manuel Vargas, “The Trouble with Tracing,” MSP 29 (2005): 269– 291; for a 
compelling response to Vargas see Kevin Timpe, “Tracing and the Epistemic Condition on Moral 
Responsibility,” TMS, 88, no. 1–2 (2011): 5–28. 
 97 For a divergent account see Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason.  
 98 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 81. 
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mechanism? Fischer and Ravizza answer by specifying three criteria for the important 
concept of “owning,” or what they call “taking responsibility” (as in, she needs to “take 
responsibility” for herself).99 First, an individual needs to “see” themselves as an agent, 
as one who is capable of at least some effectual actions in the world that stem from 
choice, desire, and intention.100 Deep, sustained, or sophisticated philosophical reflection 
is not necessary; rather, the person merely needs to take it as though they are capable of 
performing actions that are not merely instinctual or programmed. Furthermore, there 
must be a historical connection in that the person needs to see themselves as having a 
historical thread of agency—as having at least some past actions that are due to choice, 
desire, and intention. The second criterion is that the person needs to see themselves as 
one who is the right kind of being for reactive attitudes in certain contexts.101 As with the 
previous criterion, extended reflection is not needed, but only the mental posture of 
seeing oneself to be an agent among other agents in a moral community that engages in 
praise and blame. In terms of this project, this second criterion of owning requires agents 
to see themselves as persons. The third criterion stipulates that the previous two criteria 
must be appropriately based on evidence.102 The “evidence” that Fischer and Ravizza 
seem to be aiming for is something like “connection to reality”: the individual must 
understand themselves as an agent who is part of an agentival community, one who acts  
in the world and participates in the moral community. What connects these three criteria 
to moral responsibility is the “mechanism” or the process that leads to action. This 
mechanism of action must be owned by the person, which means that the person sees 
their action as flowing from their (historical) agency and that they are part of the moral 
discourse in an agentival community. While it may seem esoteric, this additional 
component to guidance control helps to make sense of the intuition that psychosis, 
brainwashing, or mind-control devices are responsibility-undermining factors: they are 
action mechanisms not owned by the individual because they do not stem from a 
mechanism that is grounded in the individual’s own agency and history.  For example, if 
Zoe goes to vote and at the last minute decides that she does not want the Independent 
candidate and initiates the action to vote, say, Democrat, and Joseph activates the brain 
 
 99 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 207-39. 
 100 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 210. 
 101 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 211. 
 102 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 213. 
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device causing Zoe to instead actually vote Independent, then it is true that Zoe’s action 
mechanism is not reasons-responsive but, importantly, it is also not her own. 
 Thus, one of the necessary conditions for moral responsibility is control, and in 
order for that condition to be met, an individual must have guidance control. Guidance 
control is the ability to act freely by way of a mechanism that is both reasons-responsive 
and owned by the individual. Applying this to temptation (more fully below in section 
3.3): in order for (T) to be possibly morally blameworthy, a TE must have guidance 
control over their desire for X/φ. This is not the only condition for moral responsibility, 
however. There is also a second necessary condition for moral responsibility—an 
epistemic condition, to which I now turn. 
  
3.2.2 The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility 
Fischer and Ravizza helpfully clarify the control condition for moral responsibility. 
However, they intentionally do not offer an examination of the epistemic criterion but 
they do note that their theory could be supplemented with any number of views on the 
epistemic condition.103 When philosophical discussion of moral responsibility got early 
momentum, the control condition was the prize topic and the epistemic condition 
received very little attention.104 No doubt, the focus on control has to do with the much 
larger debate on human freedom, but the scene has changed and the epistemic condition 
is garnering much lively discussion and debate, although the details need not occupy us 
here. My contention is that, barring thoroughgoing skepticism about responsibility, (T) 
can be interfaced with whatever specific view of responsibility one adopts. Yet, in order 
to get clear on whether (T) could ever be a culpable experience, it is necessary to lay out 
some minimal criteria for the epistemic condition. Unlike the control condition, the 
epistemic condition has a narrower scope of discussion in the philosophical literature, 
which helps us develop a more generalized account of this specific criterion.105  
 
 103 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility, 13n21. The reasons-responsive aspect does not address 
the epistemic criterion. 
 104 Fernando Rudy-Hiller, “The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility.”  
 105 To date, there has not been the kind of landmark work on this criterion like Fischer and 
Ravizza’s work on the control condition. The account here is primarily informed by Rudy-Hillen, “The 
Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility.” Other key works include: Zimmerman’s Living With 
Uncertainty, mentioned above; Manuel Vargas, Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility 
(Oxford: OUP, 2013); Carl Ginet, “The Epistemic Requirements for Moral Responsibility,” PP, 14 (2000): 
267–277; Neil Levy, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (Oxford: OUP, 2014); Alfred Mele, “Moral 
Responsibility for Actions: Epistemic and Freedom Conditions,” PE 13, no. 2 (2010): 101–111; Rik Peals 
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 Our common intuition is that ignorance can, under certain circumstances, 
exculpate a person from moral responsibility, which means that the intuition assumes 
that some kind of knowledge or awareness is necessary for responsibility. Aristotle 
provides greater specificity to what is often merely intuitive in analyzing the kinds of 
ignorance needed for a moral excuse. He envisions six relevant factors: (i) the agent, (ii) 
the act, (iii) the situation and circumstances of the act, (iv) the instrument, tool, or object 
(if there is one), (v) the end or goal, and (vi) the manner of the act (e.g., gently or 
violently).106 In terms of the contemporary discussion, the epistemic condition for moral 
responsibility requires, roughly, that a person know or be aware107 of themselves, their 
action, or action set—its manner, the situation and circumstances in which it occurs, its 
moral significance, its consequences, and alternatives to it—and their goals or aims with 
the action or action set.  Evaluating the precise degree to which each factor here is 
relevant would lead to protracted controversy and be beside the present point.108 Thus, I 
move forward by articulating a workable account of the epistemic criterion that can 
interface with (T) and serve as a test of whether it is possible to be morally culpable for 
having the experience of (T).  
 To be morally responsible in relation to the epistemic condition, then, is to have 
some awareness, or culpable ignorance, about one’s actions, desires, or intentions. I 
contend that this awareness involves either (i) being occurrently mindful of or attentive 
to the various aspects of the action under scrutiny (its manner, the situation and 
circumstances in which it occurs, its moral significance, etc.) or (ii) being dispositionally 
mindful of or attentive to the various aspect of the action.109 Regarding (i): to be 
 
(ed), Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2017); George 
Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility without Awareness (New York: OUP, 2009). 
 106 NE, 1111a.15-19. 
 107 Due to debates over the nature of knowledge, and especially debates regarding knowledge as 
justified, true belief, some philosophers prefer “awareness” as the epistemic condition over “knowledge,” 
since knowledge is a stronger and more contested standard. Cf., Gideon Rosen, “Kleinbart the Oblivious 
and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility,” JPh 105, no. 10 (2008): 591–610; Rik Peals, “What 
Kind of Ignorance Excuses? Two Neglected Issues,” PQ 64, no. 256 (July 2014): 478–96; and Baron, 
Marcia, “Justification, Excuse, and the Exculpatory Power of Ignorance,” in Perspectives on Ignorance 
from Moral and Social Philosophy, ed. Rik Peels (New York: Routledge, 2017), 53–76. 
 108 Indeed, due to what appears to be the intractable nature of the problems for moral 
responsibility that arise from sophisticated considerations of the epistemic standard, there is much 
skepticism about moral responsibility in general. Rosen explains this well, see Rosen, “Skepticism about 
Moral Responsibility,” 295-313. 
 109 For those who defend an occurrent awareness only view, see Michael Zimmerman, “Moral 
Responsibility and Ignorance,” Ethics 107, no. 3 (1997): 421–2; Ginet “The Epistemic Requirements for 
Moral Responsibility,” 270; and Rosen “Skepticism about Moral Responsibility,” 309. 
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occurrently mindful/attentive means to be, in the moment of action, actively and 
cognitively aware of the necessary epistemic components—its manner, the situation and 
circumstances in which it occurs, its moral significance, and so forth. Occurrent 
mindfulness/attentiveness cannot be the only requirement for the epistemic condition of 
moral responsibility. If that were the case, then the implication would be that only those 
who are actively thinking about all the accoutrements of action (manner, morality, 
outcomes, etc.) could be morally responsible. Yet, that is intuitively problematic, as we 
see by considering Joseph and Zoe again. 
 Joseph is campaigning for his intrepid underdog Independent candidate and he 
cannot contain his passion and excitement. Zoe has heard the speeches, she has read the 
material, and she has become fatigued with all that Joseph has to say. Zoe tells Joseph 
multiple times that she would like for him to stop haranguing her about the upcoming 
election. At their next interaction, Joseph launches into the stump speech again, and Zoe 
stops him short with a shout of indignation and accusation of culpability. But Joseph 
pleads not guilty on the grounds that he was so caught up with the excitement of the 
campaign that he had been mindless about her earlier requests that he not influence her 
voting decision. Is Joseph innocent? Suppose he is telling the truth: he was not currently 
thinking about, and thus not occurrently aware, of Zoe’s requests not to campaign. Does 
that exculpate him?  
 If the epistemic requirement is that a person must be occurrently aware of their 
actions (manner, consequences, etc.), then Joseph is not culpable. However, this seems 
problematic because intuitively Joseph is an appropriate target of Zoe’s reactive attitude 
both regarding attribution and regarding accountability. Something is missing if all we 
have for the epistemic condition is occurrent awareness. Thus, adding the requirement of 
dispositional awareness is necessary. As I argue next, if dispositional awareness is 
factored into epistemic culpability, then occurrent awareness, which is entailed and 
covered by dispositional awareness, must definitely suffice for culpability.  
 Dispositional awareness means that “tacit, dormant, dispositional, or unconscious 
beliefs can, at least in many cases, amount to the kind of awareness that is required for 
moral responsibility.”110 Joseph’s dormant awareness of Zoe’s request is enough that he 
 
 For those who defend a dispositional awareness view, see Ishtiyaque Haji, “An Epistemic 
Dimension of Blameworthiness,” Ph&PhenR 57, no. 3 (1997): 531; Peels, “Tracing Culpable Ignorance,” 
580; and Timpe, “Tracing and the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility,” 18. 
 110 Rudy-Hiller, “The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility,” §3.1.  
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should have known, such that his “ignorance” is either not actual ignorance (that is, he 
did not, not know; he was not occurrently aware of what he knew) or it is culpable 
ignorance (that is, he should have known, given prior conversations with Zoe). However, 
the degree to which a person must be occurrently or dispositionally aware is a delicate 
and difficult issue, but we can fairly approximate for present purposes that something in 
the neighborhood of awareness is needed to meet the cognitive condition of culpability. 
 We can now state a general account of the epistemic condition. To meet the 
epistemic condition for moral responsibility, a person must be culpably ignorant of or 
have some appropriate degree of occurrent or dispositional awareness of their action(s), 
the circumstances and manner of their action(s), the consequences of their action(s), the 
moral valence of their action(s), and possible alternatives to their action(s). 
 To be morally responsible, then, requires that a person (i) have guidance control 
of their action(s)—that their action(s) stem from a mechanism that they own and that is 
moderately reasons-responsive—and (ii) have either dispositional or occurrent awareness 
of, or be culpably ignorant of, the morally salient features of the act(s)—manner, 
circumstance, outcomes, alternatives, etc. In light of this step in my unfolding analysis, 
we now ask the important question: is (T) ever morally culpable? 
 
3.3 (T) is Sometimes Morally Responsible, but Not Always 
In order to answer the question regarding whether a person can ever be morally 
responsible for (T), I begin by recalling the conditions of (T): 
(1) TE has a desire for some state of affairs, X, or action φ. 
(2) TE’s desire for X is such that it could motivate to action in order to do φ or 
obtain X. 
(3) TE believes X/φ or the desire for X/φ, or both, is bad. 
(4) TE has, concurrent with a desire for X/φ, some other psychic state, Y, that 
conflicts with X’s obtaining, with desiring X, or with φ-ing. 
(5) TE sees Y as morally superior to X/φ. 
(6) TE [succumbs to temptation] pursues actualization, in some capacity, of the 
desire for X or φ and gives up, rejects, or ignores the psychic conflict, Y. 
 
To direct us to the heart of the discussion, I contend that temptation succumbed-to could 
be morally culpable. After all, (T) is connected to actions or desires that the temptee 
believes are bad. Thus, if someone succumbs to temptation, and the temptation involves 
something they believe is bad, then it is coherent that what they do in succumbing is 
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morally blameworthy. Of course, not every temptation to which a person succumbs is 
going to be blameworthy since it remains possible to succumb to temptation and not 
meet one or both of the conditions for moral responsibility. We must now ask: what 
about having the experience itself—could the experience ever make a person morally 
blameworthy? 
 There is an obvious set of temptation experiences that are always going to fail the 
conditions for moral culpability. Temptation essentially involves desire and even if 
appetitive desires, which are mere physical drives, are ruled out (I argued for this in 
Chapter 3 section 3.1), it remains possible that some tempting desires that persons have 
arise uncontrolled. These uncontrolled desires still meet the criteria for (T), but they fail 
the control condition for moral responsibility. They fail because they are not aptly 
reasons-responsive, although they can be part of a person’s own mechanism of action. 
Put differently, sometimes (T) comes from a desire outside the control of the temptee—
and that loss of control is sufficient to undermine the culpability of the temptation.111 
Hence, a person is not morally blameworthy for all experiences of (T). But this does not 
mean that a person is never blameworthy for an experience of (T). Further careful 
analysis will show this to be the case. 
 To argue for the possibility of (T) being blameworthy, I return to a contention I 
made in Chapter 3 section 3.1.3. There I argued that the desires relevant to (T) are 
occurrent rather than merely standing—the desire needs to play an active role in the 
temtpee’s psyche. I further contended that occurrent desires can stem from a tendency 
that has formed from frequent occurrent desires of the same type—dispositional-standing 
desires. This was grounded in Alfred Mele’s refined conception of standing desire: a 
standing desire for X is the ongoing tendency to desire X based on having had frequent 
occurrent desires for X.112 A person’s experience of (T) that is most apt for being 
blameworthy are those experiences of (T) that have occurrent desires for X that trace 
from a standing-disposition to desire X. These desires are most closely connected to the 
conditions of moral culpability because they can be subject to guidance control and the 
appropriate epistemic awareness. The following case will draw these points together and 
show that temptation is possibly blameworthy. 
 
 111 This likely gets close to the description of temptation in the minds of those who argue that it is 
not ever culpable. This conception, however, is too narrow of a description of temptation.  
112 Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency (New York: OUP, 2003), 35. 
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 Levi has a desire to cheat on his upcoming ethics exam. This desire traces from a 
history of cheating in all of his classes: Levi is a serial cheater. This was not always the 
case, though. Before University, Levi was an honest student who made good grades. 
Since coming to University and becoming involved in a social club, he is not motivated 
to study. However, he needs to make good grades to keep his scholarship and to graduate 
with honors because he plans to go to Law School. The first couple of times cheating 
was psychologically hard but now it comes easily and with the assurance of good grades. 
Levi believes that it is very unlikely that the professor will catch him. Yet, if assured that 
he would be caught, he would not cheat. Levi recognizes that it is wrong to cheat and he 
signed the University academic integrity code as a first-year student. In addition, he has 
been reminded by every course syllabus that cheating is a violation of academic integrity, 
and Levi recalls the ethics professor’s semi-serious joke about the irony of cheating on 
an ethics exam. There was also the time last semester when the writing professor caught 
him looking at his smart watch for the answers. She was forgiving but warned Levi that 
it should be a one-time occurrence and another instance could mean failure or expulsion. 
He certainly does not want to fail or be kicked out, and, when he is honest with himself, 
he does not want to cheat. Levi knows that making more time for studying is morally 
better than cheating.   
 In this scenario, Levi is tempted to cheat: he meets all of the conditions for (T). 
Further, he also meets both conditions for moral responsibility. First, he has guidance 
control over his desire to cheat because his desire is both reason-responsive and his own. 
It is reason-responsive since if he were assured that he would be caught, he would refrain 
from cheating. Thus, Levi’s action mechanism is moderately responsive to reason. 
Furthermore, Levi’s desire comes from a process that he owns (he is not under any 
psychosis, hypnosis, drugs, manipulation, etc.). It is not an ephemeral desire because it is 
one that he has “cultivated” over time. Therefore, Levi’s action mechanism is his own. 
Second, Levi meets the epistemic condition for moral responsibility: he has the 
appropriate awareness of his actions. He is aware that using his smart watch to store 
answers is cheating (the action), that cheating is prohibited by both the professor and the 
university (the situation and moral valence of the action), that getting caught could mean 
failure or expulsion (the possible consequence of the action), and that studying more is 
the better avenue (the alternative actions). Hence, Levi’s temptation meets the conditions 
of blameworthiness, demonstrating that he is the appropriate target of accountable blame. 
Although many real-world instances appear to mirror Levi’s case, even if there are no 
such instances, my argument here nevertheless shows in principle that (T) can sometimes 
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make a person blameworthy. Thus, while not always so, (T) can be, in some cases, 
blameworthy. 
 
3.4 (T), Blameworthiness, and Analytic Moral Theology 
As I argued in Chapter 1 (section 3.1), analytic moral theology finds authoritative 
sourcing in biblical and theological data. In Chapter 2 (section 2.8) I attended to the 
relevant biblical data on temptation. What is pertinent from that study for the present 
argument is that temptation is a morally negative experience in the New Testament. In 
Chapter 3 (sections 3.3.1 and 3.5) I marshaled arguments from moral psychology and 
philosophy of action to show that (T) is consistent and coherent with both the biblical 
data and analytic moral philosophy. The present chapter has further contributed to this 
running contention by arguing that (T) can sometimes be a blameworthy experience for 
the temptee. Therefore, the account of (T) that I establish in this project is consonant 
with biblical-theological data and, hence, is a contribution to the developing field of 
analytic moral theology.113  
 
4 Conclusion: Review of the Argument and its Location in the Project 
In this chapter I have argued for two claims. First, that the experience of (T) is not the 
same as akrasia or weakness of will but that sometimes (T) succumbed-to can be akrasia 
or weakness of will. This argument is itself a creative, substantial contribution to the 
scholarship on akrasia/weakness of will. Moreover, this contention further distinguishes 
(T) from other related moral phenomenon and advances the main thesis of this project by 
giving an analytic account of the nature of temptation that is coherent.  
 The second argument of this chapter is that temptation is sometimes morally 
blameworthy under a standard and widely accepted criteria of moral responsibility. A 
person who experiences (T) can do so while retaining guidance control and being aptly 
aware of their actions, and, thus, (T) can be a morally blameworthy experience. This 
second argument enforces the main contention of this project by showing that (T) 
involves moral evaluation of a person’s interior life. Moral virtue acquisition is 
necessarily attentive to a person’s desires, motivations, intentions, goals, and action. 
 
 113 A next step in a larger project would be to interface (T) with a theology of sin. A key question 
that remains to be answered is whether an experience of (T) is ever sinful. This is beyond the scope of the 
current argument but shows the potential theological fruit of analytic moral theology.  
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Therefore, if the possibility of (T) is necessary for moral virtue formation, (T) must also 
be morally attentive to a person’s desires, motivations, intentions, goals, and actions. 
Hence, interfacing (T) with moral responsibility further highlights the moral role that 
desires, motivations, intentions, goals, and actions have in experiences of temptation. 
 The next and penultimate chapter argues for the second half of the project’s main 
thesis that the possibility of temptation is necessary for the development of moral virtue. 
The veracity of that thesis relies fundamentally on the nature of temptation, hence the 
close analytic attention of the argument of Chapters 3 and 4. This thesis also relies on the 
nature of moral virtue and how it is developed in human persons. Chapter 5 argues for a 
neo-Aristotelian conception of moral virtue and virtue formation and argues that the 




Chapter 5: The Role of Temptation in Moral Virtue 
Formation 
 
1 Introduction  
The preceding chapters have formed a conceptual foundation, establishing the precise 
analytic nature of temptation. This chapter will rest on those intermediate conclusions 
and press the argument to its ultimate conclusion. Chapter 3 argued for a very particular 
synthetic, constructive account of temptation, (T), critically navigating alternative 
theories, which included the common-thread ideas and theological parameters found in 
Chapter 2 and then construing these in terms of the necessary conditions for genuine (T) 
to occur. Employing analytic methods, that chapter attended closely to the logical 
outworking of the technical definition of (T) to ensure it was consistent, coherent, and 
informed. Chapter 4 further clarified the nature of (T), and again, engaged the 
methodology of analytic moral theology by distinguishing (T) from akrasia and 
weakness of will and by investigating how (T) relates to moral responsibility.  Now, this 
chapter first examines the nature of virtue formation interpreted on a neo-Aristotelian 
account.1 Second, and most important, for this project, the current chapter marshals all of 
the foregoing sub-arguments in defense of the claim that in order to form moral virtues 
by habituation, an agent needs an environment that is conducive to and allows for the 
possibility of the experience of (T).  
 If my account of (T) in Chapters 3 and 4 is accurate to moral reality, then that 
account should be compatible with a variety of ethical systems, particularly to the extent 
that they also are accurate to all moral realities involved. However, at this point in the 
developing argument, it is not too obvious to state that (T) seems to have a natural 
affinity for an Aristotelian account of virtue ethics.2 On the one hand, the philosophical 
exposition of (T) that I defend should find purchase with consequentialists or 
 
 1 For an overview of Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, see Nancy E. Snow, “Neo-Aristotelian Virtue 
Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Virtue, ed. Nancy E. Snow (New York: OUP, 2018), 321-42. The 
approach I take is neo-Aristotelian and as such neither purports to be an exegetical analysis of Aristotle nor 
a work that aims to think Aristotle’s thoughts after him. Rather, like all neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, the 
aim here is to take important cues and grounding assumptions from Aristotle (cf., Sukaina Hirji, “What’s 
Aristotelian about Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?” Ph&PhenR 98, no. 3 [May 2019]: 671-96). 
 2 For non-Aristotelian accounts of virtue see Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue (New York: CUP, 2001); 
Michael Slote, Moral Sentimentalism (New York: OUP, 2010); and Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A 




deontologists, or other varieties of normative approaches.3 So long as the normative 
theory makes space for conative attitudes, then the account I offer could be helpfully 
included. On the other hand, my account fits especially well and closely with those 
ethical systems that make the agent rather than actions or consequences central. In this 
light, a strong case can be made that virtue ethics—with strong ancient and medieval 
roots and with a resurgent revival in contemporary analytic moral philosophy and moral 
theology—makes best sense of all the moral and theological data.4 Likewise, my more 
specific claim that (T) makes best sense of the data pertaining to that specific moral 
reality provides an auspicious starting point for further reflection in the area of moral 
theology. 
 There are two core pieces to the project’s thesis that need conceptual 
clarification: (i) the nature of temptation and (ii) the nature of moral virtue formation. 
Part of the analytic theological-philosophical method is breaking apart complex 
propositions into their component parts and arguing for their consistency and coherency. 
Applying this method to the nature of temptation required more groundwork because 
there was less theological and philosophical background. Therefore, arguing for (T) 
occupied more territory in this project than will arguing for the nature of virtue 
formation. Virtue ethics has a long and rich history and thus I will limit my arguments in 
this chapter in two ways. First, I will not defend virtue ethics in general from the ground 
up. And, second, I will contend for a general but widely applicable account of virtue 
formation within the neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue ethics. My main burden in what 
 
 3 For this tripartite conception of ethical theory see Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael 
Slote, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate, Great Debates in Philosophy, ed. Ernest Sosa (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Pub., 1997).  As Linda Zagzebski explains, “what makes a theory a virtue theory is that it 
focuses analysis more on the concepts involved in the evaluation of person than on act evaluation” (Virtues 
of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge [New York: 
CUP, 1996], 78).  
 4 For a defense of Christian ethics as virtue ethics see: Joseph J. Kotva, Jr., The Christian Case for 
Virtue Ethics (Washington, D.C.: GUP, 1996) and Brad J. Kallenberg, “Virtue Ethics,” in Christian Ethics: 
Four Views, ed. Steve Wilkens (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2017). Cf., Jean Porter, The Recovery 
of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1990); 
William P. Brown, ed., Character & Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2002); David P. Gushee and Glen H. Stassen, Kingdom 
Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary Context, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. 
Co., 2003); Paul J. Wadell, Happiness and the Christian Moral Life: An Introduction to Christian Ethics, 
3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: The Rowman & Littlefield Pub. Group, 2016); N.T. Wright, After You Believe: Why 
Christian Character Matters (New York: HarperCollins Pub., 2010); Samuel Wells, Improvisation: The 
Drama of Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004); Daniel A. Westberg, Renewing Moral 
Theology: Christian Ethics as Action, Character and Grace (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015); 
William C. Mattison III, Introducing Moral Theology: True Happiness and the Virtues (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Brazos Press, 2008); Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics 





follows, therefore, will be to argue that the possibility of (T) as necessary for virtue 
formation is most fully understood when the notion of virtue formation is analyzed in the 
vein of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Toward this aim, this chapter first briefly reviews 
how character is formed according to a broadly neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic, and second, 
explains (T)’s role or function in character formation. 
 
1.1 Temptation and Virtue Ethics 
In this section I argue that virtue ethics is the normative theory that makes best sense of 
the morality of (T). I have contended that (T) is a morally dubious experience (Chapter 3, 
section 3.3.1) and there I noted this negative evaluation is in terms of the something 
internal to the temptee. An experience of (T) is not yet an action in the typical sense 
important to deontological ethics, although, of course, it might lead to such action.5 Also, 
temptation is not typically the kind of consequence under review in normative systems 
that make outcomes central to moral evaluation. Instead, (T) involves states that are 
internal to the agent and this is precisely where the locus of attention is placed in virtue 
ethical theories.6 Indeed, the connection between an ethic of virtue and the nature of (T) 
that I exposit is clearly seen in light of Philippa Foot’s notion of virtue as closely tied to 
volition and intention.7 
 I will argue that becoming virtuous requires the possibility of the experience of 
(T), although moral virtue formation does not require actually experiencing temptation, 
and, thus, a fortiori, it does not require succumbing to temptation. A central concern of 
virtue ethics is moral character formation, the making of an excellent person, which 
entails becoming virtuous. On the two opposite poles of moral character—the fully 
virtuous and the fully vicious—an agent would not experience temptation,8 but as an 
 
 5 Alfred Mele argues that practical decisions are actions and if he is correct, then (T) is a kind of 
action (Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will [New York: OUP, 2017], 7-
12). Importantly, though, it is not the kind of action that matters for deontological ethics, which is the point 
here.  
 6 Ethics of character is one of the species of the larger family of ethical theory; or, as Robert 
Adams puts it, ethics of character is a department of ethical theory (A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in 
Being for the Good [New York: OUP, 2006], 4).  
 7 Philippa Foot, “Virtues and Vices,” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Stephen Darwall (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Pub., 2003), 105-20. Zagzebski differentiates, in agreement with Michael Slote, between 
happiness-based virtue ethics and motivation-based virtue ethics (Virtues of the Mind, 80-84), and, she 
argues, Aristotle follows most closely the happiness-based approach. One need not settle any dispute 
between the two approaches to make the connection between virtue and temptation here. 
 8 John McDowell, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” PAS, Supplementary 




agent moves either toward more fully virtuous or more fully vicious it is necessary that 
the person have both the capacity to experience temptation and an environment 
conducive to experiences of temptation. This recalls the parallel in my argument with 
John Hick’s Ireneaen Soul Making Theodicy and Michael Brady’s argument regarding 
suffering and virtue.9 Hick’s and Brady’s positions are that in order for authentic 
character growth to take place, the world must be the kind of place where evil and 
suffering is possible (not necessarily actual, but at least possible). Likewise, I am making 
this same kind of conservative claim in the following line of reasoning: while actual 
experiences of (T) are not necessary for persons to become more nearly virtuous, 
experiences of (T) must be a real possibility. To establish this, I will begin with an 
analysis of the nature of character formation. 
 
2 Moral Virtue Acquisition  
In order to locate my conception of temptation within a framework of virtue ethics, I first 
consider how character is formed according to a neo-Aristotelian virtue framework.10 I 
pursue this particular framework because it pays special attention to the internal 
workings of persons, an interest which is not as central in other ethical frameworks.11 
Indeed, a neo-Aristotelian virtue approach especially focuses on the alignment of desires, 
reasons, and actions, which is a major point of contact with (T).12 The final step in the 
argument (taken up in section 5 below) will be to show how the possibility of (T) is 
necessary for an agent to have the fullest opportunity for virtue formation. Put simply: 
the cultivation of virtue requires both the inner capacity to experience (T) and the 
possibility of (T). 
 
 
 9 John Hick, Evil and the Love of God (New York: Pallgrave McMillan, 2010). Michael S. Brady, 
Suffering and Virtue (New York: OUP, 2018).  
 10 Daniel Russell notes that Aristotle himself did not seem to have a special process for virtue 
acquisition. Rather, Aristotle took moral growth to be a rather mundane process that mirrors skill 
acquisition (“Aristotle on Cultivating Virtue” in Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, 
Theology, and Psychology, ed. Nancy E. Snow [New York: OUP, 2015], 17-48). Thus the need for this 
argument to be neo-Aristotelian rather than strictly Aristotelian.  
 11 Heather Battaly, Virtue (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015), 10-12, 33-35.  
 12 On this conception of Aristotelian virtue see Howard Curzer, Aristotle & The Virtues (New 




2.1 Anthropology: Human Nature Determines the Nature of Virtue and Virtue Formation 
At the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle asks about what makes for human 
excellence, for a degree of fulfillment of the kind of thing a human being is.13 In 
unfolding his answer to the question, Aristotle helped secure the idea for the whole 
Western intellectual tradition that a human being seeks to be moral, both to do moral 
things and to become a person with moral qualities.14 Thus, I start from the premise that 
human persons are moral agents that have as a key aim or drive to become morally well-
developed; it is a purpose of their nature to pursue moral growth. This understanding 
entails that moral perfection is not the state into which humans are born. As David Carr 
reports, “none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature.”15 This truth is also attested to 
in traditional Christian theology.16 The First Epistle of John captures the theological 
commitment clearly: “If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is 
not in us” (1.8 ESV). And, the Catechism of the Catholic Church summarizes the point, 
“Revelation gives us the certainty of faith that the whole of human history is marked by 
the original fault freely committed by our first parents.”17 Yet, healthy and sane humans 
by God’s common grace expressed in their nature pursue a state of moral goodness.18 
This human pursuit is evident in the moral education of children and our communal 
practices of moral blame and praise.19 Parents generally have always sought to instill 
some moral code or sense of morality or even inner moral qualities in their children, 
 
 13 NE, 1097b22–1098a20. A note about citation of Aristotle’s NE: in this chapter, when I make a 
general reference to Aristotle’s ethics, without quotation and no appeal to a translation, I will simply cite 
NE followed by the Bekker reference; e.g.: NE, 1103a15. Otherwise, all citations will be from the Ross 
translation in the volume edited by Barnes, and will be cited with the full title of the work and the page 
number from Barnes’s edition [e.g., NE, 1742]) 
 14 Richard Kraut, “Aristotle’s Ethics,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2018 edition), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/aristotle-ethics/. 
 15 David Carr, “Character and Moral Choice in the Cultivation of Virtue” Philosophy 78, no. 304 
(Apr., 2003): 222; cf., NE, 2.1103a.19.  
 16 Anthony N.S. Lane, “Lust: The Human Person as Affected by Disordered Desires,” EQ 78, no. 
1 (2006): 21-35; Cornelius Plantinga Jr., Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1995). 
 17 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed., 390, 
https://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p1s2c1p7.htm, accessed 21 July 2020. 
18 This is not to say that humans by nature (i.e., without God’s enabling grace) pursue holiness or 
union with God. The state of sin and the effects of the Fall disorder and disrupt the human pursuit of 
goodness (cf. Lane, “Lust,” op. cit.). In this state, humans love the wrong things and love the right things 
wrongly (David K. Naugle, “St. Augustine’s Concept of Disordered Love and its Contemporary 
Application,” Southwest Commission on Religious Studies Theology and Philosophy of Religion Group 
[12 March 1993]: online https://www3.dbu.edu/ naugle/pdf/ disordered_ love.pdf, accessed 29 August 
2020) Disoriented though humans are, there remains enough of the imago Dei that humans pursue all 
things sub specie boni: under the guise of the good (Jensen, Sin, 15-40). 




indicating once again that humans begin life morally immature and pursue moral 
growth.20 Two basic facts are revealed by this wide human endeavor: first humans are not 
morally impeccable; and second, there is a widespread effort to morally educate 
humans.21 These observations sound a core note to my argument: the process of moral 
education for humans is determined by human ontology. 
 Human ontology necessarily conditions and intertwines two core components of 
virtue ethics: (i) the specific nature of human moral excellence and (ii) the process of 
moral education.22 According to a neo-Aristotelian trajectory, moral excellence is inner 
states such as dispositions, habits, or tendencies that make the person who has them 
excellent.23 Thus, moral growth depends on forming particular inner states like habits 
because moral education is conceptually dependent upon the nature of moral excellence. 
As Myles Burnyeat argues, “any tolerably explicit view of the process of moral 
development depends decisively on a conception of virtue.” 24 Julia Annas agrees when 
she argues that “virtue is to be understood in part by the way it is acquired.”25 Therefore, 
on neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, there is a tight connection between both the nature of 
moral excellence and the process of virtue formation.  
 In the neo-Aristotelian vein, this process of virtue formation involves shaping the 
inner life of human agents.26 As Christine McKinnon concludes, “Morality is thus deeply 
rooted in facts of human nature and the human needs, desires, and capacities to which 
these give rise.”27 Virtue acquisition, then, is the process of seeking to instill character 
 
 20 Of course there are those persons who are either morally insane (i.e., unable to respond to or 
“see” morality) or are sociopathic (i.e., they “see” morality but are unmoved by it) [Susan Wolf, “Sanity 
and the Metaphysics of Responsibility” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in 
Moral Psychology, ed. Ferdinand David Schoeman (Cambridge: CUP, 1987)]. They, perhaps, would not 
make any attempt to moral education. The morally insane or sociopathic are not “healthy” and “sane” 
person who is taken as paradigmatic for my argument and therefore I leave those cases aside.   
 21 Richards, The Ethics of Parenthood, 164. 
 22 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 119-20. 
 23 Nathan Bowditch, “Aristotle on Habituation: The Key to Unlocking the Nicomachean Ethics” 
EtPer 15, no. 3 (2008): 309-42. 
 24 M. F. Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Learning to be Good,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amélie 
Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley, CA: UCAP, 1980), 69. [69-92] For a view that shares some commonality with 
Burnyeat but disagrees about the role of pleasure in virtue formation see Curzer, Aristotle & the Virtues, 
318-40.  
25 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 27. 
 26 I use a number of phrases synonymously: “character growth,” “moral growth,” “character 
formation,” “virtue formation,” “virtue inculcation,” “virtue acquisition,” etc.  
 27 Christine McKinnon, Character, Virtue Theories, and the Vices (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview 




and intellectual traits that make for a virtuous or excellent human agent.28 A key point for 
my argument is articulated best by McKinnon: “The human capacities that make 
morality possible include the abilities to be self-consciously aware of desires, to evaluate 
desires, and to deliberately endorse those that one approves of and to deliberately 
suppress those that one disapproves of.”29 The human development of moral virtue 
therefore requires attending to psychic attitudes and it is this aspect of both the nature of 
virtue itself and virtue formation that requires the possibility of experiences of 
temptation. To argue for this connection between (T) and virtue formation, I contend that 
there are five essential elements to any virtue: (i) action, (ii) motivation, (iii) affection, 
(iv) judgment, and (v) habit.30 I argue that, in order to become virtuous, these five 
essential elements must be at work in a person—and that these elements provide avenues 
that connect to the role of temptation. 
 
3 The Five Necessary Elements of a Virtue 
 
3.1 Action 
The first essential element of a virtue is that nearly all moral virtues entail a 
characteristic activity or activities.31 For example, the virtue of temperance shows itself 
in adequately controlling, inter alia, one’s desire for and consumption of food. And 
generosity consists in the giving of one’s material goods to those who are in need. It is 
not sufficient for an agent simply to intend to carry out some characteristic action for that 
intention may not come to fruition in actual action:32 virtue is not acquired by mere 
 
 28 This true whether it is purely internal states that are determinative to an agent’s being good, or 
whether being a good agent is a matter of having the traits that reliably bring about certain ends (Heather 
Battaly, Virtue Ethics [Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015], 25-28). My argument works whichever approach 
is held.  
 29 McKinnon, Character, 5. 
 30 These elements are adapted from Jason Baehr, “The Four Dimensions of an Intellectual Virtue,” 
in Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy, eds., Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote, 
and Ernest Sosa (eds.) (New York: Routledge, 2015): pp. 86-98. Howard Curzer offers five components of 
virtue from Aristotle’s account: (a) “the ability to identify which acts are virtuous in a given situation,” (b) 
“an understanding of why they are virtuous,” (c) “a desire for the virtuous actions for their own sakes,” (d) 
“dispositions of virtuous action”, i.e., reliable action, and (e) “dispositions of virtuous passion,” i.e., 
reliable feeling (Aristotle & The Virtues, 318). There is no inherent inconsistency between Baehr and 
Curzer. Baehr’s account is simpler and for that reason it guides the discussion here. Furthermore, Cruzer’s 
(a) and (b) are covered by Baehr’s ‘judgment’ element and, therefore, the two accounts are sufficiently 
similar so as to need no adjudication.  
 31 Some virtues that do not seem to have any activity. For example, integrity does not seem to 
have its own characteristic action (McKinnon, Character, 38). 




intention but rather by regular action.33 The agent must go beyond the mere formation of 
a good intention, or claim to have a “good heart.”34 Attempting to act appropriately is a 
fundamental and necessary condition for virtue formation.35 Developing virtue requires 
actually engaging in some action or trying to engage in some action in an appropriate 
circumstance. Aristotle makes this clear when he offers the analogy, “men become 
builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre.”36 Julia Annas affirms, 
“Aristotle is right here: virtue is like building in that learning to be brave is learning to do 
something, to act in certain ways, and that where we have to learn to do something, we 
learn it by doing it (not just reading a book about it).”37 Consistently and (possibly) 
reliably doing virtuous actions are required in order to become virtuous. Doing is prelude 
to becoming. Virtues are, then, persistent inner states that can be established only by 
intentional, repeated actions. Simply put, virtue requires doing something, or at least 
attempting or exerting effort (which is distinct from intending) to do something.38 
Becoming virtuous requires more than “everyday virtuous action, actions that are in 
 
 33 Bill Pollard, “Habitual Actions,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, eds. Timothy 
O’Connor and Constantine Sandis (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2010), 76; cf. Richard Kraut, “Aristotle's 
Ethics.”  
 34 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 99. 
 35 Three concerns ground the phrasing “attempting” and “trying.” First is the problem of moral 
luck: “moral luck” are the factors beyond the control of the agent that impact moral evaluation of the agent 
(Dana K., Nelkin, “Moral Luck,” SEP, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2013 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/win2013/entries/moral-luck/>). Second is the problem that not all actions are successful and 
sometimes that is because the agent has made no effort to act. Virtuous action may not need to be 
successful, but persons developing virtue do need to make effort—attempt or try—to effect action in the 
world (on this connection between “attempting” and “trying” where it is presumed success is not had see 
Peter Heath and Peter Winch, “Trying and Attempting,” PAS, Supplementary Volumes, 75 [1971]: 193-
227; and Jennifer Hornsby, “Trying to Act,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, eds. Timothy 
O’Connor and Constantine Sandis [Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2010], 18-25). Third, and finally, not all 
virtue ethicists agree that virtuous action must be successful (e.g., Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue [New York: 
CUP, 2001]; cf. Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind). The argument here, however, does need not take a 
position on whether virtue-issuing actions are necessarily reliable.  
 36 NE, 1743 (1103a.34).  
 37 Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (New York: OUP, 2011), 22.  
 38 There is debate over whether virtuous action has to be successful or not. Some contend that it is 
not enough that one merely attempt (and intend) to act but that one must act correctly (e.g., Zagzebski, 
Virtues of the Mind, 136-7; Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue [New York: CUP, 2001]). Others disagree 
suggesting that the intention and attempt is enough (see Julia Annas, “The Structure of Virtue,” in 
Intellectual Virtue, eds. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski [New York: OUP, 2003]; Jason Baehr, The 
Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology [New York: OUP, 2011]; Philippa Foot, 
“Virtues and Vices,” in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger Crisp and Michale Slote [New York: OUP, 1997]; James 
Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility [Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993]; 
and Michael Slote, Moral from Motives [New York: OUP, 2001]). My argument will work with either 




accordance with virtue in the sense of conforming to it.”39 Becoming virtuous requires 
actions that spring from internal states that are themselves (becoming) excellent.  
 
3.2 Motivation 
A second requirement for virtue is right motivation.40 Moral growth and being virtuous 
necessarily involves an agent’s volition being proper, aimed at the relevant good(s), such 
that the ensuing actions spring from the right kind of motivation.41 As Rui Sampio da 
Silva argues, “It is precisely because moral education and habituation are not a blind, 
nonrational, unreflective process that desires, as moulded inclinations, far from being 
brute causal forces, have a rational character.”42 On a neo-Aristotelian account, then, a 
virtuous person has as a necessary feature of their virtue “moulded inclinations,” which 
are rightly oriented desires.  
 To tie the first two virtue elements of action and motivation together with the 
forthcoming remaining dimensions, let us consider an example from Charles Dickens’s A 
Christmas Carol: the case study of Ebenezer Scrooge.43 Scrooge’s being generous to 
those he encounters after his last ghostly visit requires not only that Scrooge act to give 
material goods to the needy but that his action be motivated by some “distinctively moral 
end” (for example, justice, love for neighbor, or the alleviation of suffering).44 For 
example, Scrooge’s virtuous motivation could be that generosity is intrinsically good or 
that giving to those in need works to bring about their flourishing (and thus his own). 
Therefore, Scrooge’s being virtuous is not commensurate with his desires or motivations 
being misaligned toward either non-moral end or immoral ends. For example, if Scrooge 
gave from his material goods merely because it would cause others to honor him, then 
his motivation is wrong and his giving is not generosity in that instance. Thus, in order to 
be virtuous, a person must (attempt to) engage in characteristic activity/activities of 
virtue and be properly motivated by moral ends.   
 
 39 Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtuous Action,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, eds. 
Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2010), 317. 
 40 Robert Audi, “Acting from Virtue,” Mind 104, no. 415 (Jul., 1995): 450.  
 41 Baehr, “Four Dimensions,” 88. 
 42 Rui Sampio da Silva, “Moral Motivation and Judgment in Virtue Ethics,” Philonsorbonne 12 
(2018): 110. 
 43 In the following I do not argue that Scrooge is vicious. Perhaps he really is a man of principle as 
Scott C. Lowe suggests (although he is quite clear that Scrooge is not morally perfect) in “Ebenezer 
Scrooge: Man of Principle” Think 23, no. 8 (Autumn 2009): 27-34.  






The third necessary condition for becoming a virtuous person pertains to possessing the 
right kinds of affections.45 Being virtuous requires a person to align their affections to be 
congruent with the good, which is the telos or goal of the virtue in question.46 According 
to a neo-Aristotelian approach, “a person’s nonrational desires must come to be in accord 
with practical reason’s grasp of what is good so that she acts easily and harmoniously 
and takes pleasure in following reason’s dictates.”47 The point here is that the person 
developing virtue comes to “learn to enjoy doing it, to come to take pleasure—the 
appropriate pleasure—in doing it.”48 Resuming our Scrooge example: if we suppose that 
in giving the giant turkey to the Cratchit family, Scrooge feels resentment or umbrage, 
then he is not actually being generous because he does not have the right affection. At a 
minimum, Scrooge should feel joy—or satisfaction or some other positive emotion—in 
performing his generous act; the right kind of affection must be connected to this virtue. 
 The argument at this stage, then, is that character formation requires being rightly 
motivated to intend and attempt to do some action(s) that is characteristic of some virtue 
and that one have the right sorts of feelings associated with the virtue. 
 
3.4 Judgment  
The fourth and final condition needed for virtue development is judgment—which is the 
discerning and rational element in Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Judgment is conceived 
as a “sensitivity” to three factors: (i) which virtue(s) is pertinent to the situation, (ii) 
when the characteristic activity/activities should be performed, and (iii) to what extent 
that activity/activities should be employed.49 Within the virtue ethics framework, the 
 
 45 Susan Stark, “Virtue and Emotion,” Noȗs 35, no. 3 (2001): 440-55.  
 46 Baehr, “Four Dimensions,” 90. Cf., NE, 1099a, 1175a. 
 47 Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago, IL: UCP, 
2008), 24. 
 48 Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” 77. There is debate on this point: Curzer 
disagrees with Burnyeat regarding the role of pleasure in virtue formation and action (Curzer, Aristotle & 
the Virtues, 321-5). Certainly not every virtue is tied to a positive affection. For example, courage is the 
right balance of the affection of fear and fear is not a positive affection. The chief point is that the 
appropriate affection is connected to the motivation and characteristic activity.  
 49 Baehr, 2015, 98. There is overlap between Baehr’s “judgment” and “prudence” in the virtue 
ethic literature. Nathan Bowditch argues that prudence is the key to understanding Aristotle’s approach to 
character formation; see “Aristotle on Habituation: The Key to Unlocking the Nicomachean Ethics” EtPer 




virtuous person is able to identify which action(s) is virtuous and to understand why it is 
so.50 In other words, “virtuous agents are those who respond at the right time, to the right 
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive and in the right way.”51 Thus, for 
Scrooge to have the judgment dimension of the virtue of generosity in response to the 
Cratchit family, Scrooge needs to (i) recognize that generosity is needed, (ii)/(iii) discern 
when, where, and how to act with generosity. On the neo-Aristotelian account that I have 
developed, for Scrooge to have all the necessary elements of the virtue of generosity, the 
following must be true of him. He will engage the characteristic acts of generosity by 
giving material goods to those who are in need. The actions of giving away his goods 
will be motivated by the right moral frame and be accompanied with the appropriate 
affections. Finally, Scrooge will judge aptly the right time to act, the appropriate 
materials to give, and the apt recipients of his materials. Importantly, these four 
dimensions of virtue also imply one other important factor pertinent to virtue 
development and the argument of this chapter.52 
 
3.5 Habit 
The four necessary dimensions of virtue together entail a further element of virtue that 
needs to be made explicit: “virtue is not just a matter of performing certain right actions 
but also of the way in which these actions are produced. Truly virtuous action issues 
forth from knowledge, decision, and stable character.”53 As Aristotle observes, “moral 
excellence comes about as a result of habit.”54 In a neo-Aristotelian view, then, “we 
acquire virtues largely by habituation, that is by acting as if we already possess them.”55 
Humans “instill virtues by encouraging habitual performance of certain actions.”56 Thus, 
 
 50 Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues, 318.  
 51 Carr, “Character and Moral Choice,” 219, 221.  
 52 A sixth essential component to virtue formation that is not pertinent to the argument of this 
chapter is the role of a teacher/exemplar and community in the process of character development. James 
K.A. Smith captures the point exactly, “We learn the virtues through imitation” (Smith, You Are What You 
Love, 18). Cf., Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 16-32 and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory 
(New York: OUP, 2017). On the essential role of a person’s community in their developing virtues see 
Lawrence Blum, “Community and Virtue,” in How Should We Live: Essays on the Virtues, ed. Roger Crisp 
(New York: OUP, 1998), 231-50. 
 53 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 23 (emphasis added). 
 54 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, revised by J.O. Urmson, in The Complete 
Works of Aristotle, the Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol., 2 (Princeton, NJ: PUP, 
1984), 1742. Cf., NE, 2.1103a.18. 
 55 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 23.  




there is a crucial synergism between “doing” and “being.” Yet this habitual performance 
is not a mere repetition or mimicking: the virtuous person must come to “own”—to 
become “self-directed” regarding—the motives, affections, and characteristic activity.57 
Habits are formed over time and virtuous habits are “settled dispositions”—they are part 
of who we are as persons and that takes time to register or lock-in, as it were.58 Thus, for 
Scrooge to be virtuous is ineluctably linked to what he does—in this case, it requires that 
his generous actions become habit. Perhaps Dickens attempts to capture this in Scrooge 
when he describes the reformed man as becoming as good a friend and man “as the good 
old city knew.”59 In becoming habits, virtues are settled dispositions of his character 
(what both the ancients and the medievals would call “states of the soul”60)—and this 
means that, in the case of Scrooge, he will have regularly practiced (or attempted to 
practice) generous acts, seeking to be rightly motivated, to have the right affections, and 
consistently judged rightly.61 In a sense, Scrooge needs to develop a kind of 
“automaticity” with regard to virtuous actions and temperaments.62 He needs to 
strengthen his moral dispositions to act and react in relevant circumstances. To amend 
Julia Annas’s example in this context: “For [Scrooge] to be generous, generosity has to 
be a feature of [him]—that is, a feature of [Scrooge] as a whole, and not just any old 
feature, but one that is persisting, reliable, and characteristic.”63 Virtue acquisition is a 
process of concerted repetition and practice. Thus, it is not a mere rote or thoughtless 
habit—it is not a mere “routine.”64 Indeed, “virtue is generated and increased only by 
reasoned habituation, not by mindless repetition.”65  
 
 57 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 27, 70-73. 
 58 McKinnon, Character, 29; Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 134; Annas, The Morality of 
Happiness, 329, 368; Arthur F. Holmes, Shaping Character: Moral Education in The Christian College 
[Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1990], 64; Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory and 
Abortion,” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp & Michael Slote [New York: OUP, 1997], 230 
59 Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol (London: Chapman & Hall, 1843; The Project Gutenberg 
EBook, 2018), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46/46-h/46-h.htm, access 05 September 2020. I am grateful 
to Terry Cross for pointing me to Dickens’s conclusion here.  
 60 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 126. 
 61 Virtues are not personality traits, however. On this see Christian Miller, Character & Moral 
Psychology (New York: Oxford, 2014), 8-18; and Moral Character: An Empirical Theory (New York: 
Oxford, 2013), 4-12. 
 62 On the relation of virtue formation to expertise and automaticity see Matt Stichter, “Virtue As A 
Skill,” in The Oxford Handbook of Virtue, ed. Nancy E. Snow (New York: OUP, 2018), 64-6; and The 
Skillfulness of Virtue: Improving Our Moral and Epistemic Lives (Cambridge: CUP, 2018).  
 63 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 8. 
 64 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 14, 16. 




 The necessary features of action, motivation, affection, judgment, and habit 
capture the neo-Aristotelian account of virtue that is core to the argument of this chapter. 
It is this preceding account of moral development that constitutes the second key piece of 
the main thesis needing clarification. For an analytic defense of the main thesis (“the 
development of moral virtues requires the possibility of temptation”) to be clear, precise, 
and coherent it needs to articulate exactly what the nature of temptation is and the nature 
of moral virtue formation. This section has argued for the clarity and coherency of a neo-
Aristotelian account of moral virtue formation. In the next section I briefly review the 
nature of (T) from Chapter 3 in order to prepare to forward the project’s main thesis in 
section 5 that the development of moral virtues requires the possibility of (T). 
 
4 The Nature of Temptation, (T) 
In Chapter 3 I argued that temptation  is a subjective experience in which a temptee has a 
desire for some state of affairs or action, X, and coincident with that desire the temptee 
believes the desire is bad and has another psychic state that both conflicts with the first 
desire and is believed as morally superior to the first desire. Stated formally: 
(T)=def. Temptation is an internal psychic conflict whereby a temptee, TE, desires 
some state of affairs, which state of affairs or the desire for the state of affairs the 
TE judges to be bad, and simultaneously the TE has some other psychic state 
that conflicts with the obtaining of or desire for the bad state of affairs and which 
state is seen as morally superior. 
 
From this conception I argued for five individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for any experience of (T): 
(1) TE has a desire for some state of affairs, X, or action φ. 
(2) TE’s desire for X is such that it could motivate to action in order to do φ or 
obtain X. 
(3) TE believes X/φ or the desire for X/φ, or both, is bad. 
(4) TE has, concurrent with a desire for X/φ, some other psychic state, Y, that 
conflicts with X’s obtaining, with desiring X, or with φ-ing. 
(5) TE sees Y as morally superior to X/φ. 
 
If one further necessary condition is met, the TE moves from a mere state of 
experiencing (T) to having succumbed to temptation:  
(6) TE pursues actualization, in some capacity, of the desire for X or φ and gives 





In the next section, I argue that moral virtue formation requires the possibility of 
experiencing (T). In completing this argument in the following section 5, my central 
claim is established. 
 
5 (T) and the Development of Moral Virtue 
We are now at the stage in the development of the argument to articulate and defend the 
main thesis of the project; namely, if human agents are to develop the moral virtues, then 
the possibility of temptation is necessary. I have argued that on a neo-Aristotelian 
account developing virtue requires four dimensions—actions, motivation, affections, and 
judgment—and that these four dimensions entail a further necessary element—habit. The 
argument of this section, then, is to locate the role that (T) plays in this neo-Aristotelian 
scheme of moral virtue development. The argument unfolds in two steps. First, I examine 
the motivational dimension by more closely connecting it to the Aristotelian notion of 
rational desire. And, second, I contend that in the habituation of virtuous rational desires 
the possibility of (T) is necessary. This second step builds on and solidifies the argument 
of the entire project. 
 
5.1 (T) and the Five Necessary Elements of a Virtue 
In light of the necessary elements of virtue identified in section 3, it is the motivational 
element that most clearly connects to (T). Recall that for some (attempted) action to be 
virtuous it must have behind it the right motivations. The tight connection in philosophy 
of action between motivations and desires is well-established, as I have shown in Chapter 
3, section 3.2. This means that we can understand the motivational component of virtue 
as being about desire: for an agent to have any particular virtue that agent must, inter 
alia, have the right sorts of desires regarding the action and ends in view. Thus, the 
virtuous person is the one whose desires are for the right states of affairs, ends, and 
actions. Indeed, the virtuous person “wants to act virtuously.”66 If, as Aristotle says, 
“[t]he activities of virtues are concerned with what conduces to the end,”67 and desire 
moves the agent in action toward that end, then desire is a necessary aspect of virtue—
 
 66 Bowditch, “Aristotle on Habituation,” 325; Bowditch uses ‘wanting’ and ‘desiring’ 
synonymously, as (326). 




and thus desire is a necessary part of virtue formation. Now, this is where (T) enters the 
formation process. To see precisely how (T) connects to virtue formation, let us tease out 
important details regarding desire and action. 
 Following Aristotle, Nathan Bowditch differentiates three types of desire.68 First, 
there are appetites, which are the kinds of desires that spring from physical constitution. 
Second, persons have emotional impulses; some of these, like anger, are tied to action 
but not all. And, third, there are rational desires. Rational desires are more complex than 
either appetitive desires or emotional impulses, both of which are pre-reflective.  
Rational desires are wants for some state of affairs that requires recognizing a further 
desire that is the means to fulfilling the “desire at a distance.”69 
 Each of these three types of desire may lead to action and therefore have a place 
both in being fully virtuous and in becoming virtuous. In a Chapter 3, section 3.1, I 
argued that (T) could involve appetitive desires, which I articulated as including both 
desires that stem from the physical nature of a person and emotional impulses. However, 
I contended that mere physical urges or pure emotional urges that are disconnected from 
action do not constitute the kind of desire needed for (T). Furthermore, I argued that 
desires of the kind that Aristotle and Bowditch call “rational desire” are certainly 
conducive to (T). Therefore, an experience of (T) could occur with any of the three kinds 
of desire Aristotle lists. However, rational desire is particularly pertinent to (T) and 
virtue formation because rational desires incorporate more of an agent’s psychic 
components: it intertwines both the conative and cognitive. Hence, my argument will 
focus on the confluence of rational desire, (T), and moral virtue formation. 
 
5.2 Rational Desires and Virtue Formation  
Rational desires are “desires to act in ways that fulfill ends endorsed by reason.”70 More 
precisely, rational desires are desires for particular ends coupled with the desire to act on 
the means to those ends.71 These complex desires allow for a kind of moral development 
that appetitive and emotional desires generally do not.72 Humans often simply find 
 
 68 Bowditch, “Aristotle on Habituation,” 326; cf., NE, 1113a-1113b. 
 69 Bowditch, “Aristotle on Habituation,” 326.  
 70 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 30. 
 71 Bowditch, “Aristotle on Habituation,” 326. 
 72 Yet, it is not obvious that appetitive/emotional desires are completely outside of the sphere of 




themselves having appetitive or emotional desires without any effort to bring them about. 
Because of this immediate and uncontrolled occurrence, appetitive and emotional desires 
are neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy.73 Two paradigmatic examples of appetitive 
desires and emotional desires are the desire to eat and anger, respectively.74 Rational 
desires, however, operate a differently. They can arise in ways similar to appetitive or 
emotional desire, but they are more centrally connected to an person’s reasoning process 
because they are open to influence by practical reason.75 Thus, rational desires are readily 
open to being morally shaped in a way that is different from appetitive or emotional 
desires. In order to become virtuous, then, persons must come to desire the right ends and 
to desire the right means to those ends. In other words, virtuous persons have excellent 
rational desires. Since “[m]ost people do not in fact have any virtues…” and being 
virtuous is not the natural state of human persons, they must endeavor to become 
virtuous.76 Fortunately, there are two steps to habituating rational desire.77 
 The first step in developing the habit of excellent rational desire is to develop the 
reflective ability to differentiate and morally evaluate a set of desires that are separate 
from one’s appetitive or emotional desires.78 In Chapter 3, section 3.5.2, I described this 
reflective ability as “evaluative ranking.”79 Alasdair MacIntyre argues that this process of 
developing evaluative-ranking is necessary for developing practical reason, which is 
itself necessary for the attainment of a virtuous character.80 As he argues, in order to 
become an excellent practical reasoner, a person must “learn how to stand back in some 
measure from [their] present desires, so as to be able to evaluate them.”81 In order to 
become morally virtuous, then, one must learn how to do evaluative-ranking. On a neo-
 
desires, surely this is possible; cf., James K.A. Smith, Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works 
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 73 John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, “Introduction” in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, 
eds. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993]). I defend this in 
Chapter 4, sections 3.2-3.3. 
 74 Bowditch, “Aristotle on Habituation,” 326.  
 75 Bowditch, “Aristotle on Habituation,” 312. 
 76 Christian Miller, The Character Gap: How Good Are We? (New York: OUP, 2018), 20; cf., 
NE, 1103.a.19-25. 
 77 Bowditch, “Aristotle on Habituation,” 327.  
 78 Bowditch, “Aristotle on Habituation,” 327.  
 79 Michael Bratman, “Toxin, Temptation, and Stability of Intention,” in Rational Commitment and 
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Aristotelian account, this first step in the process is greatly aided by a network of other 
persons who can both model and teach this distancing from and reflecting on one’s 
conative framework.82 The person on the path to becoming virtuous learns to distinguish 
their appetitive/emotional desires from their rational desires and, further, to distinguish 
good rational desires from bad rational desires.  
 Consider this reflective distancing—evaluative-ranking—in terms of our Scrooge 
case study. Scrooge’s becoming virtuous will require that he come to recognize the 
difference between his miserly emotional impulses and his rational desire for wealth 
accumulation as an end. In addition, being virtuous will require Scrooge to go beyond 
merely recognizing the difference between his emotional impulses and his rational 
desire. He will also need to morally evaluate his emotional impulses and his rational 
desire with its own end and desires to act on the means to that end. Scrooge’s pathway to 
developing virtuous desires begins with his coming to rationally distance himself from 
his own desires, discern the differences between them, and recognize what counts as 
good or bad desires for ends and means. Having done this Scrooge has taken the first 
step toward developing the motivation needed in order to become virtuous. He also needs 
to take the following second step. 
 The second step in forming virtuous rational desires is to “develop the ability to 
satisfy these less specific rational desires [desires for ends] in a way that supports the 
development of virtuous character.”83 In other words, this second step involves 
developing desires for actions that are morally good means to the good end(s) and 
developing the capacity to act on the good means to the end.84 Developing the necessary 
motivational dimension of a virtue means learning to have desires for the right actions 
and those actions are ones that are conducive to bringing about not only the excellence of 
the actor but also the good end(s). Since humans are not naturally virtuous, the process to 
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become virtuous is a process of learning to overcome contrary desires.85 It is in sense that 
virtues are “correctives” to our misaligned desires.86 
 Let us return once again to our case study of Ebenezer Scrooge. It is not enough 
that Scrooge simply come to desire, for example, that Bob Cratchit flourish. Rather, 
Scrooge also needs to desire the means to fulfill that end, and to come to have the 
capacity to act on the means to that end. In order to develop the virtue of generosity, the 
formerly miserly moneylender must come to desire the good of another person’s material 
well-being and to desire to meet that end by, for example, giving of his own abundant 
material wealth. Scrooge needs both to desire the act of giving his material goods, and 
then (attempt to) act in such a way as to fulfill the means to that end. In light of this 
analysis, I now turn to the analysis of the necessary connection between (T) and the 
formation of moral virtue.  
 
5.3 Virtue Formation, Rational Desire, and (T): In Defense of the Project Thesis 
The very nature of (T) requires that a person have the ability to distance themselves from 
their desires in order to reflect on and morally evaluate those desires.87 Both conditions 
(3) and (5) in the necessary conditions for (T) above require a capacity to step back from 
the desires themselves, recognize the desires for what they are (for example, not mere 
appetitive drives) and evaluate the moral value of the desires. Temptation, therefore, 
requires evaluative-ranking. In one sense, then, developing the necessary first step in 
becoming virtuous with regard to rational desires corresponds to developing the psychic 
characteristics necessary to experience (T). In itself, this does not mean that (T) is 
necessary for virtue development. Rather, all the development of evaluative-ranking 
shows is that in so far as moral virtue formation requires rightly ordered (rational) desire, 
then moral virtue development will necessarily be coincident to developing the ability to 
experience instances of temptation.88 Hence, this shows that the possibility of (T) is 
necessary component for virtue formation. For in order to differentiate and morally 
 
 85 McKinnon, Character, Virtue Theories, and the Virtues, 32, 34.  
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overgeneralizing that all virtues are correctives (“Will Power and the Virtues,” PhR 93, no. 2 (1984): 232-
3. 
 87 This reflective distancing—evaluative ranking—necessary to (T) does not need to be long-form, 
drawn-out, or concerted philosophical reflection. 
 88 Not that any temptee will consciously recognize that their experiences of temptation as 




reflect on one’s motivations and desires such that one can believe some of their desires 
are more morally desirable or praiseworthy than others (evaluative-ranking)—what 
moral virtue formation requires—there must be at least the possibility of (T) because (T) 
also requires evaluative-ranking. Stated simply: the motivational and evaluative capacity 
needed in order to become morally virtuous is also the motivational and evaluative 
capacity needed in order to experience (T). The conclusion is not that becoming virtuous 
and temptation are sometimes simultaneous experiences. Rather, the conclusion I have 
argued for is that moral virtue formation requires a reflective ability—evaluative-
ranking—and that (T) also requires this reflective ability. Thus, if a person is to be able 
to develop moral virtues, then they need a reflective ability that also makes temptation 
possible. Hence, if the world is such that (T) is not possible, then that world is such that 
moral virtue formation is not possible. That is, the loss of evaluative-ranking in a world 
where temptation is not possible also means necessarily the loss of a required faculty in 
becoming/being virtuous. Therefore, if human persons are to develop the moral virtues, 
then the possibility of temptation is necessary. 
 Let us now apply the thesis of this project to our case study Scrooge to see how 
he would need a world in which (T) is possible in order to develop the virtue of 
generosity. Scrooge begins to give away his material goods to those in need—for 
example, Bob Cratchit and to the charity he initially rejects. In so doing, Scrooge learns 
to judge to whom he should give, what to give, when to give, and how much to give. 
Scrooge also comes to know what the good(s) is/are that orients his actions and that 
should direct his motivations and desires. But this process predictably encounters some 
complexities in the dimension of motivation. Since Scrooge is human, he is not naturally 
virtuous and this means that he will have times where his motivations conflict. On the 
one hand, he will desire to be generous, to give to the poor and destitute. On the other 
hand, Scrooge will desire to be stingy, to keep his earnings for himself. It is at this point 
where temptation and moral virtue formation overlap.  
 Suppose the two portly gentlemen raising money for the poor around Christmas 
approach Scrooge after he has made his commitment to be virtuous. They ask for a 
donation in order to provide “the Poor some meat and drink, and means of warmth.”89 
Scrooge wants, X, to tell them on their way and to keep his money for himself. He has 
for many years denied alms requests and his firm has made less profit this year because 
 





he has already been more generous than in the past. Scrooge is motivated to realize X. As 
he reflects on their request and his motivational state, Scrooge believes his desire for X is 
bad. Furthermore, Scrooge has a desire to, Y, be more liberal with his capital and, 
further, he believes Y is morally superior to X. Scrooge is experiencing temptation. And, 
for Scrooge to genuinely form his desires toward the virtue of generosity, he must have 
the ability to engage in evaluative-ranking: he has to be able to stand back from his 
desires and reflectively differentiate and morally evaluate his desires for X and Y. Since 
(T) also requires the same evaluative-ranking ability, in order for Scrooge to become 
virtuous he needs a world in with the experience of (T) is possible. Scrooge’s case gives 
concrete form to the analytic argument of this project and shows that the argument has 
intuitive coherence along with its philosophical consistency.  
 
5.4 The Argument Summarized 
The argument of this section is readily summarized. If character formation is cast in 
terms of a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, then morality in human life is understood as the 
development of virtue. According to a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, the nature of virtue 
and the process of developing virtues are conditioned by human ontology. The 
philosophical and theological anthropological assumption is that humans are not 
naturally virtuous but can develop the virtues through habituating certain good actions, 
motivations, affections, and judgments. Developing virtue, then, requires attending to 
one’s motivational-desire states. Thus, developing moral virtue necessarily requires an 
evaluative-ranking ability: being able to distinguish good desires from bad desires. 
Temptation also necessarily requires an evaluative-ranking ability. Therefore, in order to 
develop moral virtue, it is necessary that (T) is possible. The arguments of this section 
have brought together all of the conclusions from the previous sub-arguments in order to 
establish the main thesis of this project. This section has shown the truth of the 
conclusion that if human persons are to develop the moral virtues, then the possibility of 
temptation is necessary.  
 Except for a general appeal to theological anthropology in section 2.2 above, the 
argument so far has been grounded in natural philosophy. This is according to the 
method of analytic moral theology that I outlined in Chapter 1, section 3.4. Analytic 
moral theology aims to philosophically investigate moral notions in a way that is both 
analytically rigorous and fruitful for theological engagement. As the argument has 




conceptions either to their theological fountainhead or to potential pathways of further 
exploration. In Chapter 2 the biblical-theological data set the parameters for the nature of 
temptation. Chapter 3 argued for a technical conception of temptation that gave 
philosophically coherent robustness to the protoaccount of temptation found in the letter 
of James in the New Testament. Chapter 4, in section 3, gave more analytic handles to 
the biblical conception of temptation as morally problematic by arguing that temptation 
is morally blameworthy in some instances. In the next section I continue this process of 
interfacing biblical-theological considerations with the thesis of this project. I contend 
that my arguments and conclusions are coherent with Christian virtue ethics and other 
ethical systems that incorporate virtue theory. Thus, the philosophical investigation into 
the process of natural virtue development that I develop can be held as true consistently 
with Christian moral theology. However, there is a potential objection from a particular 
strain of Christian virtue ethics.90 This theological worry comes from a neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethicist par excellence, Thomas Aquinas.91 Essentially, the problem for my 
account stems from the role of grace in human moral development. The next section, 
then, serves as a brief theological test of my thesis.  
 
6 Thomistic Infused Virtue as a Theological Test for the Role of (T) in 
Virtue Formation 
In section 3.5 above, I argued that from a neo-Aristotelian view, character formation is a 
process—thus, it is not immediate. Yet, Christian tradition raises a question for this neo-
Aristotelian argument: if virtue formation is a process of habituation that takes time, 
experience, and practice,92 could divine grace make a person instantaneously virtuous?93 
 
 90 I was initially put on this line of argument by Kip Redick (Chair, Dept. of Philosophy and 
Religious Studies, Christopher Newport University) in his response to my presentation of arguments from 
this chapter at the 2019 meeting of the Society for Pentecostal Studies (William Seymour College, 
Hyattsville, MD). Redick did not make the Thomistic connection but pressed questions regarding how the 
Holy Spirit might be involved in virtue formation both in mundane ways and in miraculous ways. That 
question deserves much more attention than I can give here and is a ripe area for Christian virtue ethicists 
to explore, particularly from a Pentecostal perspective. 
 91 Eleonore Stump, “The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics: Aquinas on the 
Passions,” FPh 28, no. 1 (2011): 29-43. Cf., Brandon Dahm, “The Acquired Virtues are Real Virtues: A 
Response to Stump,” FPh 32, no. 4 (October 2015): 453-70. 
 92 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, 116-7. 
 93 This question has another theological dimension. According to traditional Christian theology in 
order for a human to enter eternal life—heaven—they must be morally perfect, or holy. Humans in their 
glorified and eternal state “are hyper-willing to act rightly, and sinning is simply unthinkable, off the table, 
not a serious deliberative possibility for them” (Mark Murphy, “Perfect Goodness,” SEP, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta [Spring 2014 edition], https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/perfect-goodness/). Yet, it 
is clear that most humans do not die in a state of moral perfection. How can we make sense of the 




Could someone step into a divine version of Robert Nozick’s “transformation machine”94 
where, by the work of God, they are transformed from, say, stingy to generous? If the 
answer to these questions is “yes,” then it would seem that my thesis is defeated: the 
possibility of (T) is not necessary to moral virtue formation because God can make 
humans immediately virtuous by grace.  
A theological commitment from Thomas Aquinas makes this problem more 
acute. Thomas famously argues for a category of virtues called the “infused virtues.” 
These virtues are “infused” in humans by God’s grace and thus do not need a process,95 
and, therefore, certainly do not need the possibility of temptation. According to Aquinas, 
God is the cause of some virtues in humans. In the Disputed Questions on Virtue, 
Thomas concludes twice, “Therefore, it seems that there are moral virtues infused in us 
by God.”96 In the Summa Theologica he affirms: “Therefore some habits are infused into 
man by God.”97 Jennifer Herdt captures well the problem of infused virtue for a process-
oriented account of moral development: 
when it comes to the infused virtues, Aquinas seems to suggest that these 
skip the habituation gap; as their name indicates, they are not acquired 
through repeated action that strives to approximate an ideal or indeed 
through human actions at all but rather are given directly by God…The 
very distinction between acquired and infused virtue threatens the 
integrity of one or the other. If virtues acquired through human action fail 
to allow us to attain our true end, how can they be true virtues? And if the 
virtues that do allows us to attain our true end are not acquired through 
human action, in what sense do they perfect rather than undermine human 
agency?98 
 
Brown, “No Heaven Without Purgatory,” RelStud 21, no. 4 [Dec. 1995]: 447-56)? The standard Catholic 
answer is to posit a time after death, Purgatory, to become virtuous (there is some Protestant support; see 
Jerry L. Walls, Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation [New York: OUP, 2012]). Solving this 
interesting theological question is not the burden of my project. I note it to point to a potential line of study 
that can theologically and philosophically build on the arguments that I have offered. 
 94 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 646.  
 95 Thomas Aquinas also sees a worry here and takes it as an objection to his view that 
habits/virtues are inculcated via action (Summa Theologica, 1-2, Q. 51, Art. 2) and are connected to the 
nature of the thing acting (ST, 1-11, Q. 51, Art. 1): “Further, God works in all things according to the mode 
which is suitable to their nature: for it belongs to Divine providence to preserve nature, as Dionysius says 
(Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above (Art. 2). Therefore 
God does not cause habit to be in man except by acts” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Complete 
English Edition in Five Volumes, trans., Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol., 2 [New York: 
Benziger Bros., 1948], 1-2, Q. 51, Art. 4, Obj. 2). Thomas’s own solution will give direction to my 
argument. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations from the Summa Theologica will come from the Fathers 
of the English Dominican Province edition. 
 96 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Virtue, trans. Ralph McInerny (South Bend, IN: St. 
Augustine’s Press, 1999), 66; ST, 1-2, Q. 52, Art. 4.  
 97 Aquinas, ST, 1-2, Q. 51, Art., 4. 





Herdt’s final question clearly highlights the problem for the role of temptation in moral 
virtue formation. Above, in section 5.2, I have argued that moral virtue formation 
requires developing the ability to do evaluative-ranking. This ability to stand back from 
one’s desires and morally evaluate them is necessary both for developing virtuous 
motivations and for experiencing temptation. Evaluative-ranking is part of what a neo-
Aristotelian account posits as enabling persons to overcome the “habituation gap.”99—
moving from “everyday virtuous action” to “ideal virtuous action.”100 If  evaluative-
ranking can be by-passed in the acquisition of virtue, then, as it turns out, there is no 
need for an environment necessarily conducive to temptation.101 In this section I briefly 
address this line of objection by arguing that my account of (T) and its role in character 
formation is coherent with Thomas’s idea of infused virtue.102 This section, then, gives 
further philosophical and theological coherence to my thesis. 
 
6.1 The Nature of Thomistic Infused Virtue: Theological and Moral 
One answer to the theological worry against my argument is to deny that there are any 
such things as infused virtues: if there are no divinely infused virtues, then there is no 
worry for my argument (at least not from this direction). While this is a possible and 
reasonable route from the perspective of natural philosophy, analytic moral theology 
 
 99 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 23. Austin describes this gap as “the problem of causal circularity” 
(Aquinas On Virtue, 170).  
 100 Hursthouse, “Virtuous Action,” 317. 
 101 Aquinas seems to indicate this lack of human agency when he says, “God is the efficient cause 
of virtue” (Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae, trans. Laurence Shapcote, eds. John Mortensen and 
Enrique Alarcón, Latin-English Opera Omni [Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred 
Doctrine, 2012], I-II 55.4, online: https://aquinas.cc/64/66/~3685. 
 102 This theological test of my thesis mirrors a long and ongoing debate in Thomistic scholarship 
over whether acquired virtues can coexist with the infused virtues. I cannot settle that dispute here. The 
aim of this section is to argue that there is space within Christian virtue ethics for my project’s thesis. The 
current discussion was initiated by William Mattison and Angela McKay Knobel (Angela McKay Knobel, 
“Can Aquinas’s Infused Virtues Coexist in the Christian Life?” SCE 23 [2010]: 381-96 and William 
Mattison, “Can Christians Possess the Acquired Virtues?” TS 72 [2011]: 558-85). For those who affirm 
that Thomas allows acquired virtue and infused virtue to coexist in a person: see Romanus Cessario, The 
Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 99-113; 
Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 82-91; Michael Sherwin, “Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice: A 
Test Case for the Thomistic Theory of Infused Cardinal Virtues,” The Thomist 73 (2009): 29-52. For the 
opposing view, see Mattison and Knobel, op. cit. and Jean Porter, “Moral Virtues, Charity, and Grace: 
Why the Infused and Acquired Virtues Cannot Co-exist,” JMT 8, no. 2 (2019): 40-66. My line of argument 
follows Sherwin, Herdt, Nicholas Austin, Aquinas on Virtue: A Causal Reading (Washington, DC: GUP, 






must take seriously God’s possible interaction and intervention in human moral life. It 
may be the case that God never intervenes in human character formation and thus does 
not infuse any virtue, but if it is possible that he does then we need to take seriously this 
theological test case. In what follows I argue that the solution comes from Thomas 
Aquinas himself. First, I offer a brief distinction between infused and acquired virtues to 
set the stage for the solution. 
 Thomas largely agrees with the neo-Aristotle account I have articulated, namely 
that acquired virtues are habituated through action. Infused virtues, however, are given 
by divine grace.103 For Aquinas, virtues are good habits that orient the person who has 
them to an end/telos and the ultimate end—God—is beyond human nature. Therefore, 
humans need grace in order to orient to this superlative end.104 Thus, the need for infused 
virtues—the settled dispositions that orient the one who has them toward the end that 
exceeds their natural capacities. Another way to conceive of the need for a distinction 
between two kinds of virtues is to think of their sphere of operation. In his elucidation of 
the difference, William Mattison describes the acquired moral virtues as “innerworldly” 
because their end is with common human affairs whereas the infused virtues are oriented 
beyond common human affairs and toward the ultimate end, God.105 The power and 
ability to reach our divine end is not in us because that end is beyond us.106 Infused 
virtues enable humans to attain their divine end. Nicholas Austin explains: “The efficient 
cause of virtue that directs us to the final cause of the vision of God can only be God 
Himself since there are no germs in our created nature that can germinate of themselves 
in a disposition to such an exalted end.”107 If the idea here were only that God implants a 
seed of virtue into the human character that must be nurtured into full growth, then there 
would be no problem for my thesis that the possibility of (T) is necessary for moral 
 
 103 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2005), 445.  
 104 ST, 1-2, Q. 52, Art. 4. 
 105 William C. Mattison, Introducing Moral Theology: True Happiness and the Virtues (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2008), 326-30.  
 106 Paul J. Wadell, Happiness and the Christian Moral Life: An Introduction to Christian Ethics, 
3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 110.  




virtue formation.108 Yet, this is not Aquinas’s idea. Instead, at baptism God gives all of 
the theological virtues and gives them in full.109 
 Michael Sherwin offers a case study that helps illuminate the conundrum that 
Aquinas’s view raises but also shows the way toward a solution.110 In the late nineteenth 
century an Irish laborer and alcoholic, Matthew Talbot, had a dramatic conversion 
experience. After a week of shirking work and spending his pay on alcohol, Talbot is set 
to beg for more money from his friends to continue drinking. They refuse. As the story 
goes, that day Talbot gives up drinking, is baptized, and dedicates his life “to prayer, 
sacrifice, and the service of the poor.”111 But as is known all too well to human 
experience, even such a dramatic conversion is often accompanied by contrary desires 
and struggles to live fully into the new commitment of life. As Sherwin notes, “he still 
retained, especially in the beginning, a strong desire (and inclination) to continue 
drinking and to return to his former way of life.”112  
 Let us consider Talbot’s case in light of Thomas’s moral theology. Talbot would 
have received the infused virtues at baptism and as they are received in full and perfectly, 
how could he continue to struggle?113 Austin summarizes the problem well: “If new 
converts find morally virtuous action difficult, and moral virtues are infused with grace, 
then either we question virtue’s infusion at baptism or we have to account for the 
anomaly of moral virtues that lack the facility ordinarily characteristic of virtue.”114 Two 
distinctions provide the needed solution.  
 First, in Thomas’s conception, the infused virtues are chiefly theological virtues 
of faith, hope, and love. Although Aquinas does argue that there are infused moral 
virtues, these importantly differ from acquired moral virtues.115 What is central to infused 
virtues and what differentiates them from the acquired, natural virtues is that the object 
 
 108 Although not his exact language, this is how Wadell describes the infused virtues. As he 
describes, it is not as though God “zaps” us and we are virtuous in some regard with no more work on our 
part. “On the contrary, as God’s gifts to us, the infused moral virtues give us the capacity or potential for 
acts that help us attain God, but as with any other virtue that capacity has to be acted on, developed, and 
strengthened over time” (Happiness and the Christian Life, 111).  
 109 Austin, Aquinas on Virtue, 195; see ST, 1-2, Q. 62 and 3, Q. 69, Art. 4.  
 110 Sherwin, “Infused Virtue,” 35-7.  
 111 Sherwin, “Infused Virtue,” 36.  
 112 Sherwin, “Infused Virtue,” 37 
 113 Sherwin, “Infused Virtue,” 37; Austin, Aquinas on Virtue, 193. 
 114 Austin, Aquinas on Virtue, 193. 





of the infused virtues is God.116 This difference is easily seen when comparing the 
paradigm theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity to paradigmatic natural virtues: 
theological virtues are aimed at God whereas natural virtues are aimed at either the self 
or others.117 Thus, Thomas’s theological framework allows for moral virtues that are 
acquired through the normal process of habituation.  
 Jared Brandt offers the second solution by providing a further distinction between 
acquired virtues and infused virtues: “the infused virtues, unlike the acquired virtues, can 
be present alongside contrary dispositions.”118 As the acquired virtues are habituated they 
necessarily work against any dispositions that make their characteristic expression and 
motivation difficult.119 Since the infused virtues are a divine gift they are not habituated 
by actions that would also remove contrary dispositions. Moreover, Aquinas is 
concerned to be consistent with one of his theologically organizing claims: “grace does 
not destroy nature but perfects it.”120 The infused virtues do not supplant human nature 
for some other nature but are given to raise up that nature to attain and aim for something 
that is beyond it while preserving its integrity. As Aquinas says, “Infused virtue is caused 
in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent.”121According to 
Craig Boyd, “The idea here is that grace and nature are not diametrically opposed 
principles locking in mortal combat for ontological supremacy but that there is a 
complementarity.”122 Thus, in the infused virtues, God leaves space for the human nature 
to acquire its “natural” perfections in a way that is commensurate to that nature. 
 Talbot’s struggle with temperance after conversion and baptism, then, is not a 
problem for a virtue ethic that endorses God’s gracious action in human moral character, 
if the distinctions noted above are part of the ethical framework. In his conversion, God 
would have infused into Talbot the theological virtues and those moral virtues that have 
as their object God. Yet, this infusion would not have overridden his contrary 
dispositions: his standing-dispositional desire to drink alcohol, for example. 
 
 116 Aquinas, ST, 1-2, Q. 62, Art. 1; cf., Harms, “Acquired and Infused Moral Virtue,” 80 and 
Mattison, Introducing Moral Theology, 327-30. 
 117 Brandt, “Growth in Infused Virtue,” 80, 83-6. 
 118 Brandt, “Growth in Infused Virtue,” 92.  
 119 Aquinas, ST, 1-2, Q. 65, Art. 3; see also Brandt, “Growth in Infused Virtue,” 93.  
 120 Craig A. Boyd, “Aquinas on Sanctifying the Affections: Participating in the Life of the Spirit,” 
in The Spirit, the Affections, and the Christian Tradition, eds., Dale M. Coulter and Amos Yong (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016), 143.  
 121 Aquinas, ST, 1-2, Q. 55, Art. 4, ad. 6. 





6.2 Passing the Test: How Infused Virtue does not Rule Out the Possibility of (T) 
Here is how my argument passes this brief theological test: (i) the theological points 
condition my argument in an important respect and (ii) with this condition in place, it 
remains true that the possibility of (T) is necessary for the development of acquired 
moral virtue. First, if God infuses any virtues, then it must be admitted that those infused 
virtues do not require the possibility of temptation in order to be had. It can be 
reasonably argued that God does infuse virtues that have him as their object and 
therefore require his gracious work in order to aim persons beyond their natural 
capacities. Thus, it can be reasonably concluded that not all virtues require the possibility 
of (T) in order to be had. Fortunately, this does not defeat the argument of my project, 
but only moderates it and does so in a way that is more theologically informed. 
 Second, there are virtues where the possibility of (T) remains necessary because 
(i) these virtues are not deposited in human character but are habituated over time, and 
(ii) God’s infusion of some virtues leaves unchanged various other motivations and 
desires. As it pertains to natural human dispositions, then, it can be argued that God 
designed both the world and humans to develop virtue through a process of habituation 
that requires the ability to do evaluative-ranking (as I argue above in sections 5.2 and 
5.3). Therefore, if the domain of moral consideration is “innerworldly,” and as such is 
within the realities of human desiring, willing, and reasoning, the process of moral virtue 
formation requires an environment permissive to temptation. Moreover, the full 
expression of the infused virtues would also need the possibility of temptation, but only 
in so far as the infused virtues require connected, contrary dispositions and desires to 
come into alignment with the infused virtues. 
 In this section I have argued that my thesis—if human persons are to develop the 
moral virtues, then the possibility of temptation is necessary—passes the theological test 
posed by Thomas’s conception of infused virtue. This section, therefore, contributes to 




There is a second theological test that the main thesis needs to pass from Christian 




work of Jesus Christ?123 This question presses two lines of worry for my argument. First, 
(a), in order for Jesus to have developed virtue, would he, in fact, need a world that is 
conducive to (T)—could he not have developed moral virtue in a different world? And 
second, (b), given that (T) is morally dubious, how could a sinless and impeccable being 
experience (T)?124 How might my project respond to these possible worries?  
 First, is the possibility of (T) really necessary for Jesus to have developed virtue? 
An affirmative answer seems to have two serious problems. On the one hand, my 
argument implies some kind of limitation on Jesus: he could not “grow in wisdom” 
(Luke 2.52) were it not the case that the world permits of (T).125 On the other hand, I 
have argued that (T) is morally dubious and that any experience of temptation (on (T)) is 
a morally problematic experience. How, then, does this comport with the traditional 
Christian commitment to Jesus’s being sinless, especially in light of Hebrews 4.15: “who 
in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin” (ESV).126 The second 
iteration of this objection overlaps with objection (b) from above and will be dealt with 
next. First, however, does Jesus really need a world conducive to (T) in order to become 
virtuous? My argument entails an affirmative answer and I do not think that this answer 
constitutes a serious worry for the coherency of the conclusion for the following reasons. 
Christian theology is dogmatically committed to notion that Jesus is both fully divine and 
fully human. My argument contends that in so far as being authentically human entails 
not already being fully virtuous and becoming and being morally virtuous necessarily 
requires developing and utilizing an “evaluative-ranking” capacity and experiencing (T) 
also requires a capacity for “evaluative-ranking,” then any authentic human will need a 
 
123 Relatedly, how would the thesis cohere with pre-fall humans: does this account of temptation 
and moral virtue formation apply to a putative Adam and Eve? This is a less pressing objection than the 
Christological one and therefore I do not pursue this line of inquiry (considerations of scope also require 
limitations). That said, I think the account of (T) defended here would apply to an Adam and Eve and, in 
Hickean-Irenaean fashion, I hold that the first humans were immature and needed to grow in moral virtue 
and therefore, the argument I defend is not defeated by considerations of pre-fall humans.  
124 There is debate regarding whether Christ was sinless and impeccable (without sin and unable 
to sin) or whether Christ was simply sinless (without sin but able to sin). For a review of the literature and 
a defense of the classical view (sinless and impeccable) see Oliver D. Crisp, “Was Christ Sinless or 
Impeccable?” Irish Theological Quarterly 72 (2007): 168-86.  
125 Let us assume for the argument that “wisdom” in Luke’s account is the virtue of prudence. 
126 For an analytic defense of this traditional view see, Oliver D. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity, 
Current Issues in Theology, ed. Iain Torrance (New York, CUP, 2007) and Timothy Pawl, In Defense of 





world that permits of (T) in order to develop moral virtue.127 Thus, if Jesus’s humanity is 
authentic—it is the same nature as all other humans—then Jesus will need a world that is 
permissive of (T) in order for his human nature to develop the moral virtues.128 
 How can my argument hold coherently that (i) Jesus is both sinless and 
impeccable—conciliar Christology—that (ii) Jesus requires a world permissive of (T) in 
order to develop moral virtue and (iii) that (T) is a morally dubious experience and 
sometimes morally blameworthy? This seems to be an inconsistent set and as such a 
potential defeater to the main thesis. Above I articulate how (i) and (ii) can cohere: 
Jesus’s being authentically human—having a human nature—requires a world permitting 
of (T) in order to develop moral virtues due to the nature of moral virtues, humanity, and 
(T). However, this does not show that any experience of (T) is coherent with Jesus’s 
being sinless and impeccable: how could someone who is sinless and incapable of 
sinning experience something that is morally dubious and potentially blameworthy? By 
way of a first response, it is important to note the precise claim my argument makes 
regarding (T) and blameworthiness. In Chapter 3, section 3.3, I argue that (T) is 
sometimes morally culpable but not always. Thus, it is entirely possible that all of Jesus’s 
experiences of (T) are non-blameworthy. Indeed, given the theological commitment to 
Jesus’s being sinless and incapable of sin, we would be required to believe—in order to 
be consistent: that Jesus’s experiences of (T) are, in fact, non-culpable experiences of 
(T). So far, then, my thesis coheres with the Christian tradition’s view of Jesus’s moral 
character. Yet, the real problem is (T)’s being morally dubious in Jesus’s experience. 
Thus, I now turn to objection (b): given that (T) is morally dubious, how could a sinless 
and impeccable being experience (T)? 
 The defense of my argument on this point must be brief due to constraints of 
space and scope. A fully developed answer requires a much longer treatment and 
broaches many issues of theological debate in Christology.129 All my argument requires 
 
127 Notice: commitment to the idea that humans are not already fully virtuous is not the same as 
being committed to the idea that all humans are necessarily fallen or sinful. Thus, we can hold that Jesus is 
both sinless and less than fully virtuous—because, for example, his moral character is immature. 
128 This applies to Jesus’s human nature only. The divine nature neither develops virtue nor 
experiences temptation. Because God is necessarily morally perfect and perfectly wise, God cannot 
develop virtue and God cannot experience temptation. A perfectly good and wise being will neither have 
desires for bad states of affairs, or bad desires, nor will such a being have false beliefs about his desires; 
thus, it is impossible for God to experience (T). This argument is adapted from Edward E. Wiernga, The 
Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 12. 
129 A forthcoming volume is dedicated to exploring some of the theological and philosophical 




to pass this theological test at this stage is to show a plausible line of reasoning that is 
coherent and consistent—that is internally sound and that could logically “hang with” 
traditional theological commitments (see Chapter 1, section 2.2.3). Pulling together some 
of the precise commitments of my account of (T) shows a trajectory that is plausible and 
reasonable. First, I have not claimed that (T) requires a fallen nature, only that (T) 
requires that a TE have a conflicting psychic experience where TE believes the conflict 
involves a desire that is morally worse than some other option (mental state, state of 
affairs, etc.; see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2).130 Thus, for Jesus to experience (T), he need 
not have a fallen or sinful human nature that actually desires morally bad states of affairs. 
This means that a sinless or impeccable human could experience (T) since the experience 
need not involve actual sinful or bad desires (or bad/sinful states of affairs) but only 
those believed to be bad.131  
Yet, this is not all that I have argued. I have also contended that an experience of (T) is at 
the same time a loss or failure of moral integrity and as such is morally dubious (Chapter 
3, section 1.2.5 and especially 3.3.1). How is it possible for a sinless and impeccable 
person to experience a loss or failure of moral integrity? At the start we must recognize 
that there is an important difference between sinlessness/impeccability and moral 
perfection. To be sinless is simply to be without sin, to be impeccable is to be incapable 
of sin, and to be morally perfect is to be wholly good, righteous, and virtuous.132 A 
morally perfect being is also perfectly integrous: they are whole-hearted for what is good 
and experience no breakdown between their first- and second-order desires, which 
desires are always ordered toward that which is good. Such a being could not experience 
(T). Importantly, it is theologically and logically plausible to hold that Jesus was not 
morally perfect (cf. Luke 2.15), even if he was sinless and impeccable. Furthermore, it is 
possible for a sinless, impeccable person to experience a psychic conflict of the kind 
 
Impeccability and Temptation: Understanding Christ’s Divine and Human Will (New York: Routledge, 
2021). 
130 On whether Jesus had a fallen nature see Oliver D. Crisp, “Did Jesus have a Fallen Human 
Nature?” IJST 6, no. 3 (July 2004): 270-88. 
131 This is the point that Tom Morris is defending when he argues that Jesus only needs the 
epistemic possibility of temptation not the metaphysical possibility (see Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of 
God Incarnate [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986], 147-53; and Chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above). 
132 Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz, The Divine Attributes, Exploring the Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. Michael L. Peterson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2002), 143-65; Wiernga, The Nature of 
God, 202-212; Laura Garcia, “Moral Perfection,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, eds. 




essential to (T) so long as the initiating desire is not one that is itself (or the states of 
affair toward which it aims) morally problematic. It is only moral perfection that 
precludes psychic conflicts that are believed to be bad and someone could be sinless and 
impeccable while also being morally immature; thus, experiencing just the kinds of 
conflicts necessary for (T). If this is theologically plausible, then it is possible that Jesus, 
qua human, experienced (T). Put differently, (T) only requires a kind of moral 
immaturity, not a fallen or sinful nature, not actual sin, and therefore is not incoherent 
when applied to the divine-human Jesus. This shows that my argument remains plausible 
in light of conciliar Christology and therefore passes this second theological test.   
 
8 Conclusion 
This chapter has brought the various components developed in the previous chapter 
together in order to argue for the thesis of the project. In this chapter I have argued that 
the possibility of experiencing (T) is a necessary condition for the formation of virtue. 
The majority foundation for this was given in Chapters 3 and 4 where I argued for an 
analytically precise conception of temptation. Furthermore, this conclusion is built upon 
central notions in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (i) human nature determines the process 
of virtue formation, (ii) virtue per se is conditioned by its formation process, (iii) virtues 
are habits that necessarily include right actions, motivations, affections, and judgement, 
(iv) the motivational dimension of virtue connects to the motivational dimension of (T), 
(v) temptation necessarily involves evaluative-ranking, and (vi) virtue formation requires 
evaluative-ranking. With the argument concluded, I then tested its theological coherency 
by interfacing it with a possible line of objection from the Thomistic idea of infused 
virtues. The result of that test was two-fold. First, a concession: infused virtues do not 
require an environment where temptation is possible. This explains why in the project 
thesis and throughout I have conditioned the scope of virtue formation to “moral virtue” 
in order to signal that theological virtues, or infused virtues, are not included in the 
thesis. Second, the thesis statement passed the test by displaying its capacity to cohere 
with important theological commitments. The next and final chapter concludes the 
project with a brief summary of the core arguments and a consideration of further 




Chapter 6: Conclusion: Summary of the Argument and 
Avenues of Future Study 
 
 
1 Summary of the Argument and Statement of Contribution 
The argument of this project provides an original contribution to the relatively new field 
of analytic moral theology. A central goal that guides this approach to ethical reflection 
is to discern how far and wide our epistemology can carry us in gaining knowledge about 
moral reality. Various sources circumscribe the scope of this goal: Christian scriptures, 
Christian tradition, and analytic philosophy. Moreover, analytic moral theology is 
methodologically committed to argumentative rigor and precision, consistency, and 
coherency. My argument has been motivated by the ambitions of analytic philosophy, as 
informed and normed by the authoritative sourcing of moral theology, thus displaying 
the methodology of analytic moral theology. In this sense, analytic moral theology takes 
a biblical-theological moral notion or commitment and develops a robust and rigorous 
analytic conception of it that is informed by pertinent philosophical considerations. My 
argument here has arrived at this result first, with its exposition of the nature of 
temptation and, then, by applying that account of (T) to the nature of moral virtue 
development according to a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic.  
 Paralleling John Hick’s and Michael Brady’s arguments that the world needs to 
be such that suffering is possible in order for character formation to occur, I have argued 
that in order for human agents to develop the moral virtues, the world needs to be such 
that temptation is possible. In the mode of analytic philosophy, this argument began by 
breaking down the larger claim into smaller parts with a critical analysis of the relevant 
philosophical and theological sources on the nature of temptation in Chapter 2. That 
chapter concluded with a look to the biblical data, which data would set the basic 
parameters for the subsequent analytic conception of (T) in Chapter 3: namely, that 
temptation is subjective; it essentially involves desire, and that temptation is morally 
problematic. The third chapter articulated and defended a precise analytic definition of 
(T). Following the methods of analytic moral philosophy, the necessary conditions 
entailed in the analytic definition were extracted, examined, and defended. While guided 
by the grounding data provided by the scriptural data, I argued for consistency and 




necessary conditions by being informed by philosophical moral psychology and 
philosophy of action. Chapter 3, then, established and defended (T) as an original, 
substantial contribution to moral theology. Moreover, Chapter 3 brought needed 
precision to the project thesis by explicating precisely what “temptation” is. Building on 
this constructive argument, Chapter 4 gave further clarity and location to (T) in the larger 
body of moral philosophy. There I argued that, although often used equivocally, 
temptation and akrasia or weakness of will are different but related concepts. Chiefly, I 
established that the state of experiencing (T) is neither akrasia nor weakness of will but 
that temptation succumbed-to can be either akrasia or weakness of will, or both. This 
line of argument did not merely further clarify (T) but also importantly differentiated (T) 
from moral phenomena already discussed in literature on virtue formation. Moreover, 
that argument was also an original, substantial contribution to the literature on 
akrasia/weakness of will. Owing to the philosophical discussion of akrasia, weakness of 
will and moral responsibility, in Chapter 4 I also argued that (T) is sometimes morally 
blameworthy but not always. This argument served a two-pronged purpose: (i) it gave 
substance to the claim that my argument pattern mirrors that of Hick’s and Brady’s, 
namely that it is possible for something bad to be necessary for virtue formation; and, 
(ii), this argument gave philosophical robustness to the biblical-theological notion that 
temptation is morally problematic. With the arguments of Chapter 2 through 4 in place, 
the set-up was in place for Chapter 5 and the final argument. I argued in Chapter 5 for 
the conclusion that human agents need a world that is permissible of (T) in order to 
develop moral virtues. Chiefly this argument rested on the interface between (T) and 
virtue at the point of rational desire and evaluative ranking. Since both virtue and (T) 
require the ability to engage in evaluative ranking, and humans are not already virtuous, 
it follows that in order to develop virtue, humans need a world that is conducive to 
developing the ability to evaluatively rank their desires. Thus, in order to develop virtue, 
humans need a world where (T) is possible.  
 Throughout the various parts of the project’s argument, many incidental and 
subsidiary concerns were necessarily cast aside and much fertile ground for further 
exploration was ignored. This project opens space for much subsequent philosophical 
and theological exploration. In the next and final section, I note a handful of areas that 





2 Avenues of Future Study 
The arguments of this project are original, substantial contributions to moral theology 
and philosophy and as such provide ample fountainheads for streams of further research 
and exploration. The final word on (T) is far from being said in this project. There are 
many rich opportunities for careful theological and philosophical reflection on 
experiences of temptation. 
 
2.1 (T) and Systematic Theology 
There are two immediate areas in systematic theology that are ripe for further analysis. 
First, my study in Chapter 4 invites further investigation of the relation between (T) and 
sin. That (T) is morally problematic is grounded in the scriptural witness (as noted in 
Chapter 2 and 3), but is (T) ever sinful? Analytic moral theology has the tools to pursue a 
robust and coherent answer to this question. Related to sin and (T) is the problem of 
Jesus’s temptation. Various theologians and philosophers have attempted to articulate 
solutions to this problem. Perhaps the account of (T) that I defend here can prove 
insightful to this conversation.  
 
2.2 (T) and the Virtues of Temperance and Wisdom 
I have argued that the conception of temptation I construct has a natural home in virtue 
ethics. Building on this, there is a readily available investigation that explores the role 
that (T) could have in the development of specific virtues. For example, I can see a 
conceptual connection between my argument in this project and a step further that argues 
that (T) is necessary for the development of both self-control/temperance and practical 
wisdom/phronesis. The sources in both moral theology and philosophy provide abundant 
resources for an argument along these lines. 
 
2.3 (T) and Thomistic Philosophy of Action 
An inviting avenue of exploration is a fine-grained exploration of Thomas Aquinas’s 
philosophy of action and temptation. Thomas’s conception of human action, especially in 
his discussions of continence, incontinence, moral weakness and ignorance, are 
profoundly complex and nuanced such that he might offer both clarification and potential 





2.4 (T) and Epistemic Temptation 
In the recent literature on akrasia there has developed a interesting line of inquiry called 
“epistemic akrasia.” According to David Owens, the epistemically akratic person is one 
who believes something that they think they ought not believe; like the akratic person, so 
the analogy goes, an individual does something that they think they ought not do.1 The 
epistemic off-shoot from moral philosophy and action theory could suggest a similar 
epistemic off-shoot for temptation. In this line of thought, epistemic temptation could be 
the experience of wanting to believe something that one also believes to be untrue or 
unjustified. If akrasia and weakness of will are related to (T), then perhaps too epistemic 
akrasia is related to epistemic-(T). 
 
2.5 (T) and Social Science Research 
I noted in Chapter 2 that there is much empirical research on temptation but that none of 
that research conceptualizes temptation more robustly than the standard dictionary 
definition. Therefore, there is potential for fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue between 
social science research on temptation and the account of (T) that I have defended here. It 
may be that (T) is both philosophically coherent and also matches the live 
phenomenological research on human agents. Or, indeed, it may be that such research 
can added needed corrective nuance to the argument I defend. In either case, there is 
great potential for cross-disciplinary study. 
 
 1 Owens is not the first to wrestle with this question, but he is the first to label it epistemic akrasia, 
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